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Abstract 
Indonesia experienced significant constitutional and political systems transformation after fall of 
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998. Constitutional reform was carried out in four stages, from 
1999 to 2002, to promote and protect fundamental principles of constitutional government. In order 
to achieve these objectives, the Constitutional Court was established in 2003 with the main function 
of upholding constitutional rules and values, particularly through the mechanism of constitutional 
review of laws.  
The aim of this thesis is to assess the roles and contributions of the Constitutional Court in securing 
constitutional government in the Republic of Indonesia over the past twelve years (2003-2015) and 
to propose recommendations for reform. The thesis measures performance of the Court against core 
values and principles of constitutional government, namely: (1) the separation of powers; (2) 
representative democracy; and (3) the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
This thesis concludes that although the adoption of the centralised constitutional review model in 
Indonesia was based on political expediency in absence of a serious theoretical inquiry, the 
Constitutional Court has played a pivotal role in securing constitutional government in Indonesia. 
The Court has performed crucial roles in guiding constitutional transition and democratic 
consolidation in Indonesia. In addition, Court’s contribution in protecting fundamental rights and 
freedoms has been significant and progressive. While Court decisions have been relatively well 
accepted, its judicial activism and assumed positive legislator role have sparked controversies.  
This research also finds several weaknesses in the structure and performance of the Court.  The quality 
and consistency of its decisions have come under justifiable criticism. The structural problems include 
its limited jurisdiction, judicial review system dualism between the Constitutional Court and the 
Supreme Court leading to jurisdictional uncertainty and inadequacy of the Court’s authority to 
enforce its decisions.  
In order to further strengthen constitutional government in Indonesia, this thesis recommends reform 
of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction by the vesting of jurisdiction with respect to both 
constitutional complaints and constitutional questions and the integration of the judicial review 
systems under a one-roof scheme. In addition, the thesis recommends improvements to the judicial 
selection mechanism and the tenure of constitutional justices as well as the reduction of the Court’s 
non-judicial functions in order to strengthen its independence and integrity.  
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CHAPTER 1 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT SYSTEM AND  
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
“Every country in the world claims to have a constitution, but only some have constitutional government, 
and most of the world’s people do not live under constitutional government.”1 
This thesis aims to assess the role and contribution of the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 
strengthening constitutional government in the Republic of Indonesia. The performance of the court 
will be measured against the core values and principles of constitutional government. The study is 
conducted through a theoretical inquiry concerning these values and principles; analyses of key 
decisions of the Constitutional Court and its consequences; and the problems and controversies that 
the Court has encountered in its first twelve years of existence (2003-2015). The thesis offers 
proposals for improving the effectiveness of the Constitutional Court in consolidating and building 
on the gains of the reform era. I start by explaining the historical context of Indonesian constitutional 
reform creating the new Indonesian Constitutional Court. 
I   INTRODUCTION 
The fall of Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998 was followed by constitutional amendments that 
brought about fundamental changes to the constitutional structure of Indonesia, particularly to 
presidential powers. The purpose of the amendments was not limited to improve separation of powers 
between state institutions in exercising its functions and powers under a mechanism of checks and 
balances, but also to reformulate the rule of law (negara hukum) concerning the protection of human 
rights and the strengthening of the democratic government.2 The Indonesian constitutional reform 
that took place between 1999 and 2002 is particularly important because this marks the first successful 
Indonesian Constitutional amendment since its creation in 1945.3 Consequently, the 1945 
                                               
1 Suri Ratnapala, ‘Securing Constitutional Government: The Perpetual Challenge’ (2003) VIII (1) The Independent 
Review: A Journal of Political Economy 5-26, 5. See also Suri Ratnapala and Jonathan Crowe, Australian Constitutional 
Law: Foundations and Theory (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 1. 
2 See, eg, Denny Indrayana, Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999-2002: An Evaluation of Constitution-Making in 
Transition (PhD Thesis, The University of Melbourne, 2008) chapter 8. See also Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik 
Indonesia, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 
[Comprehensive Manuscript on the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia] (Sekretaris 
Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan MKRI, 1st revised, 2010) vol 8, ch 4. 
3 See Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Panduan Pemasyarakatan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara 
Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 [Guidence for Socialising the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia] 
(Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2007) 28. 
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Constitution was extensively amended.4 In terms of content, the articles were extended from 37 to 73 
and from 49 paragraphs to 170.5 Jimly Asshiddiqie, the first Chief Justice of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court, argues that although the name of the Constitution remains, the amendments 
essentially created a new constitution in terms of content. The substance has changed from 71 key 
provisions to 199. Only 25 provisions remain unchanged from the original 1945 Constitution. The 
remaining 174 provisions are new provisions, formulated during the amendment process. In other 
words, the current Constitution has effectively tripled in content. 6 
Towards the end of the 20th century, the constitutional reform in Indonesia created four main 
fundamental principles, i.e.: (1) the principle of constitutional supremacy; (2) the principle of 
separation of powers with checks and balances mechanism; (3) the principle of constitutional 
democracy; and (4) the principle of protection of the fundamental rights of citizens. Each of these 
principles has significant impact for the development of constitutionalism in Indonesia today.  
First, the constitutional reform has shifted supremacy from parliamentary supremacy to constitutional 
supremacy. The sovereignty of the people is no longer embodied in one state institution, the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, or MPR), but spans across several state 
institutions.7 Second, the constitutional design of Soeharto’s New Order8 was missing the concept of 
a checks and balances mechanism between state institutions because, in reality, power was centralised 
in the hands of the President. The President as the chief executive had myriad prerogative rights and 
constitutional powers, including the legislative power to formulate national statutes.9 At present, these 
constitutional amendments have created clearer separation of powers that can strengthen the state 
functions exercised by separate state institutions in the three branches of government, i.e. executive, 
legislative and judiciary, applying checks and balances. In fact, constitutional amendments have 
                                               
4 For the purpose of this research, the current Constitution of Indonesia will be written as ‘the Indonesian Constitution’ 
or ‘the Constitution’, unless it is stated differently. 
5 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, above n 3, 47.  
6 See Jimly Asshiddiqie, The Constitutional Law of Indonesia (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009) 90. 
7 See Article 1(2) of the Indonesian Constitution that states, ‘Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is exercised in 
accordance with the Constitution.’ Compare with the Article 1(2) of the 1945 Constitution before the amendment, which 
stated, ‘Sovereignty is in the hands of people and fully implemented by the People’s Consultative Assembly.’ 
8 The Soeharto regime is also known as the ‘New Order’ (Orde Baru) regime that occurred from 1966 to 1998. This term 
is used in contrast to the ‘Old Order’ (Orde Lama) regime, which refers to the regime of his predecessor Soekarno, the 
first President of Indonesia who introduced the Guided Democracy. See Robert Cribb, ‘The Historical Roots of 
Indonesia’s New Order: Beyond the Colonial Comparison’ in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds), Soeharto’s New 
Order and Its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch (ANU E Press, 2010) 67, 67. 
9 See Article 5 of the original Constitution that stated, ‘The President shall hold the power to make statues in agreement 
with the People’s Representative Council.’  
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limited executive control over the state and strengthened rule of law based on the Constitution.10 
Moreover, auxiliary state institutions were also established. Hence, there is no longer centralised 
power in the hands of the executive branch that can control the other branches of government. Instead, 
sharing of functions between branches of government is made possible.11  
Third, historical evidence indicates that the protection of human rights by constitutional or other 
means is indispensable to achieving the rule of law. The amendment of the 1945 Constitution 
expanded the constitutional guarantees of human rights in a specific chapter, covering most of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).12 Therefore, it is believed that the amendment of 
the human rights provisions is the most fundamental change because the original Constitution only 
contained four articles and five paragraphs concerning human rights,13 which were rarely enforced. 
Currently, 13 articles and 27 paragraphs pertain to human rights guarantees in the amended 
Constitution. Indeed, Article 28I(4) of the current Constitution asserts, ‘The protection, advancement, 
upholding and fulfilment of basic human rights is the responsibility of the state, especially the 
government.’ This means that the state, and in particular the executive powers, has a constitutional 
obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens. 
Fourth, in a democratic country government’s legitimacy is derived from the people as the ultimate 
source of authority. Following the amendment of the 1945 Constitution, Indonesia entered a transition 
from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime. Leadership successions were introduced based 
on the principles of free and direct elections; applying the “one person, one vote” mechanism. The 
freedom to associate, assemble and express opinions are not only guaranteed in the Constitution, but 
also protected in the laws.14 Although when asked about the development of Indonesia’s democracy 
people were divided into groups of the optimistic and pessimistic, I believe that there is a common 
and shared optimistic belief grounded in a quiet reality that Indonesia is progressing towards 
                                               
10 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, above n 3, 7. See also Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Naskah 
Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 [Comprehensive Manuscript 
on the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia] (Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan MKRI, 
1st revised, 2010) vol 4(1), ch 3. 
11 See Jimly Asshiddiqie, Perkembangan dan Konsolidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi [Development and 
Consolidation of State Institutions Post Reformation] (Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraaan Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, 
2006) 105. 
12 See Article 28 to Article 28J in Chapter XA of the Constitution.  
13 Those articles were related with equality in law and government, right to work and to live in human dignity (Article 
27); freedom to associate, assemble and to express opinion (Article 28); freedom of religion and freedom to worship 
(Article 29); and right to education (Article 31). 
14 See, eg, Law No 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. 
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democratic consolidation.15 Even though democratic practices fluctuate, the Indonesian democracy 
index has improved gradually since the reformasi (reform era) of 1998.16 
One of the historical developments resulting from the constitutional reform in 2001 is that Indonesia 
created a new court, separate from the Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung), i.e. the Constitutional 
Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi, or MK).17 The Court was created to uphold constitutional values, 
strengthen checks and balances mechanism, create clean and good government and protect the human 
rights of  citizens.18 The Court was formed through a constitutional amendment in 2001 and was 
officially established on 13 August 2003.19 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia cannot be separated from the development 
of the important idea of judicial review in a democratic constitutional state.20 This concept is based 
on the idea that law, as a political product of parliament, has a character often influenced and 
determined by political configuration. This political influence can lead to the situation where a 
legislative product reflects the interests of a dominant political force in parliament that may not be 
appropriate or could conflict with a higher law, namely the Constitution. Hence, it needs a mechanism 
to anticipate and to overcome this problem by introducing a constitutional review mechanism.21 
                                               
15 Recent discussions concerning the development of democracy in Indonesia, see, eg, Rizal Sukma, ‘Indonesia Finds a 
New Voice’ (2011) 22 Journal of Democracy 110-123; Ross H. McLeod and Andrew MacIntyre (eds), Indonesia: 
Democracy and the Promise of Good Governance (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007); Edward Aspinall and 
Marcus Mietzner (eds), Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society (Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2010. 
16 See, eg, World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicator: Country Data Report for Indonesia, 1996-2011 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c102.pdf>; Economist Intelligent Unit (EIU), The Democracy Index 
2011: Democracy under stress <https://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx? campaignid= DemocracyIndex2011>. 
17 The word of ‘Mahkamah’ is originally an Arabic word (ةمكحملا) which means ‘Court’. The word of ‘Konstitusi’ is taken 
from an English word of ‘Constitution’. Therefore, the term of ‘Mahkamah Konstitusi’ is translated into English as 
‘Constitutional Court’. 
18 Benny K. Harman, ‘The Role of the Constitutional Court in Indonesian Legal Reform’ in Naoyuki Sakumoto and 
Hikmahanto Juwana (eds), Reforming Laws and Institutions in Indonesia: An Assessment (Institute of Developing 
Economies Japan External Trade Organisation, 2007). 
19 Debate between MPR members during the process of establishment of the Constitutional Court, see Mahkamah 
Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia 
Tahun 1945 [Comprehensive Manuscript on the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia] 
(Sekretaris Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan MKRI, 1st revised, 2010) vol 6, ch 5. 
20 ‘Judicial review’ is usually employed in the context of the judicial power of reviewing not only constitutional validity 
but also administrative actions or decisions. The countries that follow the Centralised or European model mostly set up 
the review system separately for reviewing the constitutional validity of laws, known as ‘constitutional review’. Hence, 
the terms of judicial review and constitutional review will be used interchangeably in this thesis. 
21 See Moh. Mahfud MD, ‘Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang-undangan yang Responsif: Proses dan Substansi 
[Responsive Legal Drafting: Process and Substance]’ (Paper presented at Seminar on Academic Discussion, Faculty of 
Law of the University of Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, 8 May 2010) 6. 
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Based on the constitutional amendment in 2001, the idea of judicial review can finally be realised by 
granting the Constitutional Court power to review laws against the Constitution.  
In addition to the jurisdiction for conducting constitutional review, the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court has other jurisdictions, which include: determining disputes concerning the authorities of the 
state institutions whose powers are derived from the Constitution; deciding matters concerning the 
dissolution of a political party; and deciding disputes over the result of general elections.22 The Court 
also has a jurisdiction to make a decision concerning the opinion of the Peoples’ Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, or DPR) about alleged violations of the Constitution by the 
President and/or the Vice President. In other words, it has the power to make a decision related to 
legal matters for any impeachment process of the President and/or the Vice President.23 
The jurisdictions granted to the Constitutional Court of Indonesia are a combination of powers 
possessed by other constitutional courts in various countries that adhere to the centralised model, 
commonly known as the European model or the Kelsenian model.24 This model holds the 
Constitutional Court as a separate judicial organ from the Supreme Court where its jurisdictions are 
not distributed to ordinary courts. This model is used in countries such as Austria, Germany, South 
Africa, South Korea and Turkey. An alternative system to the centralised model is known as the 
decentralised model or the American model. In this model the power to review the constitutionality 
of laws is in the hands of the Supreme Court and there is no separate constitutional court or other 
similar courts. This power can also be distributed to other lower courts in accordance with the 
prevailing system,25 as occurs in countries such as the United States of America, Australia, Canada 
and the Philippines.  
In general, the main reasons for creating constitutional courts are to uphold the rule of law principles, 
to give maximum protection for achieving democracy and the fundamental rights of the citizens.26 
Hence, decisions made by the constitutional courts will be very important in determining the future 
of the constitutional government of a country. In the Indonesian context, the creation of the 
                                               
22 See Article 24C(1) of the Constitution. 
23 See Article 24C(2) of the Constitution. 
24 See Hans Kelsen, ‘Judicial Review of Legislation’ (1942) 4(2) The Journal of Politics 183; Christoph Bezemek, ‘A 
Kelsenian Model of Constitutional Adjudication: The Austrian Constitutional Court’ (2012) 67 Zeitschrift fur offentliches 
Recht 115, 117. 
25 Bezemek, above n 24, 116. See also Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’ in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo 
(eds), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 816, 818. 
26 Trevor L. Brown and Charles R. Wise, ‘Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The Case of 
Ukraine’ (2004) 119(1) Political Science Quarterly 143, 155. 
6 
 
 
Constitutional Court, which adopts the European model, is also to strengthen the constitutional 
democratic state.27 Is the European model best suited to Indonesia’s type of constitution and political 
culture? In Chapter 2, I analyse the reasons why Indonesia chose the European model rather than the 
American model in the creation of the Constitutional Court. 
Furthermore, one crucial implication from the amendment of the 1945 Constitution is the shifting of 
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy. Jutta Limbach, 
a German jurist who became the 7th President of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (1994-
2002), argues there are three universal principles of constitutional supremacy: (1) a distinction exists 
between constitutional and legal norms; (2) legislators are bound to the constitution; and (3) a state 
institution has power to review the constitutionality of statutes and government actions.28 This 
doctrine emphasises that all systems created by the government and all applicable rules or regulations 
in a state must be based on constitutional values, so that the principles of constitutional government 
can be implemented.  
For twelve years, since its establishment on 13 August 2003 until 31 December 2015, the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court has decided 1,746 cases. These decisions are divided into 858 decisions 
concerning constitutional review, 25 decisions concerning cases on disputes between state 
institutions, and 863 decisions concerning electoral cases consisting of 1,314 legal issues.29 The 
decisions on electoral cases can be categorised further into four decisions on presidential elections, 
161 decisions on legislative elections and 698 decisions on regional head elections.30 Presently, the 
burden of electoral cases handled by the Constitutional Court is relatively heavy and time consuming. 
Consequently, the Court loses much time that could be allocated to handling constitutional review 
cases as its core authority, as will be explained in Chapter 2. 
                                               
27 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Upholding the Constitutional Democratic State, Annual Report (2011). 
28 Jutta Limbach, ‘The Concept of the Supremacy of the Constitution’ (2001) 64(1) The Modern Law Review 1, 3. 
29 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Rekapitulasi Perkara [Cases Recapitulation] <http://www.mahkamah 
konstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=web.Beranda>. 
30 Ibid. 
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Based on case statistics, the Constitutional Court decided to grant remedies in 203 out of 858 
constitutional review cases (24%). In such, the Constitutional Court annulled particular provisions 
within laws, or laws in their entirety,31 which were enacted by the DPR and the President for 
contradicting provisions and principles contained in the Constitution, particularly with the 
constitutional bill of rights stated in Chapter XA of the Constitution. Moreover, the Court has also 
upheld roughly 10% of complaints on electoral disputes. As a result, there were changes to election 
outcomes based on re-voting or recounting in many regions.32 The decisions made by the Court have 
proven that the election processes across Indonesia have frequently violated the principles of 
democracy.33 
The Constitutional Court’s performance has also sparked controversy. Criticism comes not only from 
politicians, but also from academics and civil society.  The Court had been criticised for placing 
concerns on introduction of a sociological paradigm of law. This is introduced through judicial 
activism, which exercises substantive justice with fluid acknowledgment of procedural justice.34  One 
of the common methods of judicial activism practiced by the Constitutional Court in decision-making 
is to declare statutes to be ‘conditionally constitutional’ or ‘conditionally unconstitutional’. This 
                                               
31 For example, Law No. 20 of 2002 on Electricity, Law No. 27 of 2004 on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
Law No. 9 of 2009 on Educational Legal Entities and Law No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources. 
32 See Achmad Sodiki, ‘Dealing with Election Complaints: An Indonesian Perspective’ (Paper presented at the 7th 
Conference of Asian Constitutional Court Judges on General Election Law, Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 
Jakarta, 13 July 2010). 
33 ‘MK: Tidak Ada Pilkada yang Bersih dari Pelanggaran [Constitutional Court: There were no Local Elections which 
were Free from Violations]’, Antara News (online), 25 January 2012 
<http://www.antaranews.com/berita/1327465494/mk-tidak-ada-pilkada-yang-bersih-dari-pelanggaran>. 
34 See Moh. Mahfud MD, ‘Peran Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Pembangunan Hukum Progresif untuk Keadilan Sosial 
[The Role of Constitutional Court in Developing Progressive Law for Social Justice’ (Paper presented at Seminar on 
Menembus Kebuntuan Legalitas Formal Menuju Pembangunan Hukum dengan Pendekatan Hukum Progresif [Breaking 
the Formal Legality Deadlock towards Development of Law with a Progressive Law Approach], Faculty of Law, the 
University of Diponegoro, Semarang, 19 December 2009). 
49%
2%
49%
Figure 1
Decisions of the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
(2003 - 2015)
Constitutional Review (858
decisions)
Dispute on State Institutions
(25 decisions)
Disputes on Election Results
(863 decisions)
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means that the Court declares a law conditionally or temporarily constitutional or unconstitutional as 
long as its implementation is consistent with the interpretation declared by the Court.35 
Serious criticism came from members of the DPR, who asserted that some of the Court’s decisions 
were beyond its legal power (ultra vires) and beyond which is sought (ultra petita). They also claimed 
that the Court has robbed the DPR’s power to legislate.36 For instance, the Court issued a decision to 
increase the minimum age of criminal responsibility under the Juvenile Court Law of 1997 from eight 
years to 12 years. The Court reasoned that the minimum age of criminal responsibility should relate 
to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s stipulations.37 In another case, the Court annulled 
several provisions in the Constitutional Court Law of 2011 because the impugned sections were 
regarded as an unlawful attempt by the DPR to limit the jurisdiction of the Court.38 Therefore, some 
politicians argued that the nature of the Constitutional Court, described by Hans Kelsen as a ‘negative 
legislator’,39 has morphed into a ‘positive legislator’ judiciary. 
In short, there have been equally vocal praises and criticisms directed towards decisions of the 
Constitutional Court; while frictions concerning constitutional powers between the Constitutional 
Court and the DPR have been inevitable. Therefore, researching the role of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court becomes more intriguing because of the Court’s distinctive and progressive 
characteristics within the new Indonesian constitutional system.40 
II   RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the above description, there is a general expectation that the Constitutional Court of 
Indonesia will substantially contribute to the achievement of constitutional government as described 
above. In that regard, this thesis examines and answers the following research questions: 
                                               
35 Simon Butt, ‘Conditional Constitutionality, Pragmatism and the Rule of Law’ (2008) 9(28) Sydney Law School 
Research Paper 1. 
36 ‘Kewenangan MK Dipangkas karena DPR Terancam [The Constitutional Court’s powers are cut because the DPR is 
threatened], Hukum Online (online), 22 June 2012 <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/ baca/lt4e012e5c5a8f3/ merasa-
terancam-dpr-batasi-kewenangan-mk>. 
37 See Age of Criminal Responsibility (2010) case. 
38 See 1st Constitutional Court Law Amendment (2011) case.  
39 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press, 1945) 268-9. 
40 See, eg, Timothy Lindsey (ed), Law Reform in Developing and Transitional States (Taylor & Francis, 2006); Sebastiaan 
Pompe, The Indonesian Supreme Court: A Study of Institutional Collapse (Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 
2005); Naoyuki Sakumoto and Hikmahanto Juwana (eds), Reforming Laws and Institutions in Indonesia: An Assessment 
(Institute of Developing Economies Japan External Trade Organisation, 2007). 
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1. What are the theoretical and practical reasons for adopting the European model of constitutional 
review as opposed to the American model? Is this the most appropriate model in the context of 
Indonesia’s chosen constitutional system, considering its history and political culture? 
2. How does the Indonesian Constitutional Court play its role in securing a constitutional 
government? To what extent do the Court’s landmark decisions help in maintaining 
constitutional government in Indonesia? 
3. Has the Constitutional Court exercised its functions and jurisdiction optimally? What are the 
challenges faced by the Constitutional Court in exercising its powers? How can the function of 
the Constitutional Court be improved and what recommendations can be provided for improving 
the Constitutional Court’s role in the future?  
III   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
As explained previously, the main purpose of this research is to investigate the role of the 
Constitutional Court in securing constitutional government in Indonesia. In this section, I discuss the 
definition and theoretical framework of two main issues, namely: constitutional court and 
constitutional government. 
A   Constitutional Courts in Comparison 
Alex Stone Sweet describes a constitutional court as ‘a constitutionally-established, independent 
organ of the State whose central purpose is to defend the normative superiority of the constitutional 
law within the juridical order.’41 In very broad terms, Walter Cairns defines a constitutional court as 
‘a judicial body, or organisation of bodies, which has the power of constitutional review’.42 According 
to Cairns, not all bodies that have the power of constitutional review use the name ‘court’,43 such as 
the Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) in France and the Constitutional Tribunal 
(Trybunał Konstytucyjny) in Poland. Moreover, constitutional courts in various countries have 
different powers. For instance, the Constitutional Council in France has a more limited role than other 
constitutional courts in Europe. It primarily engages in pre-review with some conditional exceptions 
for a posteriori constitutional review.44 
                                               
41 Sweet, above n 25, 817. 
42 Walter Cairns, ‘Does a Written Constitution Require a Constitutional Court?’ (1998) 30 Bracton Law Journal 13, 14. 
43  Ibid. 
44 See Federico Fabbrini, ‘Kelsen in Paris: France’s Constitutional Reform and the Introduction of A Posteriori 
Constitutional Review of Legislation’ (2008) 9(10) German Law Journal 1297. 
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Georg Jellinek introduced the original idea to create a specialised constitutional court with the 
jurisdiction of constitutional review in the 18th century. He believes that a constitutional court is not 
only a state court to decide on the conflict of the competency between different legislators, but also 
between majority and minority factions in parliament concerned with the substantive constitutionality 
of statutes.45  
This idea was developed and further realised by Hans Kelsen in the early 20th century, particularly in 
Austria and Germany. Kelsen developed a new model of review called the centralised model or 
European model, which has essential differences to the American model. The centralised model 
creates a separate court from the general courts which does not operate below the Supreme Court. 
Given that this innovation was created by Hans Kelsen, most analysts refer to this model the 
Kelsenian model.46  
Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova argue that in terms of the power of constitutional review there are four 
essential differences between the European model and the American model.47 First, there are 
differences in the institutional structure regarding who has the power to review the laws. In the 
European model, there is a single and separate court able to perform constitutional reviews. Other 
courts are prohibited from doing so, though they may request constitutional questions to go to the 
constitutional court or other equivalent courts. This system is also known as the centralised system. 
In contrast, ordinary courts in the American system can perform constitutional review and invalidate 
statutes that are unconstitutional. Second, there are differences regarding timing and when 
constitutional review can occur. Many constitutional courts in the European model have a priori or 
ex ante review over legislation, treaties or governmental acts. Other courts have both a priori and a 
posteriori review, while others have one of two different types of review.48 However, courts in the 
American model only have a posteriori review, sometimes called ex post. This means that a statute 
can only be reviewed after it has taken effect.  
Third, there are differences concerning the type of judiciable constitutional questions raised, or 
whether constitutional review occurs in the absence of a real case or controversy. In the European 
model most of the constitutional courts can exercise authority both in the absence of a real case or 
                                               
45 Bezemek, above n 24, 117. 
46 Ibid 116; Alec Stone Sweet, ‘Constitutional Court and Parliamentary Democracy’ (2002) 25(1) West European Politics 
77, 79. 
47 See Lee Epstein, Olga Shvetsova and Jack Knight, ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and 
Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government’ (2001) 35(1) Law & Society Review 117, 121. 
48 A priori review means review of legislation after passage by the Parliament, but before promulgation by the President. 
A posteriori review means review of legislation after promulgation by the President. 
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controversy and also in concrete cases. In the American model, e.g. in the United States and Australia, 
the courts can decide only on real and concrete cases or controversies.49 Fourth, there are differences 
related to standing or party(ies) eligible to lodge the petition. In the European model this varies from 
governmental actors, including executive and members of parliament, to individual citizens. In 
contrast, in the American model only litigants who have a personal and real stake in the outcome of 
a real case or controversy can bring suit. 
In its development, constitutional courts in many countries have also modified its system by adding 
an important feature from the decentralised system where the judges of ordinary courts can also refer 
a question related to the constitutional issue to the Constitutional Court. Based on a study conducted 
by Sweet, if all models of constitutional review are to be classified as either a European model or an 
American model, roughly 85 out of 138 countries (62%) have adopted the European model.50 In fact, 
16 out of 34 OECD member countries adopted the European model. In addition, among the top 50 
democracies according to Democracy Ranking in 2012, roughly 22 countries adopted the American 
model.51 
The powers granted to constitutional courts from one country to another vary. This difference is 
driven by the differing social and political histories in each country, as well as the need for 
comparative study conducted during the process of its establishment. Some of the powers of the 
constitutional courts are too political or constitutionally important to be given to ordinary courts, such 
as resolving electoral disputes, banning political parties or handling impeachment cases of elected 
officials.52 After World War II the establishment of constitutional courts was designed to safeguard 
the transition process from an authoritarian regime to a constitutional democracy regime.53 It is 
believed that constitutional courts have several functions, such as facilitating a state’s transition 
towards democratic governance. Many countries that underwent transformation into democracies at 
                                               
49 In Re Judiciary Act, the High Court of Australia interpreted that the case shall refer to a controversy concerning ‘some 
immediate right, duty or liability to be established by the determination of the Court’. See Re Judiciary Act (1921) 29 
CLR 257. 
50 Sweet, above n 25, 819. 
51 See also Arne Mavčič, A Tabular Presentation of Constitutional/Judicial Review around the World (1 April 2010) 
<http://concourts.net/tab/tab1.php?lng=en&stat=1&prt=0&srt=0>; David F.J. Campbell et al, Democracy Ranking 2012 
<http://www.democracyranking.org/downloads/2012/Scores_of_the_Democracy-Ranking-2012.htm>. 
52 Sweet, above n 25, 823.  
53 See, eg, László Sólyom, ‘The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Transition to Democracy: With Special Reference 
to Hungary’ (2003) 18(1) International Sociology 133, 137; Francesco Biagi, ‘The Constitutional Courts as the Guardians 
of “Substantive” Transitions: The Cases of Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic’ (Paper presented at the VIIIth World 
Congress of the International Association of Constitutional Law on Constitutions and Principles, Mexico City, 6-10 
December 2012). 
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the end of the 20th century also established a constitutional court, such as Eastern European former 
communist states, South Korea, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia.54 In this thesis, I analysed 
constitutional court developments with special emphasis on Indonesian experiences in building a 
democratic state post-authoritarian regime. 
B   Academic Perspectives on Constitutional Government 
Constitutional government translates to limited government. However, scope of a constitutional 
government varies depending on the views from different academics. This section explains the 
differences and similarities of those views to determine the main elements of the constitutional 
government used for the discussion in this thesis. 
Sorenson points out that ‘the proper end of government is the protection of goods for citizens, and 
the most fundamental threat to citizens is government itself with the extensive governmental 
powers.’55 He also believes that the most fundamental protection of citizens is limited government. 
In other words, it is a government with a limited number of varieties of powers.56 Moreover, Zoethout, 
Tang and Akkermans claim that ‘every government may deteriorate and become destructive of the 
values it was intended to promote.’57 Therefore, they suggest that governmental powers should be 
controlled using the concept of constitutionalism. Although Hager describes constitutionalism as a 
doctrine that places the constitution as the supreme law of a country, the term constitutional 
government is generally used interchangeably with constitutionalism.58 Thus, constitutional 
government can be used for controlling governmental powers. 
According to K.C. Wheare, a constitutional government is not just a government based on the terms 
of a constitution. He argues that constitutional government means ‘government according to rule as 
opposed to arbitrary government.’59 In other words, it is ‘government limited by the terms of a 
Constitution, not a government limited only by the desires and capacities of those who exercise 
power.’60 The term constitution itself is defined by Strong as ‘a collection of principles according to 
                                               
54 See Jimly Asshiddiqie, ‘Creating a Constitutional Court for a New Democracy’ (Paper presented at Seabrook Chambers 
Lecture, Melbourne Law School, 11 March 2009) 4, 5. 
55 Leonard R. Sorenson, ‘The Limits of Constitutional Government: Reflections toward the Conclusion of the Bicentennial 
Celebration of Our Constitution’ (1989) 51(04) The Review of Politics 551, 553. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See Carla M. Zoethout, Ger van der Tang and P. W. C. Akkermans, Control in Constitutional Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1993). 
58 Barry M. Hager, The Rule of Law: A Lexicon for Policy Makers (Mansfield Center for Pacific Afairs, 2000) 19. 
59 K.C. Wheare, Modern Constitutions (Oxford University Press, 1966) 137. 
60 Ibid. 
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which the powers of the government, the rights of the governed, and the relations between the two 
are adjusted.’61 In this context, Ratnapala argues that:  
The term ‘constitution’ once was synonymous with constitutional government that meant a 
particular type of political order in which the rulers’ authority, including their legislative power, 
was limited through appropriate institutional devices, and both rulers and citizens were subject to 
the general law of the land.’62  
In addition, Hans Keman defines constitutional government as ‘a regime type that is characterized by 
the fact that government operates within a set of legal and institutional constraints that both limits its 
power and protects the individual liberty of the citizen of polity.’63 He stated that:  
The central elements of constitutional government therefore are the set of rules or ‘basic laws’ 
that establish (usually in writing) the duties, powers and functions of government (i.e. the 
institutional autonomy) and define the relationship between state and individual.64 
Based on the explanations given above, constitutional government can essentially be defined as 
government by basic laws or constitution and not by persons according to their own will.  
Moreover, if the Constitution has provisions that limits government’s power or contains a list of 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizen, but does not provide mechanisms for enforcing those 
provisions, it cannot be automatically concluded that the country has a constitutional government. 
Even where there are established mechanisms, constitutional government might fail because, in 
practice, constitutional forms and processes may not observed or they may be actively subverted by 
those responsible for upholding the constitution. In the context of constitutionalism, Charles Fombad 
points out that: 
A constitutional government should not only be sufficiently limited in a way that protects its 
citizens from arbitrary rule but also that such a government should be able to operate efficiently 
and in a way that it can be effectively compelled to operate within its constitutional limitations.65  
                                               
61 C.F. Strong, Modern Political Constitution (Sidgwick & Jackson, 6th ed, 1963) 11. 
62 Ratnapala, above n 1, 5. 
63 Hans Keman, ‘Constitutional Government’ in Masashi Sekiguchi (ed), Government and Politics (EOLSS, Vol 1, 2009) 
68, 69. 
64 Ibid 68. 
65 Charles Manga Fombad, ‘Challenges to Constitutionalism and Constitutional Rights in Africa and the Enabling Role 
of Political Parties: Lessons and Perspectives from Southern Africa’ (Paper presented at the Seminar, South African 
Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law (SAIFAC), Johannesburg, 21 July 
2005) 5. 
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Fombad says that ‘constitutionalism combines the idea of a government limited in its action and 
accountable to its citizens for its action’.66 In addition, Ratnapala and Crowe believe that ‘the value 
of constitutionalism lies in its potential to constrain legislators and other power holders by exposing 
their decisions to broad public scrutiny’.67 
The elements of constitutionalism vary throughout relevant literature. Hilaire Barnett suggests that 
constitutionalism is the doctrine which governs legitimacy of government actions. According to 
Barnett, constitutionalism should have at least three elements: (1) the limitation of power; (2) the 
separation of powers; and (3) the doctrine of responsible accountable government.68 Moreover, Louis 
Henkin sets out the principal demands of constitutionalism as follows: (1) limited government based 
on the constitution; (2) popular sovereignty and democratic government; (3) a separation of powers 
or other checks and balances; (4) civilian control of the military; (5) police governed by law and 
judicial control; (6) an independent judiciary; and (7) the guarantee of individual rights.69 
Further, Giovanni Sartori uses the terms constitutionalism and liberal constitutionalism 
interchangeably and defines constitutionalism as having the following prerequisites: (1) a 
constitution; (2) judicial review; (3) an independent judiciary; (4) the due process of law; and (5) 
binding procedures establishing the methods of law-making.70  Scott Guy defines constitutionalism 
as ‘a philosophical ideal of government subject to permanent limitations on the exercise of state 
power’.71 To minimise the abuse of governmental powers, he suggests that constitutionalism must 
have four elements: (1) the separation of powers; (2) the rule of law; (3) the representative democracy; 
and (4) the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms.72  
In contrast to Sartori and Guy on the elements of constitutionalism, Fombad argues that 
constitutionalism should be distinguished from rule of law. He identifies the five elements of 
constitutionalism as: (1) the recognition and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms; (2) the 
                                               
66 Ibid. 
67 Ratnapala and Crowe, above n 1, 13. 
68 Hilaire Barnett, Constitutional & Administrative Law (Routledge-Cavendish, 2006) 5. 
69 Louis Henkin, ‘A New Birth of Constitutionalism: Genetic Influences and Genetic Defects’ (1993) 14(3-4) Cardozo 
Law Review 533, 535-6. 
70 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited (Chatham House Publishers, 1987) 309. 
71 Scott Guy, Constitutional Law (Pearson Australia, 2010) 2. 
72 Ibid 3. 
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separation of powers; (3) an independent judiciary; (4) the review of the constitutionality of law; and 
(5) the control of the amendment of the constitution.73 
In this context, the elements of constitutionalism are analysed in relations to the Constitutional 
Court’s role in securing the new constitutional government system in Indonesia’s post-constitutional 
reform in 2002. Thus, this research focuses on three elements of constitutionalism, namely: (1) the 
separation of powers with checks and balances mechanism; (2) the representative democracy; and (3) 
the guarantee and protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. These three elements are selected 
because they are the core and common elements of constitutionalism according to the majority of 
scholars previously discussed. Other elements, such as independence of judiciary and rule of law, can 
be incorporated into the element of separation of power and the element of protection of fundamental 
rights and freedoms. Moreover, these three core and common elements are closely related to the 
limited powers of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, which become the main discussion in this 
research. Given that the Constitutional Court has decided many cases concerning these elements, 
sufficient data is available to analyse the Constitutional Court decisions’ influence on the elements. 
IV   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Based on the literature review conducted to date, there is no specific research on the role played by 
the Constitutional Court in securing constitutional government in Indonesia. However, there are some 
theses and considerable literature discussing the Indonesian Constitutional Court, each with different 
perspectives. The literature is not directly related to the concept of constitutional government in 
Indonesia, which has been influenced by the existence of the Constitutional Court post-constitutional 
reform in 2002. Most of the literature focuses on the Constitutional Court’s powers, the leadership of 
the Chief Justices or analysis of a particular case or cases. Nevertheless, various commentaries from 
such studies are relevant for the purpose of this research to provide an in-depth examination. 
During the third wave of democratisation, Christoph Hönige points out that around two thirds of new 
democracies established constitutional courts or other equivalent organs.74 Since these constitutional 
courts play a pivotal role, he suggests that there should be more research about constitutional courts 
and their effects within a political system.75 In the Indonesian context, there has been some literature 
discussing the Constitutional Court, but not directly linked to a study on constitutional government. 
                                               
73 Fombad, above n 65, 5. 
74 Christoph Hönnige, ‘Beyond Judicialization: Why We Need More Comparative Research About Constitutional Courts’ 
(2011) 10(3) European Political Science 346, 355. 
75 Ibid. 
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For instance, several theses discussing the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (Mahkamah Konstitusi) 
in relation to its functions and authorities are written by I Dewa Gede Palguna,76 Maruarar Siahaan,77 
Simon Butt78 and Hendrianto.79  
Following the amendment of 1945 Constitution, Palguna, a current Constitutional Justice of the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court (2003-2008 and 2015-present) finds that the citizens’ constitutional 
rights have not yet been fully protected because the Constitutional Court does not have the power to 
adjudicate constitutional complaint cases.80 In other countries, this power is generally vested in the 
constitutional courts or other equivalent organs as one of a constitutional court’s main authorities.81 
Palguna’s study has shortcomings because it did not discuss the challenges that will be faced by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court if given the constitutional complaint power, particularly pertaining 
to the number of cases to be handled by the Court. This thesis considers avenues for tackling those 
challenges. 
Furthermore, Siahaan’s thesis examines the implementation of Constitutional Court decisions. He 
indicates that the impact of these decisions extends beyond the statutes reviewed to other laws or 
government regulations and rules.82 Interestingly, as a former Constitutional Justice, he argues that 
interpretation and construction made by the Constitutional Court may result in a decision which can 
be described not only as negative legislation, but also as positive legislation by establishing norms, 
providing direction and  giving guidelines either for the legislators or law enforcers.83 The study by  
Siahaan finds likelihood of similarity to the experiences of other countries and contradiction to the 
basic concept developed by Hans Kelsen who argued that constitutional court should only perform 
                                               
76 I Dewa Gede Palguna, Pengaduan Konstitutional (Constitutional Complaint) sebagai Upaya Hukum Perlindungan 
Hak-Hak Konstitusional Warga Negara: Studi Kewenangan Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia dengan Rujukan 
Amerika Serikat, Republik Federal Jerman, dan Korea Selatan sebagai Perbandingan [Constitutional Complaint as a 
Legal Remedy for Protecting Constitutional Rights of Citizens: A Study on the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s Power 
in a Comparative Perspective] (Doctoral Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2011). 
77 Maruarar Siahaan, Implementasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Pengujian Undang-Undang: Studi tentang 
Mekanisme Checks and Balances di Indonesia [Implementation of the Constitutional Court’s Decisions in Constitutional 
Review: A Study on Checks and Balances Mechanism in Indonesia] (Doctoral Thesis, Universitas Diponegoro, 2010) 
78 Simon A. Butt, Judicial Review in Indonesia: Between Civil Law and Accountability?: A Study of Constitutional Court 
Decisions 2003-2005 (PhD Thesis, the University of Melbourne, 2006). 
79 Hendrianto, From Humble Beginnings to a Functioning Court: The Indonesian Constitutional Court, 2003-2008 (PhD 
Dissertation, the University of Washington, 2008). 
80 Ibid 512. 
81 See the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht), Constitutional Complaint <http://www. 
bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/organization/verfassungsbeschwerde.html>. 
82 Siahaan, above n 77, 356-61. 
83 Ibid 422-3. 
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as a negative legislator with parliament serving as the only positive legislator. Moreover, Siahaan 
points out that as Constitutional Court lacks power to enforce its decisions, civil society movement 
and the influence of a free press have played significant roles in endorsing the decisions declared by 
the Constitutional Court. Hence, this fourth estate of power has contributed in creating checks and 
balances in Indonesia.84 
However, the study conducted by Siahaan is limited to few constitutional review cases. He did not 
include cases of jurisdictional disputes between state institutions, which are closely associated to the 
system of separation of powers with checks and balances mechanism. In fact, during his research, 
there were more than ten cases of jurisdictional disputes between state institutions decided by the 
Constitutional Court. Therefore, to fill that gap, this research performs comprehensive analyses of the 
other Constitutional Court jurisdictions and cases other than those discussed by Siahaan. 
The first thesis written in English regarding the performance of Indonesia’s Constitutional Court was 
written by Simon Butt, which involved a comprehensive assessment of the Court’s decisions. In his 
thesis, however, he focused only on decisions declared by the Court within the first three years after 
its establishment, from 2003 to 2005. He finds that the Court performed its constitutional review 
function remarkably well.85 Nonetheless, he criticised the Court’s lack of transparency in its decision-
making processes and the level of the Court’s accountability.86  
In contrast with the recommendation given by Siahaan, Butt suggests that the Court should lessen its 
activism. For example, he criticised the Court for allowing unconstitutional statutes to stand in certain 
conditions.87 In developing his study on the Constitutional Court of Indonesia, Butt has also written 
several papers analysing the Court’s decisions separately. Some of his papers concern the disputes 
between the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission,88 the economic provisions in the 
                                               
84 Siahaan, above n 77, 422. 
85 Butt, above n 78, 273. 
86 Ibid 113.  
87 Ibid 221-2. 
88 Simon Butt, ‘The Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Dispute between the Supreme Court and the Judicial 
Commission: Banishing Judicial Accountability’ in Andrew MacIntyre and Ross McLeod (eds), Democracy and the 
Promise of Good Governance (Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009) 178. 
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Constitution,89 the relationship between religion and the state in Indonesia90 and the regional head 
electoral disputes.91  
Another of Butt’s work, produced with Tim Lindsey, is a book concerning a contextual analysis of 
the Indonesian Constitution. They modify their previous papers about constitutional matters in 
Indonesia, to include a new analysis concerning the Constitutional Court’s decisions related to 
electoral jurisprudence and human rights.92 They focus mainly on judicial review powers exercised 
by the Constitutional Court while less attention is given to the other powers of the Court. As this 
thesis was about to be finished Butt published another book on ‘Constitutional Court and Democracy 
in Indonesia’ closely related with one of the constitutional elements being examined in this thesis.93 
His book helped shape the arguments in this thesis, particularly in comparing the translation of 
Indonesian legal terms and in naming the Constitutional Court cases. 
Another thesis concerning the Indonesian Constitutional Court was written by Hendrianto.94 His 
thesis primarily evaluates the leadership of the founder and the first Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court Jimly Asshiddiqie (2003-2008), including his contribution to the Court’s development. He did 
not, however, analyse the impact of the Constitutional Court decisions on any constitutional 
government elements. Hendrianto instead provides an overview of the historical establishment of the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court which provides relevant insight for this research in relations to the 
creation and development of the Indonesian Constitutional Court.95 
Additionally, a study on the existence of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia was conducted by 
Petra Stockman. She wrote, however, only on the Court’s beginnings and first years of its work.96 In 
contrast with Butt, Stockman argues that the Court’s verdicts are notable because the arguments, 
                                               
89 Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, ‘Economic Reform When the Constitution Matters: Indonesia’s Constitutional Court and 
Article 33 of the Constitution’ (2009) 44(2) Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 239. 
90 Simon Butt, ‘Islam, the State and the Constitutional Court in Indonesia’ (2010) 19(2) Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 
279. 
91 Simon Butt, ‘Indonesian Constitutional Court Decisions in Regional Head Electoral Disputes’ (2013) 01 CDI Policy 
Papers on Political Governance 1. 
92 Simon Butt and Tim Lindsey, The Constitution of Indonesia: a Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing, 2012), 189-222. 
93 Simon Butt, The Constitutional Court and Democracy in Indonesia (Brill, 2015). 
94 Hendrianto, above n 79. 
95 Hendrianto, ‘Institutional Choice and the new Indonesian Constitutional Court’ in Andrew Harding and Penelope 
Nicholson (eds), New Courts in Asia (Routledge, 2010) 158-77  
96 Petra Stockman, The New Indonesian Constitutional Court: A Study into its beginnings and first years of work (Hanns 
Seidel Foundation, 2007). 
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either in legal consideration or dissenting opinions, are often emphatic and outspoken.97 She finds 
that the Court’s work strengthened the principles of constitutional democracy in Indonesia, especially 
during its intense period of work deciding hundreds of disputes over national election results in 
2004.98 Stockman points out, however, that several of the Court’s decisions were subject to criticism. 
Nonetheless, applicants did not reject the decisions because they acknowledged that the Court had 
dealt with their cases seriously, particularly when there were dissenting opinions from some 
Constitutional Justices.99 
The role of the constitutional court is often related to its consolidating democracy function in a post-
authoritarian regime. Marcus Mietzner shows that the Indonesian Constitutional Court also played a 
significant role as an agent of democratisation in Indonesia.100 He argues that although  controversial, 
the judicial activism of the Court through its popular decisions has increased public support in 
preventing external intervention.101 As a young democratic country, he suggests that the judges’ 
judicial activism is necessary in Indonesia to consolidate the transition of democracy and to address 
democratic stagnation.102 Other literature, written by different authors, also discusses the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court. Although not directly related to the topic of this thesis, such literature is useful 
in giving diverse perspectives of the Constitutional Court’s performance.103  
Furthermore, there is a study of constitutional government in Indonesia, written by Adnan Buyung 
Nasution entitled The Aspiration for Constitutional Government in Indonesia.104 However, this book 
mostly focuses on the political debate in the Konstituante, a freely elected assembly assigned to meet 
from 1956 to 1959 for drafting the new Indonesian Constitution to replace the 1945 Constitution.105 
                                               
97 Ibid 63. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid 64.  
100 Marcus Mietzner, ‘Political Conflict Resolution and Democratic Consolidation in Indonesia: The Role of the 
Constitutional Court’ (2010) 10(3) Journal of East Asian Studies 397, 417. 
101 Ibid 417-8. 
102 Ibid 418. 
103 See, eg, Diane Zhang, The Use and Misuse of Foreign Materials by the Indonesian Constitutional Court: a Study of 
Constitutional Court Decisions 2003-2008 (Master Thesis, the University of Melbourne, 2010); Arjuna Dibley, 
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105 Ibid 405-10. See also Daniel S. Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Modern 
Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Dept. of Asian Studies, Cornell University, 1966), 235-89. 
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Consequently, this book does not provide an analysis on the current system of constitutional 
government in Indonesia and its practices, which are completely different from the previous system 
under the Soekarno and Soeharto regimes. 
V   SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS 
Based on the literature review above, it can be seen that there is no in-depth study to date pertaining 
the Constitutional Court in relations to constitutional government in Indonesia. Therefore, this study 
assists in filling the gaps regarding the theory and practice of constitutional law in Indonesia. Thus, 
this study has several contributions:  
First, to determine and analyse the role of the Constitutional Court in guarding the constitutional 
government of Indonesia, particularly its core elements associated with the separation of powers, the 
principles of democratic government and the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. Second, 
to identify and analyse to what extent the influences and implications of landmark decisions made by 
the Constitutional Court have helped in maintaining the constitutional government of Indonesia. 
Landmark decisions or leading cases criteria discussed in this thesis refer to the Constitutional Court 
decisions that created an important new legal principle, concept or constitutional interpretation 
affecting the existing law and legal system in Indonesia. Third, to explain and analyse the challenges 
and limitations faced by the Constitutional Court in maintaining the constitutional government in 
Indonesia. Fourth, to make recommendations for strengthening the effectiveness of the Constitutional 
Court’s role in securing the future of constitutional government in Indonesia. 
In regard to the performance of the Constitutional Court, this thesis also addresses the criticism of the 
Constitutional Court’s activism that has frequently provoked ‘anger’ of some DPR members. Hence, 
tension between the Court and the DPR is analysed, including potential future conflicts that may 
occur between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court in Indonesia. Given that the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court has no enforcement powers regarding its decisions, I also analyse 
the real problems faced by the Court in enforcing its decisions. Discussion of these dimensions offers 
an original contribution to this thesis. 
Furthermore, this study provides a theoretical contribution by evaluating the core elements of 
constitutionalism that support the formation of constitutional government to prevent the revival of an 
authoritarian rule in Indonesia. In addition, this study evaluates the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s 
capacity in exercising its powers in maintaining the principles of constitutional government in 
Indonesia. It also gives a practical contribution to state institutions from other branches of power, 
particularly the executive and the legislative, in order to improve the mechanism and system of 
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constitutional government in Indonesia. This study also evaluates whether the Constitutional Court 
has added significance to the development of local government, particularly concerning the regional 
head elections in Indonesia. Given that Indonesia is a pluralistic society, I also analyse the role of the 
Constitutional Court in managing tension in the relations between state and religion in Indonesia, 
specifically on freedom of religions. Thus, this thesis is expected to give a comprehensive 
contribution to the discussion on Indonesian constitutionalism. 
VI   RESEARCH SCOPE 
This research analyses and evaluates the role of the Constitutional Court in securing constitutional 
government in Indonesia. However, there are some limitations to the scope of this study. First, in-
depth analysis was performed concerning the implementation of the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court’s five jurisdictions. At the time of writing, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has not decided 
any constitutional cases related to the dissolution of political parties and the impeachment of the 
President and/or the Vice President. Therefore, the scope of analysis of the Constitutional Court’s 
exercise of authorities will be limited to three jurisdictions: (1) constitutional review; (2) dispute 
between state institutions; and (3) dispute over the general election results.  
Second, with regards to the constitutional government system, this study refers to the particular 
elements of constitutionalism that have been discussed previously. As there has been no general 
agreement of the definite elements of constitutionalism reached and these elements vary in literature, 
this research focuses on three core and common elements of constitutionalism, namely: (1) the 
separation of powers; (2) the representative democracy; and (3) the protection of fundamental rights 
and freedoms. The concept of the separation of powers analysed in this research is referred to as the 
modern separation doctrine combined with the constitutional system of checks and balances 
mechanism.106 This system is similar to the United States’ model of separation of powers, and is also 
adopted in the Indonesian state administrative system.107 Additionally, the scope of analysis regarding 
the fundamental rights and freedoms in this research is limited to the constitutional guarantees 
contained in Article 28 to Article 28J of the Indonesian Constitution, also referred to as the 
‘constitutional bill of rights’, and the concept of law state (negara hukum). Furthermore, the analysis 
of the democratic government in this research will focus on the implications of the decisions of the 
                                               
106 Suri Ratnapala, ‘John Locke’s Doctrine of the Separation of Powers: A Reevaluation’ (1993) 38 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 189, 220. 
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Constitutional Court pertaining to the system, implementation and general elections results in 
Indonesia as the main entrance in forming a democratic government based on popular sovereignty.  
Third, the Constitutional Court decisions examined in this research are not limited to the decisions 
where cases were granted by the Court, but also decisions where cases were denied; as long as these 
decisions are marked as milestone decisions with significant influence on the constitutional 
government system in Indonesia. These milestones or landmark decisions were carefully selected 
from the decisions made since the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 2003. The selection 
process was initially conducted by reviewing all decisions of the Constitutional Court in general. 
Thereafter, the decisions that have been considered important by the Constitutional Court, as 
published in the Annual Report of the Court, were analysed systematically.  
Next, I only selected important decisions selected by the Constitutional Court meeting the criteria of 
landmark decisions as explained above. Consequently, not all decisions considered important by the 
Constitutional Court automatically became landmark decisions. If an important Constitutional Court 
decision does not create a new principle and concept nor provide constitutional interpretation 
affecting the existing law and legal system, such decision is therefore excluded from decisions 
categorised as landmark decisions. 
VII   RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A   Research Design 
To gather information and data as well as to achieve valid outcomes, this research used a combination 
of both doctrinal and non-doctrinal research methodologies. 108 Although this study used and analysed 
the case statistics from the Constitutional Court of Indonesia,109 this thesis is based on qualitative 
research through the conduct of library-based and field research.110 This approach is chosen because 
it is the most appropriate evaluative research methodology. This means that the research tested 
whether the role of the Constitutional Court is in accordance with the aims of its establishment in 
relations to maintaining constitutional government in Indonesia. 
                                               
108 See Terry Hutchinson, Researching and Writing in Law (Lawbook, 3rd, 2010) 7; Mike McConvile and Wing Hong 
Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 5. 
109 See Ian Dobinson and Francis Johns, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConvile and Wing Hong Chui (eds), 
Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press, 2007) 16, 17. See also Hutchinson, above n 108, 27, 106. 
110 See Peter Halfpenny, ‘The Analysis of Qualitative Data’ (1979) 27(4) The Sociological Review 799; Wing Hong Chui, 
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In terms of discipline, this research combines two disciplines of legal doctrine, i.e. the empirical and 
normative disciplines. Empirical methods include text analysis, logic, basic statistics and historical 
research concerning the development of  Constitutional Courts.111 The normative aspect attempts to 
suggest reforms that best serve the interests of the Constitutional Court, the state and society as a 
whole.112 The non-doctrinal part of the research aims to understand the law as a social phenomenon 
by researching the social and political implications of the landmark decisions of the Constitutional 
Court towards the constitutional government and  society.113 In other words, as a socio-legal research, 
it also considers the social and political factors or the socio-political impacts of the Court’s 
decisions.114 
With respect to the theoretical aspects of investigation, I adopt the liberal philosophical conception 
of constitutional government as explained in the sub-part of the theoretical framework above. 
Therefore, this research was undertaken within the liberal philosophical tradition of constitutionalism 
where the methodology of the theoretical part of this investigation is characterised as critical 
rationalism.115 
Since legal doctrine and comparative law can provide mutual benefit, this research also involves a 
comparative approach by simultaneously studying two different legal systems concerning 
constitutional courts systems and models in various countries, known as the American and the 
European models.116 A separate examination is made on the general comparison of the different 
background, powers and functions of constitutional courts from other countries. By looking at other 
legal systems that have established constitutional courts, this comparative approach aims to provide 
an extra dimension to this research, to extend theories and ideas, and to bring a practical contribution 
to Indonesia’s system of governance.117 As a comparative research, particularly in comparative 
                                               
111 See Mark van Hoecke, ‘Legal Doctrine: Which Method(s) for What Kind of Discipline?’ in Mark van Hoecke (ed), 
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constitutional law, this study analyses how constitutional systems work in other countries to provide 
comparative best practices based on different constitutional systems.118 Moreover, the comparisons 
undertaken in this research do not only apply a descriptive approach, but also a historical approach to 
locate the origins of the two different systems of constitutional adjudication.119 In addition, when the 
literature of comparative research is written in non-English language, all translations are provided by 
the writer, except where indicated otherwise. 
1   Library Research 
As explained above, this qualitative research uses a library-based research methodology by examining 
primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include: (a) legislations, such as the 
Constitution, statutes, laws, and international conventions; (b) administrative rules and regulations, 
such as rules, regulations, decrees, orders enacted by the state institutions, administrative agencies 
and commissions; and (c) judicial opinions, such as case laws, case digests and case citations. 
Moreover, the secondary sources include textbooks, periodicals, legal journals, law review articles, 
encyclopaedias, legislative history documents, newspapers, internet sources and other 
compilations.120 For the purpose of reading convenience and the word limit allowed by the university, 
this thesis use short title for cases, while complete case numbers can be found in the bibliography. 
The library research was conducted primarily at the library of The University of Queensland, 
Australia. The research explored legal sources containing constitutional theories and practices related 
to elements of constitutional government such as: separation of powers, representative democracy 
and fundamental rights and freedoms. These sources were analysed to assess the extent to which the 
Constitutional Court is securing constitutional government in Indonesia.   
2   Field Research 
Field research was carried out in Indonesia, specifically in Jakarta, the capital city of Indonesia. The 
main purpose of this field research was to conduct archival research in order to investigate the 
Indonesian literature and opinions that are on record in official reports, news items, public statements 
and opinion pieces, inaccessible from outside Indonesia, either in printed or online sources. The field 
                                               
118 See, eg, Vicki C. Jackson and Mark Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 141. 
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research also aimed at examining the landmark decisions of the Constitutional Court that have had 
significant implications in influencing the constitutional government system in Indonesia.  
Moreover, as some parts of this research are closely related with constitutional practice in Indonesia, 
additional research was conducted in the libraries of Indonesian state institutions. Study was 
undertaken concerning the development of constitutionalism, human rights protection, democratic 
transition and independent judiciary in Indonesia. Sources concerning the history and the current 
development of the Constitutional Court of Indonesia were explored deeply in the library of 
Indonesian Constitutional Court in Merdeka Barat, Jakarta. 
B   Data Analysis 
The relevant primary data collected were examined in accordance with the aims of this study and 
analysed qualitatively to answer the research questions of this study. The secondary data were also 
deductively analysed to build analytical constructs in testing theories to assess whether the 
establishment of the Constitutional Court helps in maintaining constitutional government in 
Indonesia.121 Furthermore, data obtained were analysed through a comparative approach. This 
approach will include a comparison of the differences in the formation and basic systems adopted by 
constitutional courts in several countries, to ensure clarity in the discussion concerning the role, 
functions and systems used by the Constitutional Court in Indonesia. Thus, the comparative research 
analysis identifies the various advantages and disadvantages of each system, which adds value to a 
final and comprehensive conclusion, as well as recommendations to this study. 
VIII   THESIS STRUCTURES 
This thesis consists of eight chapters. The foundation of this thesis is discussed in Chapter 1, including 
an introductory chapter containing the background, research questions, theoretical frameworks, 
literature reviews, research scope and methodology, as well as the contribution and significance of 
this thesis. Chapter 2 discusses the establishment and jurisdiction of the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court. The discussion begins with the constitutional amendment process and the politics of judicial 
review in Indonesia, which are divided into three periods, namely the Soekarno Era (1945-1966), the 
Soeharto Era (1966-1998) and the reform era (1998 to the present). Jurisdiction of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court is also discussed in this Chapter, including the expansion of the Constitutional 
Court power in resolving electoral disputes. 
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26 
 
 
Indonesian Constitutional Court’s influences towards constitutional government system and its 
controversies are examined in three separated chapters. The influences of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court are analysed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Three main elements of the 
Constitutional Government, i.e. the separation of powers, the representative democracy and the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, constitutes the main discussion in these chapters. 
Chapter 5 analyses the controversial Indonesian Constitutional Court decisions relating to judicial 
activism and the shift of Constitutional Court’s perspective from negative to positive legislator. 
The jurisdictional limitations of the Indonesian Constitutional Court are analysed in Chapter 6. The 
absence of the Constitutional Court’s powers related to constitutional complaint and constitutional 
questions; as well as the dualism of the judicial review system and the non-judicial functions are 
discussed here. Chapter 7 analyses the institutional challenges that have to be addressed by the 
Constitutional Court, such as the enforcement of the Court’s decisions, selection mechanism and the 
tenure of constitutional justices. The conclusions of this thesis are drawn in Chapter 8. 
***
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND JURISDICTION OF THE INDONESIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
In this chapter, I will discuss the process of the Indonesian Constitutional Court establishment by 
examining the debates that have occurred during the constitutional amendments. The historical 
development of judicial review in Indonesia will also be analysed to determine the politics of judicial 
review since pre-independence in 1945. The jurisdictions of the Indonesian Constitutional Court will 
be specifically discussed through the Constitutional Court case statistics for each jurisdiction. I will 
also discuss some of the key features of the Indonesian Constitutional Court to obtain a 
comprehensive picture of the status, roles and functions of the Indonesian Constitutional Court. 
I   CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROCESS 
The constitutional reform started in 1998 with a regime change from an authoritarian state to a 
democratic state. The 1945 Constitution was extensively amended where protection of citizens’ rights 
and democracy became two of the main objectives of constitutional reform. The separation of power 
was also strengthened, particularly to reduce the powers of the President, which had been too 
dominant. 
In 2000, the Ad Hoc Committee of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan 
Rakyat, or MPR) was assigned to amend the 1945 Constitution, following a brief discussion about 
how to improve judicial power and judicial review. This decision was in line with the 
recommendations issued by the International Commission of Jurists in October 1999. The first 
recommendation given by the Commission, with respect to the creation of an independent and 
effective judiciary, was the creation of a Constitutional Court of Indonesia. According to the 
Commission, the Court should be given powers to review the constitutionality of legislations, 
regulations, other sub-ordinate legislation and executive actions and the Court should act as the final 
forum for human rights complaints resolution.122 
Furthermore, the first proposal to establish a new Constitutional Court appeared after members of the 
MPR Working Committee conducted comparative studies in several countries and invited various 
scholars to hearing sessions. The main reason which arose during the constitutional amendment 
discussion was the importance of creating a constitutional review mechanism. In a hearing session on 
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(International Commission of Jurists, 1999) 55-6.  
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21 February 2000, Bambang Widjojanto, representing the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation, 
addressed the importance of constitutional review. 
We do not have any state institution that can review a product of laws which conflict with the 
Constitution. I agree that legislations can be contested through judicial reviews, whether they 
are contrary to the Constitution or not. That is the reason why there should be an additional role 
to the Supreme Court, which is called the Constitutional Court.123 
According to academics, including Ramlan Surbakti and Fajrul Falaakh, the creation of the 
Constitutional Court was also to prevent tyranny by the majority of legislative members in the 
parliament. 
This is important in order to avoid the tyranny of the majority by the legislature. For example, 
the parliament can be controlled by a particular party which having majority members. The 
decisions made by the parliament could violate the Constitution, although supported by majority 
members.124 
There was no rejection to proposal to give Constitutional Court the power to review constitutionality 
of legislations. Lengthy debates occurred when the MPR Ad Hoc Committee members discussed the 
Constitutional Court position in the Indonesian constitutional structure. There were three opinions 
emerged in the meeting. First, the Constitutional Court should be a part of the MPR. Second, the 
Constitutional Court should be created under the Supreme Court. Third, the Constitutional Court 
should be established as a separate judicial institution.  
In the initial draft, most of the Ad Hoc Committee members agreed that the Constitutional Court 
should be formed under the Supreme Court. However, there was no agreement among members 
regarding position, jurisdiction and judges’ selection mechanism of the Constitutional Court. Finally, 
the MPR expanded its own power to review the constitutionality of laws based on MPR Decree No. 
III/MPR/2000 on the Source of Law and Hierarchy of Legislations.125 
In 2001, discussion for establishing the Constitutional Court continued. The Ad Hoc Committee 
formed an expert team consisting of 30 people with different backgrounds and expertise to give 
comments on the existing draft of the constitutional amendment. Among those were senior 
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125 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, above n 19, 488. 
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constitutional experts, such as Sri Soemantri, Bagir Manan, Philipus M. Hadjon and Jimly 
Asshiddiqie. A report prepared by the expert team was delivered before the Ad Hoc Committee by 
Asshiddiqie; who later became the first Constitutional Court Chief Justice (2003-2008). They 
proposed that the Constitutional Court should be established as an independent court, separate from 
the Supreme Court. Furthermore, they also suggested to give Constitutional Court three powers: (1) 
to review the constitutionality of laws and regulations; (2) to settle disputes between state institutions 
in implementing legislations; and (3) other powers granted specifically by law. These other powers 
were proposed to accommodate, for instance, the possibility of election law granting power to the 
Constitutional Court to resolved electoral disputes.126 
The Ad Hoc Committee received expert team recommendations, and responses varied. Pataniari 
Siahaan from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) commented that the 
Constitutional Court powers should be stated specifically in the Constitution. According to him, a 
legislature is not mandated to decide the vesting of other powers through a law. Pataniari also asked 
the expert team’s opinions concerning the powers of political party dissolution and impeachment of 
the President and/or the Vice President exercised by the Constitutional Court in other countries.127 
Hamdan Zoelva from the Crescent Star Party (PBB), who later became the fourth Constitutional Court 
Chief Justice (2013-2015), rejected a proposal by the expert team concerning the constitutional 
review power for all laws and regulations. Zoelva suggested that the Constitutional Court should only 
be given a power to review the constitutionality of laws, not other types of laws below the level of 
national laws falling under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.128 
One of the historical events that triggered the establishment of the Constitutional Court in Indonesia 
was the impeachment of President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000. The impeachment against Wahid 
was based solely on political grounds. It was conducted through majority voting in a political forum 
in the Assembly.129 In the midst of this political controversy, the idea to develop an impeachment 
mechanism through a court, based on legal and constitutional reasons, arose during the constitutional 
amendment process. Based on that motivation, the Constitutional Court was given a power to be 
involved in the impeachment process of the President and/or the Vice President. This proposal was 
fully supported by the PDI-P because they were concerned that the impeachment experienced by 
                                               
126 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, above n 123, 457-65. 
127 Ibid 630-1, 687-9. 
128 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Risalah Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara RI Tahun 
1945 (1999-2002) Tahun Sidang 2001 [Minutes of the Amendment of the 1945 Constitution (1999-2002) Year of Session 
2001] (Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2009) 299-300. 
129 Asshiddiqie, above n 54, 7. 
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Wahid might also occur to Megawati Soekarnoputri, the Chairwoman of the PDI-P, who replaced 
Wahid as the fourth President (2001-2004).130 
After a lengthy debate and discussion, two options remained on the position of Constitutional Court. 
Either it should become part of the Supreme Court, as proposed by the majority factions in the MPR, 
or it should be established as an independent and separate court from the Supreme Court, as suggested 
by the expert team and supported by small factions in the MPR. Hendriarto pointed out that the 
factions - particularly the Golkar and Army/Police factions - who wanted to form the Constitutional 
Court under the Supreme Court had an interest in establishing a weak court, so that they could avoid 
consequences of their past actions.131 
A decision regarding the Constitutional Court’s position, was made after the draft had been 
commented on by the MPR members during the General Session held on November 2001. A political 
compromise was made between factions in the MPR to establish the Constitutional Court separately 
from the Supreme Court. This decision was also taken after the Supreme Court Justices indirectly 
refused to be given additional of judicial review powers as they had thousands of pending cases to be 
resolved.132 However, the Constitutional Court was given a power only to review the constitutionality 
of national laws, while the Supreme Court retained the power to review laws and regulations under 
national laws. This means that the proposal submitted by the expert team, where all laws and 
regulations can be reviewed by the Constitutional Court, was not accepted by the MPR. 
II   POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INDONESIA 
The development of judicial review in Indonesian judicial system can be divided into three main 
periods: the Soekarno era from 1945 to 1966; the Soeharto era from 1966 to 1998 and the reform era 
from 1998 to present. The current judicial review in Indonesia follows the European or the centralised 
model of judicial review. In 1949, however, Indonesia followed the American or the decentralised 
model of judicial review. In this section, I will discuss the politics of judicial review in Indonesia by 
tracing the three different periods. 
                                               
130 Hendrianto, above n 95, 162. 
131 Ibid 160. 
132 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, above n 19, 370-1. 
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A   First Period: Soekarno Era (1945-1966) 
Although the mechanism of constitutional review was finally formed after the Constitutional Court 
establishment in 2003, the discussion and debate about the need for a judicial review system had 
occurred in the drafting process of the first Indonesian Constitution, prior to independence in 1945. 
During a meeting of the Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence 
(BPUPKI) in July 1945, one of the constitutional drafters, Muhammad Yamin, proposed that the 
Supreme Court (Balai Agung) should have a power to review laws not only against the Constitution, 
but also customary law and Islamic law. Yamin used the term of ‘comparing’ (membanding), which 
refers to the term of ‘reviewing’ (menguji).  
The Supreme Court exercises judicial power and compares laws to ensure consistency with 
customary law, Islamic law (Shari’ah) and the Constitution; they also make rules to repeal laws. 
The opinion of the Supreme Court is submitted to the President who delivers it to the House of 
Representatives.133 
The proposal delivered by Yamin was challenged by another BPUPKI member, Soepomo, citing two 
main reasons. The first reason was that Indonesia did not adopt the concept of separation of powers 
as implemented by other countries. Therefore, the judiciary could not control the other state powers 
in making laws. According to Soepomo, the issue whether a law was contrary to the Constitution or 
not was not a judicial matter, but a political matter. He also argued that the judicial review system 
would not be appropriate in the Indonesian context.134 The second reason was that Indonesian legal 
experts did not have much experience in exercising a judicial review system at that time. Soepomo 
compared Indonesia with Austria, Germany and the Czech Republic that have special courts to deal 
with constitutional matters. For these reasons, he suggested that Indonesia was not ready to apply the 
judicial review system. Given that there was no consensus during the meeting, Yamin’s proposal to 
give judicial review power to the Supreme Court was not inserted into the 1945 Constitution.135 
Furthermore, the 1945 Constitution enacted on 18 August 1945 was replaced by the Constitution of 
the Republic of the United States of Indonesia known as the RIS Constitution (1949-1950). The 
provisions contained in the RIS Constitution were strongly influenced by the United States, including 
                                               
133 Saafroedin Bahar et al, Risalah Sidang Badan Penyelidik Usaha-Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI), 
Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) 26 Mei 1945 - 22 Agustus 1945 [Minutes of Meeting of the 
Investigating Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (BPUPKI), the Preparatory Committee for 
Indonesian Independence (PPKI) 26 May 1945 - 22 August 1945] (Sekretariat Negara Republik Indonesia, 1995) 295. 
134 Ibid 305. 
135 Ibid 306. 
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the adoption of the American model of judicial review. The RIS Constitution set a judicial review 
mechanism that authorised the Supreme Court and other ordinary courts to review the 
constitutionality of federal or state laws.136 However, the RIS Constitution was applied for less than 
one year, from 27 December 1949 until 17 August 1950, and there was not a single case handled by 
the Supreme Court related to judicial review. 
Moreover, Indonesia changed the RIS Constitution for the 1950 Provisional Constitution (1950-
1959). The 1950 Provisional Constitution was intended to be temporary until a permanent constitution 
was formed. During the constitutional drafting, the Indonesian Judges Association (IKAHI) and the 
Supreme Court suggested that the Supreme Court should have a power to review the constitutionality 
of legislations. The proposal was discussed by the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), which had 
been established based on the results of the 1955 General Elections to form a permanent Constitution. 
In their discussions, the Constituent Assembly agreed to establish a special court consisting of justices 
who were authorised to review legislations.  
Unfortunately, after conducting the session for two and a half years, the Constituent Assembly was 
unable to complete the main task of forming a permanent Constitution due to a deadlock among its 
members, particularly on a very sensitive issue related to concepts and relations between state and 
religion.137 Consequently, an initial agreement to establish a judicial review system could not be 
implemented. Given that the Constituent Assembly could not manage to create a new Constitution 
for replacing the 1950 Provisional Constitution, President Soekarno declared the Presidential Decree 
of 5 July 1959 to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and to restore the validity of the 1945 
Constitution as the permanent Constitution of Indonesia. 
B   Second Period: Soeharto Era (1966-1998) 
Discussions for creating a judicial review system also occurred during the New Order under the 
Soeharto’s administration. In 1966-1967 the Ad Hoc Committee II of the Temporary MPR (MPRS) 
recommended that the Supreme Court should be given a judicial review power. However, this 
recommendation was rejected by Minister of Justice, Oemar Seno Adji, on the grounds that MPR was 
the only state institution than could maintain the Constitution.138 Based on Law Number 14 of 1970 
                                               
136 See Article 156 of the Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia. 
137 For further discussion of the Indonesian Konstituante, see Nasution, above n 104. 
138 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Jejak Langkah Satu Dasawarsa Mengawal Konstitusi (2003-2013) [A 
Decade of Footstep in Guarding the Constitution (2003-2013)] (Kepaniteraan dan Sekretariat Jenderal MKRI, 2013) 8. 
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on the Judicial Power, the Supreme Court was finally granted a power of judicial review.139 
Nevertheless, the power was limited to review of regulations against laws. The Judicial Power Law 
did not regulate the mechanism to review the constitutionality of laws. Moreover, the related 
provisions were amended by Law Number 14 of 1985 on the Supreme Court. The new provisions 
asserted that the Supreme Court only had a power to review regulations below national laws against 
the higher regulations or laws, but not against the Constitution.140 In 1992, the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, Ali Said, and several academics proposed the establishment of constitutional review 
of laws mechanism in order to implement checks and balances principle between branches of 
government. Nonetheless, this idea was never taken up by the Government.141 
The absence of a constitutional review system at that time was due by the fact that the Indonesian 
constitutional structure applies distribution of power. Consequently, it created parliamentary 
supremacy in the MPR. In practice, this doctrine meant other branches of government had not been 
allowed to intervene with the legislative branch powers. The absence of constitutional review 
mechanisms was considered a deliberate measure by Soeharto to maintain power. Despite this view, 
Soeharto genuinely and consistently suggested implementing the 1945 Constitution in his speeches. 
Lacking a state institution with authority to review and interpret the 1945 Constitution, Soeharto held 
full power in interpreting the laws that perpetuated his authority for 32 years. As a result, there were 
only 12 judicial review cases after the Supreme Court was given a limited power of judicial review 
in 1970; prior to constitutional reform occurred in 1998.142 
C   Third Period: Reform Era (1998-Present) 
Discussion on the need of a constitutional review system re-emerged during the constitutional 
amendment process in 2000. After a discussion on mechanism, the MPR issued Decree Number 
III/MPR/2000 granting the MPR a power to review constitutionality of laws. The parliamentary 
supremacy doctrine served as the main foundation in establishing this mechanism. However, such 
cannot be categorised as a judicial review mechanism as the power would be exercised by the 
legislative, not by the judiciary. Thus, this mechanism is best categorised as legislative review, and 
not judicial review. However, the MPR never exercised its power due to obscurity in the system. 
                                               
139 Article 26 of the Judicial Power Law. 
140 Article 31 of the Supreme Court Law. 
141 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, above n 138, 9 
142 For further discussion of the practices of judicial review by the Supreme Court of Indonesia, see Zainal Arifin Hoesein, 
Judicial Review di Mahkamah Agung RI: Tiga Dekade Pengujian Peraturan Perundang-Undangan [Judicial Review in 
the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia: Three Decades of Judicial Review] (Rajawali Pers, 2009). 
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Therefore, the MPR members proposed to establish a judicial institution called the Constitutional 
Court.  
As explained previously, the MPR members’ opinions were divided into two in determining judicial 
review powers granted to the Constitutional Court. The first was that the Constitutional Court should 
only review constitutionality of laws, while regulations under the national laws could only be 
reviewed by the Supreme Court. The reason was to avoid practical difficulties related to the high 
volume of laws and regulations under litigation process by the Supreme Court and lower ordinary 
courts.143 The second opinion was that constitutionality of all laws and regulations should be reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court. The aim of integrating constitutional review mechanism was to obtain 
consistent considerations and decisions in judicial review cases, as practiced in other countries.144 
The final decision was that the Constitutional Court could only review the constitutionality of national 
laws, while the Supreme Court retained the power to review the legality of laws and regulations. 
Thus, the current judicial review system in Indonesia embraces the dualism of judicial review system 
exercised by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. Consequently, this adds complexity to 
the judicial review mechanism. There is no mechanism to review constitutionality of regulations 
below the level of national law, whereas many regulations and executive decisions allegedly violate 
the Constitution. A further discussion on this issue will be analysed in Chapter 6. 
III   JURISDICTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The Constitutional Court is one of the state institutions that performs an independent judicial power 
to uphold law and justice. The Indonesian Constitutional Court has five jurisdictions directly 
mandated by the Constitution, namely: to review the constitutionality of laws (undang-undang); to 
resolve disputes regarding the authorities of the state institutions whose powers are derived from the 
Constitution; to decide political parties dissolution and to settle disputes over the results of general 
elections. For these four powers, the Constitutional Court holds the first instance and the final level 
court having final and binding decisions. The fifth jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court constitutes 
                                               
143 See Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Risalah Rapat ke-36 Panitia Ad Hoc I, Badan Pekerja MPR 
[Minutes of the 36th Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee I, the Working Committee of the People’s Consultative Assembly] 
(Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2008) 340, 344, 434, 436, 531. This opinion was delivered, among others, by Agun 
Gunandjar from the Golkar Party (Partai Golkar), Patrialis Akbar from the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat 
Nasional or PAN), Zain Badjeber and Ali Hardi Kiaidemak from the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan or PPP), and Hamdan Zoelva from the Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang or PBB).  
144 Ibid 357, 435, 437, 554. The Ad Hoc Committee members who proposed this idea, among others, were Sutjipto from 
the Functional Representative (Utusan Golongan), Gregorius Seto Harianto from the Democratic National Love Party 
(Partai Demokrasi Kasih Bangsa or PDKB), Harjono and Soewarno from the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle 
(Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan or PDI-P). 
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an obligation to provide a decision on DPR’s opinion of alleged constitutional violations committed 
by the President and/or the Vice President. This last jurisdiction is also known as deciding on 
impeachment. The following sections will discuss constitutional jurisdictions possessed by the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court in more details. 
A   Constitutional Review 
The jurisdiction to exercise constitutional review is the main and first power given to the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court. It can be traced through the discussion on the constitutional amendment process 
in the Synchronisation Meeting of the MPR Ad Hoc Committee I in 2000. In the meeting, Abdul 
Khalif from the National Awakening Party stated: 
The first one is to review the laws, and the second one is to resolve dispute or conflict of the 
articles or between legislations. So I think these are the main tasks of the Constitutional Court, 
while the other powers will be authorised by laws.145 
The same opinion was also expressed by Patrialis Akbar from the National Mandate Party, who later 
became a Constitutional Justice, as follows: 
We would like to raise the issue of main power, the basic idea of the the Constitutional Court 
establishment, if we want to review the constitutionality of law. That is the basic idea, while the 
others are additional powers.146 
The Indonesia Constitutional Court can exercise constitutional review only in abstract form, and not 
in concrete cases. Constitutional review can be carried out in two ways, which are formal and material 
constitutional review. The formal review examines whether a law has been drafted or approved in 
accordance with the procedures and processes of law making.147 The material review examines 
whether the substance of a law is contrary to the Constitution. 
An application of constitutional review can be lodged by different parties, namely: (1) individual 
Indonesian citizens, including groups of people having a common interest; (2) an entity of a 
customary law community (masyarakat hukum adat) insofar as they are still in existence and are in 
line with development of  communities and the principle of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia 
                                               
145 See Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Risalah Rapat Sinkronisasi Panitia Ad Hoc I, Badan 
Pekerja MPR tanggal 13 Juli 2000 [Minutes of the Synchronisation Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee I, the Working 
Committee of the People’s Consultative Assembly on 13 July 2000] (Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2008) 
146 Ibid. 
147 The examination shall be reviewed according Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations, 
amending Law No. 10 of 2004 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations. 
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as regulated in laws; (3) public or private legal entities; or (4) state institution.148 Additionally, access 
to the Constitutional Court is very extensive, where a taxpayer can file an application of constitutional 
review as stated in one of the Constitutional Court’s decisions: 
Based on the Constitutional Court practices (2003-2009), an Indonesian citizen, especially a 
taxpayer (vide Decision No. 003/PUU-I/2003), along with various associations and NGOs 
concerned about a law for the sake of public interest, legal entities, regional government, state 
institution and others are considered by the Constitutional Court to have legal standing to file an 
application of constitutional review, either formal or material, against the 1945 Constitution.149 
However, according to a current Constitutional Court’s decision, the legal standing of a taxpayer has 
been limited where petitioners with evidence that there is a constitutional loss that is specific, actual 
or potential with clear relations to the existing law that is being reviewed.150 
Furthermore, there are five main requirements that must be fulfilled by a petitioner for his or her legal 
standing (kedudukan hukum), as mentioned in the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence: 
a. the existence of constitutional rights and/or authorities of the petitioner granted by the 1945 
Constitution;  
b. the petitioner considers that such constitutional rights and/or authorities are impaired by the 
coming into effect of the law being petitioned for review;  
c. such constitutional rights and/or authorities must be specific (special) and actual or at least 
potential in nature which, pursuant to logical reasoning, can be assured of occurring;  
d. there is a causal relationship (causal verband) between the relevant impairment of 
constitutional rights and/or authorities and the  the law coming into effect which is being 
petitioned for review;  
e. there is a possibility that with the granting of the petition, the impairment of constitutional 
rights and/or authorities as argued will not or will no longer occur.151 
However, these five requirements greatly depend on the case examined by the Court. To determine 
whether the petitioner has legal standing, the Court sometimes has to examine the main issues before 
deciding the status of the petitioner. During court hearings for examining a constitutional review case, 
the Constitutional Court may summon the DPR and the President, usually represented by Ministers, 
                                               
148 Article 51(2) of the Constitutional Court Law. 
149 See Supreme Court (2009) case, para [3.9]. 
150 See President’s Prerogative Rights (2015) case, 66. 
151 See, eg, Regional Government (2005) case, 16; Agricultural Land Area (2007) case, 56. 
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to inquire about the law being reviewed. In addition, the Constitutional Court also provides 
opportunities to related parties who have an interest in the law being reviewed to be involved the 
court hearings. However, information given by the related parties is ad informandum only, which is 
not binding to the Constitutional Court. In examining a case, the Constitutional Court may also 
consider a range of evidence, such as letters or documents, witness testimonies, expert statements, 
other parties’ statements, clues and electronic evidences.152 
Decision-making process in each case is conducted through the Deliberation Meeting of Justices 
(Rapat Permusyawaratan Hakim). Decisions are taken by majority vote. However, if the Deliberation 
Meeting fails to reach a majority vote, the chairperson of the meeting shall have the decisive vote.153 
In the case where no decision is reached unanimously, Constitutional Justices can write dissenting 
opinions that must be included into the last part of the Court’s decision.154 Constitutional Justices are 
also allowed to write different legal reasons, although his or her decision maybe the same with the 
majority. This practice is known as concurring opinion. This decision-making mechanism is applied 
to reflect a growing and different opinions in the community, to build an intellectual atmosphere and 
also to build a moral responsibility among Constitutional Justices in making Constitutional Court 
decisions.  
Decisions of the Constitutional Court in constitutional review cases have prospective effect starting 
from the pronouncement in the plenary session, which is open to the public.155 This means that any 
legal consequence, which occurred before the decision was declared, should be considered valid. 
However, in a few of its decisions, the Constitutional Court had made an exception to enforce its 
decisions retroactively.156 
Since its establishment in 2003, the Court has reviewed the constitutionality of more than 190 
different laws. There were seven laws that had been revoked entirely and more than 74 laws that had 
been annulled partially. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has decided 858 constitutional review 
cases. Among these decisions, 203 cases were granted (24%), 297 cases were denied (35%) and 269 
cases were dismissed (31%). In terms of Constitutional Court’s Decree, 89 cases were withdrawn 
(10%). 
                                               
152 Article 36(1) of the Constitutional Court Law. 
153 Article 45(8) of the Constitutional Court Law. 
154 Article 45(10) of the Constitutional Court Law. 
155 Article 47 of the Constitutional Court Law. 
156 See, eg, Parliamentary Seats Phase III (2009) case; KPK Commissioner Tenure (2011) case. 
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The Indonesian Constitutional Court is only given a power of injunction for examining disputes 
between state institutions and elections results, not for constitutional review cases.157 This power 
allows the Court to order a person, a state institution, or ordinary court to perform or cease doing a 
particular action, including to suspend the examination of a case until the Constitutional Court 
declares its final decision. However, the Constitutional Court had issued injunctions known as 
provisional decision in several cases. These injunctions were issued to keep apace with development 
of legal awareness and sense of justice as well as to provide legal protections and certainty of just 
laws.158 
In addition, the Supreme Court is to suspend examination of a case, particularly a judicial review 
case, if, at the same time, a law which constitutes the basis for case examination is also being reviewed 
by the Constitutional Court.159 In this context, the separation of judicial review system between the 
                                               
157 See Article 63 of the Constitutional Court Law. 
158 See, eg, Bibit and Chandra (2009) case. 
159 Article 55 of the Constitutional Court Law. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Withdrawn 3 4 0 2 5 5 7 5 9 6 13 18 17
Dismissed 1 12 4 11 7 7 11 16 35 30 23 43 65
Denied 0 8 14 8 11 12 18 23 29 31 52 41 50
Granted 0 11 10 8 4 10 15 17 21 30 22 29 25
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Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court may cause complications to the judicial review system 
in Indonesia. Moreover, the Indonesian Constitutional Court also exercises the doctrine of 
presumption of constitutionality. This means that a law which is being reviewed remains valid until 
there is a decision stating that the law is contrary to the Constitution. 
B   Election Disputes 
Another jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is to settle disputes over the results of elections. This 
is the first time that Indonesia has a court to examine the electoral disputes; therefore, it has become 
very important in maintaining democratic climate in Indonesia. The original jurisdiction granted of 
the Constitutional Court initially was limited to resolving disputes between the General Election 
Committee (Komisi Pemilihan Umum or KPU) and the election participants regarding KPU decisions 
on the national election results. 
The Constitutional Court jurisdiction concerning election disputes was expanded in 2008. The DPR 
and the President granted additional jurisdiction to the Constitutional Court to settle regional head 
electoral disputes. Therefore, the Constitutional Court has the power to settle both the national and 
local electoral disputes. After exercising this additional power for more than five years, the 
Constitutional Court declared a decision in 2014 stating that the Constitutional Court’s power to 
resolve regional head electoral disputes was unconstitutional. In the following section, I will discuss 
the development and problems of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdictions in relation to election 
disputes by dividing the discussion into national and local elections. 
1   National Elections 
The national elections in Indonesia are held once every five years to elect the House of Representative 
(DPR) members, the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, or DPD) 
members, the Regional People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, or 
DPRD) members and the President and/or the Vice President.160 These national elections can also be 
categorised into the legislative elections (DPR, DPD, and DPRD) and presidential election. The 
legislative and presidential elections used to be held separately in a same year where legislative 
elections preceded the presidential election. However, based on the Constitutional Court’s decision 
in the Simultaneous Elections (2013) case, the legislative elections and the presidential election were 
to be held simultaneously starting in 2019. 
                                               
160 Article 22E (1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
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The President and/or the Vice President shall be elected as a single ticket directly by the people, 
replacing the previous system where the President and/or the Vice President were elected only by the 
MPR members.161 If there are violations on the national elections, the candidates may file electoral 
disputes before the Constitutional Court. The petitioners include the presidential and vice presidential 
candidates, political parties contesting the elections for the DPR and the DPRD members,162 and 
individual candidates for the DPD members.163 
In the development of a legislative electoral system in Indonesia, in 2008 the Constitutional Court’s 
decision replaced a ‘semi-open list’ system, in which the seat would be allocated to the candidate 
placed highest in the party list,  to a fully ‘open list’ system, where the seat would be allotted to the 
candidates getting the majority votes, notwithstanding their position on the party list.164 This change 
of system has triggered many disputes among candidates in the same party, because not only they  
compete with other parties, but also with their own colleagues. To accommodate the interest of those 
candidates, in 2014 the Constitutional Court officially expanded the opportunity to individual 
candidates for the DPR and the DPRD members to file cases concerning electoral disputes, on the 
condition that those candidates obtain written consent to file a case from their respective political 
parties to contest the election, signed by the Chairman and the Secretary General. Thus, individual 
candidates are not allowed to submit applications to question candidates from the same political party 
without consent from their own political party.165 
Furthermore, the main objectives in reviewing a presidential election case are: (1) to determine the 
result of  the first round presidential election; thus determining the candidates who will pass to the 
second round; and (2) to determine the final result of a presidential election.166 Whereas, the 
objectives of resolving dispute in the legislative elections are to verify the national results that could 
affect the number of seats gained by political parties, the electability of legislative candidates, and 
the fulfilment of parliamentary threshold of political parties.167 For the latter objective, political 
parties who do not reach a parliamentary threshold cannot sit in the DPR. This threshold is used for 
                                               
161 Article 6A(1) of the Constitution. 
162 The political parties here consist of national political parties and local political parties in Aceh Province only. 
163 Article 74(1) of the Constitutional Court Law. 
164 See Majority Votes (2008) case.  
165 Article 2(1)(b)(c) of the Constitutional Court Regulation No. 1 of 2014 concerning Guidelines for Litigation for the 
General Election Disputes of DPR, DPD and DPRD (hereinafter, the Constitutional Court Regulation on Legislative 
Elections). 
166Article 4 of the Constitutional Court Regulation No. 17 of 2009 concerning Guidelines for Litigation for Presidential 
Elections (hereinafter, the Constitutional Court Regulation on Presidential Election). 
167 Article 3 of the Constitutional Court Regulation on Legislative Elections. 
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simplifying the number of political parties in the DPR as well as to establish a more stable 
governmental system. The parliamentary threshold in the 2009 national elections was 2.5% of the 
total valid votes,168 while in the 2014 election it was 3.5%.169  
Court hearings for election cases is characterised by a fast settlement process, as the Constitutional 
Court is only given 30 working days to decide all legislative election cases and 14 working days for 
a presidential election case.170 Moreover, petitioners should file electoral disputes not later than 3 
days (3 x 24 hours) after the General Election Commission announces national election results.171 
In the 2004 Presidential Election, there were five pairs of Presidential and/or Vice Presidential 
candidates. An election complaint was submitted to the Constitutional Court concerning the first 
round presidential election results. The complaint was denied by the Constitutional Court due to 
insufficient evidence to supporting the objections. In the Presidential Election of 2009, there were 
three pairs of candidates competing for the presidency, where two cases of presidential elections 
lodged with the Constitutional Court were also denied. Meanwhile in the last Presidential Election of 
2014, another election dispute lodged by Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa was also denied by the 
Constitutional Court. The details of these cases will be discussed in the next chapter. 
In terms of legislative elections, there were numerous election cases lodged before the Constitutional 
Court. In the Legislative Elections of 2004, there were 23 out of 24 political parties and 21 individual 
candidates of the DPD who submitted election disputes to the Constitutional Court. In total, there 
were 273 legal issues received by the Constitutional Court, in which 3 cases submitted by DPD 
candidates and 38 cases lodged by political parties were granted.  The legislative election cases lodged 
with the Constitutional Court in 2004 were relatively few in number compared to the election cases 
afterwards. The reason for this disparity is that many election participants were not aware of the fact 
that Constitutional Court’s function allows it to handle electoral complaints; because the 
Constitutional Court, established a year before the 2004 General Elections, had not been widely 
recognised. 
                                               
168 Article 202 of Law No 10 of 2008 on General Election of the Members of House of Representatives, Regional 
Representative Council and Regional People’s Representative Council (hereinafter, the Legislative Election Law of 
2008). 
169 Article 208 of Law No 8 of 2012 on General Election of the Members of House of Representatives, Regional 
Representative Council and Regional People’s Representative Council (hereinafter, the Legislative Election Law of 
2012). 
170 Article 78 of the Constitutional Court Law. 
171 Article 74 of the Constitutional Court Law; Article 5 (1) the Constitutional Court Regulation on the Presidential 
Election; and Article 8 of the Constitutional Court Regulation on the Legislative Election. 
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Figure 4 
Legislative Election Cases Statistics 2004-2014 
 
In the 2009 Legislative Elections, there were 42 out of 46 political parties and 27 DPD candidates 
who lodged elections cases to the Constitutional Court. There were 650 legal issues relating to the 
legislative election cases. The election complaints submitted to the Constitutional Court were 
generally related to the fraudulent counting of votes and the problems over the allocation of 
parliamentary seats.172 In the last 2014 Legislative Elections, 14 out of 15 political parties lodged 
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electoral disputes with the Constitutional Court. Only one local party, named Aceh Party (Partai 
Aceh) who did not file a complaint. Although fewer political parties participated in the 2014 
Legislative Elections of 2014, compared to the previous legislative elections; the number of election 
cases submitted to the Constitutional Court increased. The Constitutional Court examined 735 cases 
lodged by political parties and 34 cases submitted by DPD candidates.173 The statistics of national 
elections cases can be seen in the following figure. 
Given that there were so many legislative election cases to be decided within 30 working days, the 
Constitutional Court had to examine all those cases quickly and carefully. In examining legislative 
election cases, the Constitutional Court forms three panels, where each panel consists of three Justices 
who hold hearing sessions for all cases simultaneously. The ability of the Constitutional Court to 
decide all election cases within a very short time has made the Constitutional Court a forum for 
efficient trials in guarding the democratic electoral system.174  
However, there are doubts about the accuracy and thoroughness of the Constitutional Court in 
examining all legislative election cases within a short period. There are concerns on the difference of 
standards used in examining evidences among the panels. If the examination method used by each 
panel is different, political parties that filed electoral cases will receive different treatments from the 
Constitutional Court. Therefore, the DPR should reconsider to revise the time limit for Constitutional 
Court to decide election disputes, so the Court can be more careful and thorough in examining the 
evidence given before the Court. Moreover, starting in 2019, the presidential and legislative elections 
will be held simultaneously. Thus, more serious attention needs to be given so that both types of 
electoral disputes can be handled properly. If the quality and accuracy of the decisions need to be 
improved, I suggest that the time limit for settling electoral disputes should be extended to 45 to 60 
working days.175 
                                               
173 See The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, Case Statistic on Legislative Elections Disputes 2014 
<http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id>. 
174 See, eg, Susi Dwi Harijanti and Tim Lindsey, ‘Indonesia: General elections test the amended constitution and the new 
constitutional court’ (2006) 4(1) International Journal of Constitutional Law 138. 
175 Based on the comparative study conducted by IDEA, the time limits for settling electoral disputes in 173 different 
countries are: 1-10 days (17%); 11-20 days (10%); 21-30 days (7%); 31-60 days (8%); more than 60 days (12%); and not 
specified (46%). See IDEA International, Electoral Justice Regulations Around the World: Key findings from 
International IDEA’s global research on electoral dispute-resolution systems <http://www.idea.int/publications/ 
electoral-justice-regulations-around-the-world/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&pageID=77242>, 28. 
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2   Local Elections 
The local election disputes or the regional head electoral disputes (Pemilu Kepala Daerah) used to 
be handled by ordinary courts under the Supreme Court’s supervision. However, there were many 
problems and dissatisfaction over decisions made by ordinary courts. The Depok Mayoral Election 
case triggered the DPR to transfer jurisdiction of settling regional head electoral disputes, from the 
Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court.176 The transfer of jurisdiction was made based on the 
amendment of 2004 Regional Government Law. 
Settlement of disputes on the results of the vote counting of regional head election by the 
Supreme Court is transferred to the Constitutional Court no later than 18 (eighteen) months from 
the promulgation of this Law.177 
The DPR decision to transfer the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court cannot be separated from 
constitutional interpretation by the Constitutional Court in a judicial review case in 2005.178 In its 
decision, the majority of Constitutional Justices interpreted that the regional head elections could be 
categorised as part of the general election defined by Article 22E of the Indonesian Constitution, since 
an open legal policy existed for lawmakers in the DPR. Therefore, the Constitutional Court could be 
given a power to adjudicate regional head electoral disputes based on legal policy choices made by 
the President and the DPR.  
The Court is of the opinion that lawmakers can constitutionally ensure that the direct regional 
head elections is an expansion of definition of the general elections as referred to Article 22E of 
the 1945 Constitution, therefore, disputes over the results become a part of the Constitutional 
Court’s jurisdiction based on Article 24C(1) of the 1945 Constitution. However, the lawmakers 
can also decide that the direct regional head elections is not the general elections in formal 
definition as stated in Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution so the respective electoral disputes 
can be determined as an additional power of the Supreme Court.179 
Moreover, there were dissenting opinions delivered by three Constitutional Justices who expressly 
stated that the regional head elections shall be a part of the general elections regime where 
                                               
176 See SKLN Depok Election (2006) case. 
177 Article 236C of Law No 12 of 2008 on the 2nd Amendment of Law No. 32 of 2004 on Regional Government. 
178 See Jurisdiction on Regional Head Electoral Disputes (2005) case. 
179 Ibid 114-5. 
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corresponding disputes could be settled by the Constitutional Court.180 Based on this decision, the 
DPR expanded the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction by giving it the power to settle regional head 
electoral disputes from the Supreme Court. The transfer began on 29 October 2008, after the Chief 
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court signed an official document. 
Furthermore, in settling regional head electoral disputes, the Constitutional Court initially restricted 
examinations based on the limitations set out by the Regional Government Law, where the Court 
should only examine the results of tabulated votes in making their decisions.181 This means that the 
examination is only conducted to verify whether the recapitulation of voting results stated in the 
election documents were correct. The Constitutional Court started to depart from this restriction when 
deciding the East Java Gubernatorial Election (2008) case. In this case, the Court considered other 
violations that occurred during the election process that could affect the vote tabulation results for the 
candidates. The Court also assessed various violations, including fraudulent voting, intimidation and 
preference by local government officials. In addition, the Court introduced a doctrine of electoral 
violations which were categorised as structured, systematic and massive (terstruktur, sistematis and 
masif, or TSM). In its decision, the Constitutional Court decided for the first time to order recounts 
and revotes in several counties in Madura Island.182 
There were at least three arguments made by the Constitutional Court for leaving the conservative 
path of examining election cases. First, the Court decided to achieve ‘substantive justice’ rather than 
merely ‘procedural justice’. It means that the Court tried to put aside the procedural rules in order to 
provide a more substantive justice to the parties. Second, the Constitutional Court has a duty to 
maintain constitutional values, so examination which is limited to rechecking the validity of results 
from the vote counting would not be sufficient to achieve that objective. Third, by examining electoral 
disputes beyond validity of vote counting, the Court would contribute to the acceleration and 
development of democratic values in Indonesia. The Constitutional Court has therefore positioned 
itself as a Court that will examine election cases, applying not only technical-mathematical approach, 
but also substantive approach. 
Given that in deciding the regional head electoral disputes, the Constitutional Court not only re-
counts the actual results of the vote tabulation from the voting process, but also shall uphold 
justice by assessing and examining the counting results which are being disputed; because if [the 
                                               
180 Ibid 117-132. Three Constitutional Justices who delivered dissenting opinions were Justice Laica Marzuki, Justice 
Harjono and Justice Maruarar Siahaan. 
181 Article 106(2) of Law No. 32 of 2004 on the Regional Government. 
182 See East Java Gubernatorial Election (2008) case, 136. 
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Court] only re-counts, according to a technical-mathematical definition, it can be done by the 
Regional Election Commission under the supervision of the Election Supervisory Committee 
and/or the police officers, or simply by the ordinary courts.183 
Starting from the East Java Gubernatorial (2008) case, the Constitutional Court began to consider 
various violations and breaches both in national and regional head electoral disputes that occurred 
before and during the elections. Butt classified the types of breaches into several categories, namely 
candidacy requirements, vote buying or money politics, fault of the election committee or the 
supervisory committee, intimidation, accuracy of vote counts, mass mobilisation, repeated voting and 
biased public servants.184 If there are criminal violations proven during the court hearing, the Court 
will not decide on these criminal matters, instead the cases will be forwarded to the police for further 
investigation. 
Another breakthrough made by the Constitutional Court is related to the expansion of the parties who 
may apply for the election disputes. The original legal standing was only given to the candidates who 
have been officially designated by the Election Commission. After using an extensive interpretation, 
the Constitutional Court has also given legal standing to potential candidates who have officially 
enrolled to the Election Commission, but they are rejected by the Commission as permanent 
candidates based on reasons that might violate constitutional norms and democratic principles.185  
In dealing with regional head electoral disputes, the Constitutional Court has had a heavy workload 
because every case shall be decided not later than 14 working days. This causes electoral dispute 
cases to be settled quickly, compared to other types of cases. From October 2008 to August 2015, the 
Constitutional Courts decided 698 regional head electoral disputes. Among of these cases, only 10% 
of cases granted, while 66% of cases were denied and 21% of cases were dismissed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
183 Ibid [3.28]. 
184 Butt, above n 91, 15. 
185 See, eg, Jayapura Mayoral Election (2010) case. 
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Figure 5 
Regional Head Election Case Statistics 2008-2015186 
 
 
Although the Constitutional Court is generally considered successful in exercising its jurisdiction to 
settle regional head electoral disputes; there was a constitutional review decision that surprised many. 
On 19 May 2014, the Court declared that the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction in handling regional 
head electoral disputes was unconstitutional.187 The Court reasoned that giving the regional head 
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election disputes to be handled by the Constitutional Court was not in accordance with the meaning 
of the original intent of the Constitution. In other words, the Court amputated its own jurisdiction in 
dealing with regional head electoral disputes. In a transitional period, however, the Court stated in its 
decision that they would still exercise the power to examine regional head electoral disputes until a 
new law is enacted by the DPR.  
Jurisdiction of state institutions which are defined and limited by the 1945 Constitution cannot 
be added or reduced by law or Constitutional Court decision because it will take a role as the 
framer of the 1945 Constitution. Thus, according to the Court, the additional jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court to settle regional head electoral disputes granted by expanding the meaning 
of general elections set forth in Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution is unconstitutional.188 
This decision, however, is inseparable from practical reasons. As frequently stated by several 
Constitutional Justices to mass media, the Constitutional Court was burdened with the high volume 
of regional head electoral causing a major disruption to the main function of the Constitutional Court 
in dealing with constitutional review cases.189 
In addition, the Constitutional Court realised that handling local elections disputes may increase 
potential intervention to the Court by political parties or other parties nominating candidates in 
regional elections. This is evidenced by the arrest of the 3rd Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court 
Akil Mochtar (April 2013 - October 2013) by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) in a 
bribery case related to several regional head electoral disputes handled by the Constitutional Court.190 
By eliminating its power in adjudicating local election disputes, the Constitutional Court expected 
that they could focus on examining constitutional review cases, and therefore minimising potential 
disturbance to the independence and impartiality of the Constitutional Justices.   
The Constitutional Court’s decision for eliminating its power in deciding regional head election 
disputes has attracted controversy because the Court provided different interpretations between the 
first and the second case of the Jurisdiction of Regional Head Electoral Dispute, as previously 
discussed. It has caused the Constitutional Court’s decision to appear unconvincing and 
                                               
188 Ibid 60. 
189‘Ketua MK: Kami Justru Senang Tak Tangani Sengketa Pemilukada [Chief Justice: We are actually pleased not handle 
regional head elections], Liputan 6 (online), 28 November 2013 <http://news.liputan6.com/read/759632/ketua-mk-kami-
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190 ‘Chief Justice of Constitutional Court Detained by Anti-Corruption Authority’, Jakarta Globe (online), 3 October 
2013 <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/news/chief-justice-of-constitutional-court-detained-by-anti-corruption-authori-
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inconsistent.191 In fact, when the Court declared the decision, the jurisdiction to resolve regional head 
election disputes was being discussed both by the President and the DPR.192 According to the new 
Law, enacted in 2015, the DPR granted the power to the Constitutional Court for settling regional 
head electoral disputes. In other words, the Constitutional Court is still mandated to settle regional 
head electoral disputes until the government successfully establishes a special judicial institution for 
handling election cases.193 
C   Dispute between State Institutions 
Jurisdiction to resolve disputes between state institutions is one of the powers possessed by 
Constitutional Courts in various countries. In federal countries, such as Austria and Germany, 
disputes between the federal government and the states have to be resolved by the Constitutional 
Court. During the process of constitutional amendment in Indonesia, all factions in the MPR agreed 
to give power to the Constitutional Court for adjudicating disputes of authorities between state 
institutions. At that time, there were suggestions of providing the Constitutional Court with a power 
to adjudicate disputes, not only between state institutions, but also between central and regional 
governments, and between regional governments.194 After a lengthy debate process, it was agreed 
that the Constitutional Court’s power is limited to settling disputes between state institutions with an 
emphasis on the authorities belonging to state institutions, granted by the Constitution.195 
The MPR’s minutes of meeting does not explicitly mention reasons why the Constitutional Court is 
only given limited authority to resolve disputes between state institutions deriving authorities from 
the 1945 Constitution. However, according to Hamdan Zoelva’s explanation as recorded in the 
MPR’s minutes of meeting, the limited authority is associated with the function of the Constitutional 
Court as the last bastion in maintaining the purity of the 1945 Constitution, so that disputes between 
state institutions whose authorities are not granted by the Constitution are excluded. 
Therefore, if there is a dispute to be decided by the Court, it is only a dispute between state 
institutions that are regulated by the Constitution. Thus, the state institutions that are not 
                                               
191 In its decision, there were three Constitutional Justices who delivered dissenting opinions, namely Justice Arief 
Hidayat, who later became the 5th Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Justice Anwar Usman, and Justice A. Fadlil 
Sumadi. 
192See Pan Mohamad Faiz, ‘Quo Vadis Sengketa Pilkada?’ [Quo Vadis of Regional Head Electoral Disputes?] Koran 
SINDO (Jakarta), 22 May 2014, 6. 
193 See Article 157 of Law No. 8 of 2015 on Amendment of Law No. 1 of 2015 concerning the Stipulation of Interim 
Emergency Law No. 1 of 2014 concerning Election of Governor, Regent and Mayor becomes Law. 
194 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, above n 19, 497. 
195 See Article 24C(1) of the Constitution. 
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regulated in the Constitution or whose authorities are not regulated in the Constitution their 
disputes are not settled by the Constitutional Court.196 
The state institutions that can be applicants or respondents in a dispute are limited, namely the DPR, 
the DPD, the MPR, the President, the Supreme Audit, the Regional Government or other state 
institutions whose authorities are granted by the Constitution.197 Although its authorities are also 
granted by the Constitution, the Supreme Court cannot be a party to a dispute of authority over a 
technicality of the judiciary.198 Moreover, not all authorities belonging to the state institutions can be 
an object of a dispute. In other words, only authorities prescribed by the Constitution that can be the 
object of a dispute between state institutions before the Constitutional Court. 
Until 2015, the Constitutional Court has adjudicated 24 cases of disputes between state institutions, 
which only constitutes 1.5% of the total cases handled by the Constitutional Court. Among those 
cases, only one case was granted (4%), three cases were denied (12%), 17 cases were dismissed 
(68%), and 4 other cases were withdrawn by the applicants during court hearings (16%). 
 
Most of cases dismissed by the Constitutional Court were due to either the petitioners not having 
legal standing (subjectum litis) or the objects of dispute were not the authorities defined by the 
Constitution (objectum litis). However, definition of the state institutions whose authorities are 
granted by the Constitution is still being debated by academics in Indonesia. The Constitutional Court 
never defined the names of state institutions in detail that can be parties concerning state institutional 
                                               
196 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, above n 19, 473. 
197 Article 2(1) of the Constitutional Court Regulation No 08/PMK/2006 on the Guidelines for Litigation in Dispute on 
Constitutional Authorities between State Institutions (hereinafter, the Constitutional Court Regulation on SKLN). 
198 Article 65 of the Constitutional Court Law and Article 2(3) of the Constitutional Court Regulation on SKLN. 
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disputes. However, according to the Constitutional Court Decision in the SKLN Bekasi Election (2006), 
the Court gives more emphasis on the type of authorities granted by the Constitution than on the type 
of state institutions. It means that the state institutions that can be parties in the Constitutional Court 
are not only the state institution whose authorities explicitly granted by the Constitution, but also 
limited state institutions whose authority is given by legislations based on the Constitution.199 
Several cases that attracted public attention, for example, are the dispute between the DPD and the 
DPR;200 the dispute between the Regent of Bekasi and the President;201 the dispute between the 
Minister of Home Affairs and the Independent Election Commission of Aceh;202 the dispute between 
the Government and the DPR;203 and the dispute between the Election Commission and the Regional 
Government of Papua.204 
D  Dissolution of Political Parties 
The jurisdiction to dissolve political parties granted to the Constitutional Court is inseparable from 
Indonesia’s political history. Some political parties have been dissolved or suspended without a clear 
mechanism, particularly in the absence of opportunity for political parties to defend themselves. 
During the Old Order under the Soekarno’s regime, the Masyumi Party (Partai Masyumi) and the 
Islamic Union Party (Partai Sarikat Islam or PSI) were dissolved, while the Murba Party (Partai 
Musyawarah Rakyat Banyak or Partai Murba) was suspended.205 In addition, the Indonesian 
Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI) was dissolved and the Indonesia Party (Partai 
Indonesia or Partindo) was suspended under the Soeharto’s New Order regime.206 
During the discussion of the constitutional amendment in 2001, there was a debate about the state 
institution that would be granted a power to dissolve political parties, whether it would be given to 
the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court. Members of the MPR Ad Hoc Committee suggested 
                                               
199 See, eg, Jimly Asshiddiqie, Sengketa Kewenangan Antarlembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi [Disputes of Authorities 
between State Institutions Post-Reform] (Konpress, 2005). 
200 See BPK Members Appointment (2004) case. 
201 See SKLN Bekasi Election (2006) case. 
202 See SKLN Aceh Election (2012) case. 
203 See Newmont Divestment (2012) case. 
204 See SKLN Papua Election (2012) case. 
205 Muchamad Ali Safa’at, Pembubaran Partai Politik di Indonesia (Analisis Pengaturan Hukum dan Praktik 
Pembubaran Partai Politik 1959-2004) [Dissolution of Political Parties in Indonesia (An Analysis of Legal Regulation 
and Practice of Dissolution of Political Parties 1959-2004] (Doctoral Thesis, Universitas Indonesia, 2009); Hamdan 
Zoelva, Pemakzulan Presiden di Indonesia [Impeachment of the President in Indonesia] (Doctoral Thesis, Universitas 
Padjajaran, 2010) 162-74. 
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that the Supreme Court was considered more appropriate to handle the pending cases of cassation, 
while the constitutional justices were better qualified to deal with cases related to the Constitution.207  
Additionally, Pataniari Siahaan explained that matters concerning political issues are more 
appropriately resolved by the Constitutional Court, as the case in other countries. Siahaan argues, 
‘…Constitutional Court handles matters relating to political issues, but it is not possible or not 
appropriate if it includes legal matters, criminal law or administrative court matters and so forth.’ 
After considering different opinions, the MPR decided that the power to dissolve political parties 
should be given to the Constitutional Court.208 
However, the only applicant who can file a case of dissolution of political parties is the Central 
Government.209 This mechanism has been criticised because the ruling party in government can abuse 
their power to dissolve the opposition parties, and vice versa they can protect their political parties 
from being dissolved. In submitting a petition, the government can be represented by the Attorney 
General and/or the Minister assigned by the President.210 There are two reasons for the dissolution of 
political parties by the Constitutional Court, namely: (1) if the ideology, principles, objectives and 
programs of a political party are contrary to the Constitution; or (2) activities of a political party or 
the consequences thereof are in conflict with the Constitution.211  
If the petition is granted, the Court will declare the dissolution of the political party and revoke its 
legal status. In addition, the legal effect of the decision might be: (1) prohibition of the existence of 
political parties and the use of its symbols in Indonesia; (2) dismissal of all members of the DPR and 
the DPRD coming from the disbanded political party; (3) prohibition of the former board members 
of the disbanded political party to engage in other political activities; and (4) expropriation by the 
state of the disbanded political party’s assets.212  
At the time of this writing, there has not been a single application submitted by the Central 
Government to the Constitutional Court to dissolve a political party. However, there is a constitutional 
                                               
207 See Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Risalah Rapat Pleno ke-19 Panitia Ad Hoc I, Badan Pekerja 
MPR tanggal 29 Mei 2001 [Minutes of the 19th Plenary Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee I, the Working Committee of 
People’s Consultative Assembly on 29 May 2001] (Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2008). 
208 Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, above n 19, 505. 
209 Article 68(2) of the Constitutional Court Law. 
210 Article 3(1) of the Constitutional Court Regulation No. 12 of 2008 on Procedure for Litigation of Political Parties. 
211 Article 68(2) of the Constitutional Court Law and Article 2 of the Constitutional Court Regulation on Procedure for 
Litigation of Political Parties. 
212 Article 10(1) and (2) of the Constitutional Court Regulation on Procedure for Litigation of Political Parties. 
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review case regarding the provisions restricting eligibility of petitioners for political party dissolution 
to the Constitutional Court. This case was denied by the Court on the grounds that the provisions 
were created based on legal and political choices of the legislators.213 
Although the presence of political parties’ dissolution mechanisms is strongly criticised in many 
countries, there is no significant debate in Indonesia on this matter. The reason is that Indonesia still 
undergoes a phase of democratic consolidation. Therefore, dissolution is believed to provide a strong 
warning for political parties, against prevalent practice of corruption which nowadays mostly involves 
the elites of political parties. Indeed, dissolution of political parties through an open hearing 
mechanism before the Constitutional Court can deter arbitrary reoccurrence of political party 
dissolution by the ruling government. 
E   Impeachment of the President and the Vice President 
The last jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is related with the process of impeachment of the 
President and/or the Vice President. The impeachment provision in the Constitution governs the 
Constitutional Court’s corresponding jurisdiction differently. It is not only stated in a different 
paragraph, but it also places emphasis on the obligation of the Constitutional Court to give a decision 
on an impeachment case. Given that the nature of this case has a very high political significance, the 
word of ‘obligation’ gives a meaning that the Constitutional Court cannot delay, impede, or even 
refuse to examine the impeachment petition.  
Similar to the political history of dissolution of political parties in Indonesia, there were also few 
Presidents of Indonesia who were impeached or resigned from their office for only political reasons. 
For instance, the first President, Soekarno, was impeached by the Temporary People’s Consultative 
Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Sementara, or MPRS) in 1966; the second President, Soeharto, 
resigned in 1998 after massive protests by people across Indonesia; and the third President, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, was impeached by the MPR in 2001. Based on those bitter experiences, a 
proposal to create an impeachment mechanism through the Constitutional Court was raised during 
the process of constitutional amendment. 
The impeachment of the President and/or the Vice President is to be proposed by the DPR by first 
submitting a petition to the Constitutional Court. The reasons to impeach the President and/or the 
Vice President are limited to the reasons stated in the Constitution, which are: the violation of the law 
through an act of treason, corruption, bribery, other high crimes, or moral turpitude, and/or when the 
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President and/or the Vice President no longer meet the qualifications to be President and/or Vice 
President.214 The reasons of impeachment were adopted from the United States Constitution, which 
are: treason, bribery, other high crimes and misdemeanours.215 Article 10(3) of the Constitutional 
Court Law explains the grounds of impeachment in more details as follows: 
a. Treason against the state is a criminal offence against the security of the state as prescribed 
by law.  
b. Corruption and bribery are criminal offences of corruption and bribery as prescribed by law. 
c. Other serious criminal offences are criminal acts punishable by a prison sentence of five years 
or more. 
d. Misconduct is an act which undermines the dignity of the President and/or the Vice President.  
e. Non-fulfillment of the requirements to be a President and/or Vice President is a condition as 
stated in Article 6 of the Constitution. 
Submission of the petition to the Constitutional Court shall only be made by the DPR with the support 
of at least two-thirds of the DPR members.216 Moreover, the Court shall make its decision no later 
than 90 working days after the petition is registered.217 If the President and/or the Vice President 
resign during the court hearings, the examination process will be terminated and the case will be 
disqualified by the Constitutional Court.218 
However, the decision on the impeachment case is not a final decision which determines the dismissal 
of the President and/or the Vice President. If the Constitutional Court decides that the President and/or 
the Vice President proved to have violated the Constitution, then the MPR, which consists of the DPR 
members and the DPD members, will hold a plenary session to decide the proposal of the DPR to 
impeach the President and/or the Vice President. The session shall be conducted for not more than 30 
days and it can only be held when it is attended by three-fourths of the MPR members. In addition, 
the decision can only be taken if it is approved by at least two-thirds of the MPR members who are 
present.219 
                                               
214 Article 7A and Article 7B of the Constitution. 
215 Article 2(4) of the United States Constitution. 
216 Article 7B(3) of the Constitution. 
217 Article 7B(4) of the Constitution. 
218Article 82 of the Constitutional Court Law. 
219 Article 7B(7) of the Constitution. 
55 
 
 
Thus, the impeachment process in Indonesia involves three different state institutions, namely the 
DPR, the Constitutional Court and the MPR. Harjono, a former Constitutional Justice and one of the 
framers of the amended Constitution, divides the impeachment process into three phases: (1) the issue 
of fact which is collected by the DPR, (2) the issue of law which is decided by the Constitutional 
Court, and (3) the political process which is returned to the DPR and decided by the MPR.220 
Based on the above explanation, the present impeachment mechanism in Indonesia is a very long and 
difficult process. The final decision on impeachment is not in the hands of the Constitutional Court. 
This system is different with the impeachment process in South Korea, where the Constitutional Court 
of South Korea has the final power for deciding impeachment cases, not only limited to the President 
and/or the Vice President, but also other state officials.221 
IV   CONCLUSION 
Discussion about the need for a constitutional review mechanism in the Indonesian judicial system 
has been debated since prior to independence in 1945. However, the idea was rejected because it was 
considered incompatible with the system and form of Indonesian government at that time. The 
constitutional review mechanism was practically exercised for the first time after the establishment 
of the Constitutional Court in 2003 based on constitutional amendments. However, during the 
discussion of constitutional amendments in the MPR, conflicts of interest between the political 
factions in the MPR were many. Initially, a power of constitutional review would be given to the 
Supreme Court. Yet, this proposal was rejected indirectly by the Supreme Court itself on the grounds 
that there were still thousands of pending cases awaiting decision. Giving a new power to the Supreme 
Court means that it would only add more burden. 
On the other hand, not all members of the MPR wanted to establish a Constitutional Court with strong 
position and power. At first, most factions intended for the Constitutional Court to be a part of or 
under the Supreme Court, and not a special and separate court. The constitutional review power was 
also limited to reviewing the constitutionality of laws, excluding regulations or other decisions made 
by public authorities. In addition, a recommendation given by the Constitutional Commission stating 
that the Constitutional Court should be given constitutional complaint power was also rejected by the 
MPR. 
                                               
220 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, above n 128, 331. 
221 Article 65(1) of the Korean Constitution. 
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Ultimately, the Constitutional Court was established as a special and separate court from the Supreme 
Court with several jurisdictions, namely: (1) to review the constitutionality of laws; (2) to settle 
disputes between state institutions; (3) to resolve election disputes; (4) to dissolve political parties; 
and (5) to decide on impeachment of the President and/or the Vice President. The MPR’s decision in 
establishing the Constitutional Court was a compromise; due to political interests and lack of 
understanding from most of its members concerning the importance of constitutional review 
mechanism and the Constitutional Court. 
Twelve years since its establishment, the Constitutional Court has exercised three of five of its 
constitutional powers. The Court has never examined cases related to the dissolution of political 
parties and the impeachment of the President and/or the Vice President. Most cases examined by the 
Court have been related to election disputes. Many election cases were lodged to the Constitutional 
Court after the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to settle regional head electoral disputes was moved to 
the Constitutional Court by the DPR in 2008. Therefore, Constitutional Court examination of election 
disputes includes presidential elections, legislative elections and regional head elections. 
Consequently, the Court is burdened with regional head electoral dispute cases lodged from all over 
Indonesia throughout the year. The Court hence no longer sets priority to examining constitutional 
review cases as its main power. 
In May 2014, the Constitutional Court made an important decision. In its decision, the Court reasoned 
that the power of the Constitutional Court to examine regional head electoral disputes was contrary 
to the original intent of the Constitution. In other words, the Court declared that they were not granted 
a power by the Constitution to resolve the regional head electoral disputes anymore. However, before 
the Government establishes a new court that will specifically deal with regional head election 
disputes, the Constitutional Court will still handle all regional head electoral disputes during the 
period of transition. 
Furthermore, a limited jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of laws 
has caused its function as the guardian of the constitution becoming less than optimal. In several 
cases, the Court was forced to exercise judicial activism by indirectly reviewing constitutionality of 
regulations. In addition, the dualism of judicial review systems carried out by the Constitutional Court 
and the Supreme Court, at the same time, also creates an ineffective system prone to the occurrence 
of conflicting decisions. 
The lack of rules and explanations concerning definition and scope of disputes between state 
institutions, both in the Constitution and the Constitutional Court Law, has led the Constitutional 
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Court to interpret and to develop their own definitions on state institutions and eligibility of parties 
before the Constitutional Court. The vague definition of state institutions has resulted in 16 of the 20 
dispute applications between state institutions being unacceptable, as the applicants were deemed 
ineligible and lacking in legal standing required by the Constitution. 
The weakness of the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction could also be found in the 
impeachment power. Although an impeachment decision of the Court is final in terms of law, the 
impeachment mechanism provided in the Constitution may lead the Constitutional Court’s decision 
to be ruled out by a political decision by the DPR or the MPR. It means that the Court’s decision on 
impeachment is not absolutely final and binding compared to the Korean Constitutional Court. The 
problem regarding finality of Constitutional Court decision in impeachment case should be 
reconsidered in further constitutional amendment, so that the Court’s decision cannot be disregarded 
merely by a political decision. 
In addition to the weaknesses of its jurisdiction, the Court has also re-proposed to have more powers 
concerning constitutional complaint and constitutional questions. It aims at strengthening the 
Constitutional Court’s function of protecting fundamental rights of citizens. However, the current 
institutional structure of the Constitutional Court is not ready to acquire these additional powers. If 
the Court is not able to handle the constitutional complaint and constitutional question cases, it is 
concerned that these additional powers will suffer the same fate such as when the Constitutional Court 
‘amputated’ its power to resolve regional head electoral disputes.222 
Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded that the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdictions has not had been stable. The DPR, the President and the Constitutional Court are still in 
the process of trial and error in determining the jurisdictions of the Constitutional Court. Thus, I 
believe that there will be changes in the Constitutional Court’s jurisdictions in the future, following 
the needs and the dynamic development of constitutional structure in Indonesia. To sum up, the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court is still searching for its identity by choosing the appropriate 
jurisdictions based on Indonesian political and constitutional context. 
***
                                               
222 Discussion on constitutional complaint and constitutional question is discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
MAINTAINING SEPARATION OF POWERS AND DEMOCRACY IN INDONESIA 
THROUGH THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The fundamental aim of constitutional government, considered a nomocracy as opposed to an 
autocracy, is the achievement of the rule of law as opposed to the rule of men. There are many 
institutional devices that promote and protect constitutional government. Among the most important 
of these are: (1) the separation of powers with checks and balances mechanism; (2) the representative 
democracy; and (3) the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. In this chapter, I will analyse 
the decisions of the Constitutional Court that influenced the constitutional government system in 
Indonesia. This chapter will focus on two out of three of the aforementioned elements, namely the 
separation of powers and the representative democracy, the remaining element will be discussed in 
the next chapter. This chapter is necessarily limited to examining landmark decisions of the 
Constitutional Court. I will begin by briefly explaining the nature of these elements in the Indonesian 
context. 
I   IMPLEMENTATION OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
One of the main elements of a constitutional government is the separation of powers. This element 
serves to create clear boundaries between branches of government, namely the executive, the 
legislative and the judiciary.223 It is difficult to establish a constitutional government without 
substantial separation between the branches of government that serves to create a checks and balances 
mechanism, thereby keeping a dominant power from threatening the rights and freedoms of the 
people, as well as democratic governance.224 This notion is based on the theory of separation of 
powers developed by Montesquieu in his work De L’Esprit des Lois (The Spirit of the Law).225 
Presently, there is no country in the world that purely implements the separation of powers based on 
Montesquieu’s theory by dividing strict separation between the executive, the legislative and the 
judiciary. 
The two main models of separation of powers are the presidential system and the parliamentary 
system. These two systems have many variations worldwide. Indonesia has adopted the presidential 
system, referring to the basic system of separation of powers as practiced in the United States. The 
                                               
223 Ratnapala, above n 1, 91. 
224 Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The Presidency A to Z (CQ Press, 2012) 497.  
225 See Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (1793). 
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separation of powers system in Indonesia has undergone major changes since the reform era started 
in 1998. During Soekarno’s Guided Democracy (1959-1965) and Soeharto’s authoritarian regime 
(1966-1998), an imbalance of power existed between the branches of government. The President had 
enormous powers, including the power to make national laws.226 There were also myriad political 
interventions by the executive towards the judiciary.227 After the 1945 Constitution was amended in 
1999 to 2002, the executive branch power dominance has shifted to the legislature. According to Saldi 
Isra, the current legislature holds considerable power.228  
In the context of the separation of powers, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has made various 
decisions to strengthen the checks and balances by expanding, reducing or asserting the powers of 
different state institutions. It has also resolved conflicts between state institutions relating to 
constitutional powers. Such decisions have been primarily based upon two jurisdictions of the 
Constitutional Court: (1) deciding disputes concerning state institutions’ limits of power as provided 
by the Constitution; and (2) reviewing constitutionality of laws.  
A   Limitations on the DPR’s Approvals 
In the Supreme Court Justices Selection (2013) case, the Constitutional Court interpreted the power 
of the DPR in selecting the Supreme Court Justices under Article 24A(3) of the Constitution. This 
provision reads, ‘Supreme Court Justice candidates shall be proposed by the Judicial Commission to 
the House of Representatives for approval and shall be subsequently stipulated as Justices of the 
Supreme Court by the President.’ Pursuant to Article 8(2), (3) and (4) of the Supreme Court Law and 
Article 18(4) of the Judicial Commission Law, the DPR selects one of three candidates proposed by 
the Judicial Commission. 
According to the Constitutional Court, those provisions are not in accordance with the Constitution 
because it has changed the DPR’s power from ‘giving approval’ to ‘selecting’ candidates for the 
Supreme Court. This decision was made to strengthen the independence of the Supreme Court 
Justices, who shall not be influenced by political forces or other branches government.229 Thus, the 
                                               
226 Article 4 of the 1945 Constitution (original) says, ‘The President of the Republic of Indonesia shall hold the power to 
make laws in agreement with the House of Representatives.’  
227 See Pompe, above n 40. 
228 See Saldi Isra, Pergeseran Fungsi Legislatif: Menguatnya Model Legislasi Parlementer dalam Sistem Presidensial 
Indonesia [The Shifting of Legislative Function: Strengthening the Parliamentary Legislation Model in Indonesian 
Presidential System] (RajaGrafindo Perkasa, 2010). 
229 See Supreme Court Justices Selection (2013) case, 51. 
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Constitutional Court’s decision implies that the Judicial Commission should only propose one 
candidate for each vacancy, so that the DPR only approves or disapproves the proposed candidate. 
Moreover, in the KY and KPK Members Selection (2014) case, the Constitutional Court also found 
that the DPR’s power is limited to approving or not approving the Judicial Commission (Komisi 
Yudisial, or KY) members proposed by the Selection Committee formed by the President. The legal 
reason was based on the interpretation of Article 24B(3) of the Constitution. However, the Court did 
not provide any limitation concerning the DPR’s power in selecting the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, or KPK) members. According to the Court, the DPR’s 
power in selecting the KPK members is not limited to granting or withholding approval, but includes 
the power to select the candidates proposed by the President. The Court found that there is no specific 
constitutional provision mandating the establishment of the KPK and the mechanism for selecting 
KPK members in the Constitution.230 
Based on the two cases describe above, it is clear that the Constitutional Court seeks to create a clear 
line for the DPR in selecting members of other state institutions. The Court decisions have influenced 
the principles of checks and balances between the DPR as a legislative power, the Supreme Court as 
a judicial power and the President as an executive power. As a result of the Constitutional Court 
decisions, the DPR no longer has the power to freely select candidates of Supreme Court Justices and 
Judicial Commission members proposed by the Selection Committee. The DPR’s power was thus 
limited to giving approval or refusing approval for those candidates. 
B   Legislative Powers of the DPD 
Pursuant to Article 2(1) of the Constitution, the MPR consists of the DPR members and the DPD 
members who are elected through the national elections. However, powers granted by the 
Constitution to the DPD is not the same or even comparable with the powers possessed by the DPR. 
The DPD only has limited powers to propose bills to the DPR related to regional autonomy; the 
relationship between central and regional government; formation, expansion and merger of local 
governments; management of natural resources and other economic resources; and bills related to the 
financial balance between central and regional government.231  
                                               
230 See KY and KPK Members Selection (2014) case, 72. 
231 Article 22D(1) of the Constitution. 
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Additionally, the DPD can only participate in the discussion on corresponding bills and provide 
considerations to the DPR on bills related to the state budget, taxes, education and religion.232 The 
DPD is given a limited power to oversee the implementation of concerned laws, where results of 
oversight shall be submitted to the DPR only for further considerations.233 Therefore, the powers of 
DPD are quite different from the Senate in the United States. The DPD has weaker powers than the 
DPR. Due to the differences of powers, the DPD attempted to increase its powers by proposing the 
fifth amendment of the Constitution. In addition, the DPD also lodged applications for constitutional 
review to the Constitutional Court. 
The first constitutional dispute between state institutions decided by the Constitutional Court was 
lodged by the DPD against the President and the DPR. In the BPK Members Appointment (2004) 
case, the DPD questioned the dismissal of the Supreme Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, 
or BPK) members (1999-2004) and the selection of the new BPK members (2004-2009), because the 
DPD had not been involved in the process. The DPD application was based on Article 23F(1) of the 
Constitution which reads, ‘Members of the Supreme Audit Board shall be selected by the House of 
Representatives by taking into account the considerations of the Regional Representative Council and 
shall be inaugurated by the President.’ 
In its decision, the Court found that the selection process did not ignore the constitutional power 
granted by the Constitution to the DPD. According to the Court, the new DPD members were 
inaugurated on 1 October 2004, while the process for selecting the BPK members had been completed 
by the DPR on 2 June 2004. The Court offered two alternative choices to the DPR, either postpone 
the selection process until the inauguration day of the DPD members, or exercise its constitutional 
power by selecting the BPK members according to Article I on Transitional Provisions of the 
Constitution; both were deemed equally constitutional.234 
Furthermore, in the MPR Speaker (2009) case, five members of the DPD filed for constitutional 
review of Article 14(1) of Law Number 2007 of 2009 on MPR, DPR, DPD and DPRD (hereinafter 
the MD3 Law (2009), as this provision stipulates that only a DPR member can be the Speaker of the 
MPR. 
                                               
232 Article 22D(2) of the Constitution. 
233 Article 22D(3) of the Constitution. 
234 Article I on the Transitional Provisions of the Constitution states, ‘All existing laws and regulations shall remain valid 
as long as no new ones are established in conformity with this Constitution.’ 
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According to the applicants, this provision could obstruct the DPD members from being selected as 
the MPR Speaker. It also resulted in the position of the MPR members from the DPD deemed not 
equivalent to the MPR members from the DPR. In its decision, the Constitutional Court declared that 
the phrase of ‘from the DPR members’ is unconstitutional. Hence, the MPR Speaker can be selected 
equally from the DPR members or the DPD members. However, the Court also annulled the system 
of representative composition for the MPR Deputy Speakers because it reflects the bicameralism 
mindset and institutional sectoral approach that are not in accordance with the Constitution.235 The 
implication of this decision is that the MPR Speaker and four Deputy-Speakers position can be filled 
by either from the DPR members or the DPD members, without any specific quota assigned.  
Furthermore, in the DPD Legislative Powers (2012) case, the DPD as a state institution filed a 
constitutional review of the MD3 Law (2009) and the 2011 Establishment of Laws and Regulations 
Law (hereinafter the P3 Law (2011)) because several provisions in the laws were considered to have 
reduced the law-making power of the DPD. In its decision, the Constitutional Court partially granted 
the petition. According to the Court, all the provisions in the MD3 Law (2009) and the P3 Law (2011) 
that have reduced the legislative power of the DPD specified by the Constitution, or reduced the 
functions, duties and powers of the DPD, must be declared unconstitutional. Thus, the Constitutional 
Court invalidated various provisions that have reduced the DPD power, particularly in law-making 
functions. 
Based on the three different cases explained above, it is important to point out that the Constitutional 
Court decisions have secured powers of the DPD in accordance with the Indonesian Constitution. 
These decisions have also clarified and strengthened the DPD’s powers in exercising its legislative 
function. In this context, the DPD’s efforts to strengthen its powers in accordance with the 
Constitution were more successfully pursued through constitutional reviews in the Constitutional 
Court, as its proposals to amend the Constitution did not receive a positive response from their 
colleagues in the DPR. However, the Constitutional Court’s decision to strengthen the power of DPD 
was ignored in legislation process by the DPR and the President that continue to limit the power of 
DPD. Consequently, enforcement of the Court’s decision becomes problematic. Thus, the DPD re-
submitted an application for another constitutional review to the Constitutional Court requesting the 
Court to provide confirmation of its earlier ruling that has strengthened the DPD’s authority. The 
problems of Constitutional Court decisions enforcement will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
                                               
235 See MPR Speaker (2009) case, 31. 
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C   Oversight Function of the DPR 
Under Article 20A(2) of the Constitution, the DPR has three rights, namely the right of interpellation 
(interpelasi), the right of inquiry (angket) and the right to deliver its opinion (pendapat). There is no 
further explanation in the Constitution about the mechanism for exercising such rights. Yet, there is 
an implicit mandate for such to be regulated by law.236 In Article 77(2) of the MD3 Law (2009), the 
DPR rights are described as follows.  
The interpellation right allows the DPR to ask for information from the government concerning the 
government policies that are deemed important and strategic, with broad impact on society, the nation 
and the state. The inquiry right allows the DPR to conduct an investigation on the implementation of 
laws or the government policies that allegedly contravene laws and regulations. The DPR has the 
right to deliver an opinion on the following matters: (1) government policies or extraordinary events 
that occurred nationally or internationally; (2) a follow up on the implementation of interpellation 
right and inquiry rights; and (3) an allegation that the President and/or the Vice President has 
committed a violation of law in the form of treason, corruption, bribery, other serious criminal 
offence, disgraceful conduct, or if it is proven that he/she no longer meets the requirements as the 
President and/or the Vice President.237 
In the DPR Inquiry Right (2010) case, the Constitutional Court revoked Law Number 6 of 1954 on 
the DPR Inquiry Right (hereinafter the Inquiry Law) that refers to the parliamentary system under the 
1950 Provisional Constitution.238 The Inquiry Rights stipulated in Article 28 of the Inquiry Law 
includes a power for the President to dissolve the DPR. According to the Constitutional Court, this 
provision is not in line with the current Indonesian Constitution that adopts the presidential system. 
In the presidential system, under the amended Constitution, the President cannot freeze or dissolve 
the DPR.239 In addition, the procedures of establishment and the working mechanism of the Inquiry 
Committee have also been regulated in the MD3 Law (2009). The Court reasoned that if they did not 
                                               
236 Article 20A(4) of the Constitution. 
237 See also Article 7B of the Constitution concerning the impeachment of the President and/or the Vice President. 
238 Indonesia adopted the parliamentary system from 1950 to 1959. During these nine years, there were seven times of 
replacements of the Prime Minister that caused a political instability in Indonesia. 
239 See Article 7C of the Constitution. This provision was made based on the constitutional history of Indonesia in 1959 
when President Soekarno dissolved the Constituent Assembly (Konstituante) using the Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. 
See Asshiddiqie, above n 6, 69. 
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invalidate the Inquiry Law, it would lead to a legal certainty because there were two laws where its 
substances were contradictory.240  
Furthermore, in the DPR Opinion Rights (2010) case, the Constitutional Court invalidated provisions 
concerning the three-fourths quorum of the DPR’s rights to deliver an opinion. The legal reason is 
that the minimum requirement regulated in the provisions is more difficult than the requirement 
determined by the Constitution. The Court reasoned that the requirement of a quorum has led to an 
inability of the DPR to effectively oversee presidential practices. Consequently, it is not in accordance 
with the checks and balances mechanism adopted in the Constitution.241 According to the Court, the 
impeachment procedures of the President and/or the Vice President, as determined by the 
Constitution, has reflected a stronger presidential system.242 The procedures require only an approval 
from at least two-thirds of the total members of the DPR. Hence, the Court ruled that the quorum 
requirement of the DPR, to exercise its rights to deliver opinion, should be a simple majority. 
Referring to the two decisions above, the Constitutional Court has revoked the Inquiry Law that 
authorised the President to dissolve or to freeze the DPR. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has 
created a wider opportunity for the DPR to exercise its rights to deliver opinion in order to oversee 
government policies. Given this evidence, it can be seen that the Constitutional Court plays a strategic 
role in strengthening the presidential system and balancing the powers between the executive and the 
legislative branches. 
D   Powers and Independence of the Constitutional Court 
There has been a critical discussion as to whether the Constitutional Court can review the 
constitutionality of laws that regulate its own powers. In the Article 50 (2004) case, the Constitutional 
Court received a request to examine the constitutionality of Article 50 of the Constitutional Court 
Law that reads, ‘The laws that can be lodged for review are those which have been enacted after the 
introduction of the amendment to the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.’ The primary 
case filed by the applicants was for constitutional review of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
Law. However, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Law was enacted in 1987. Therefore, the 
applicants argued that Article 50 of the Constitutional Court Law had excluded the power of the 
Constitutional Court to examine the law. In its decision, the Court ruled that Article 50 has caused 
legal uncertainty leading to injustice, with two benchmarks existing for one legal system, namely 
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laws enacted prior to and after the amendment of the Constitution. Therefore, it is contrary to the 
doctrine of the hierarchy of legal norms that have been recognised and universally accepted. In 
addition, the Court also reasoned that Article 50 has undermined the Constitutional Court’s power 
granted by the Constitution. 243 
A positive result from this decision is that the Court can review the constitutionality of any laws 
enacted before the amendment of the 1945 Constitution. This ruling also removes the limitation for 
reviewing laws created during Soeharto’s New Order, in which many of them are deemed inconsistent 
with the checks and balances, human rights protection and democratic principles. 
The Constitutional Court also made several decisions related to the independence of the Court in the 
Judicial Commission (2006) case, the 2nd Constitutional Court Law Amendment (2011) case and the 
MK Perppu (2014) case. In these decisions, the Constitutional Court annulled several provisions 
granting power to the Judicial Commission to oversee the conduct of the Supreme Court Justices and 
the Constitutional Court Justices. The Constitutional Court also invalidated the provisions providing 
the Judicial Commission a role in selecting candidates for the Constitutional Court to propose to the 
President, the DPR and the Supreme Court. Applying systematic and original intent interpretation, 
the Court reasoned that the Judicial Commission is an auxiliary state organ that is different from the 
Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court which are the main state organs for performing judicial 
power functions. Thus, as an auxiliary state organ or a supporting element, the Judicial Commission 
cannot be granted a power for exercising the separation of power by overseeing Constitutional Court 
as a judicial institution. Therefore, according to the Court, the constitutional power of the Judicial 
Commission is limited to overseeing the individual behaviour of ordinary judges, both inside and 
outside the court. 
This decision clarifies the relationship between main state organs and auxiliary state organs in the 
context of checks and balances mechanism according to the Constitution. The revocation of the 
Judicial Commission power to oversee the Constitutional Court was also intended to strengthen the 
independence of its institution. However, critics claim this decision allows the Constitutional Court 
to avoid being overseen by the Judicial Commission. In fact, the Judicial Commission was 
deliberately established to carry out the external control function. Due to rampant judicial corruption 
in judicial institutions, the public do not believe that the internal control of the Constitutional Court 
Justices can strengthen independence and impartiality of the judiciary.244 
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Furthermore, in the 1st Constitutional Court Law Amendment (2011) case, the Constitutional Court 
reviewed various provisions in the Constitutional Court Law that had been revised by the DPR. The 
main reasons the DPR revised the Constitutional Court Law are that the Constitutional Court often 
annuls laws made by the DPR, makes ultra petita rulings and creates new norms through judicial 
activism. These acts are alleged as a judicial usurpation of the legislative function of the DPR. 
Academics and activists who argue that the revised Constitutional Court Law had curtailed the 
Constitutional Court’s powers in performing its constitutional duties lodged a constitutional review 
application. In its legal reasons, the Court ruled that restricting its powers can weaken the checks and 
balances performed by the Constitutional Court against decisions, policies and laws made by the other 
branches of government. Moreover, in MK Perpu (2014) case, the Constitutional Court also entirely 
revoked the Law based on the Interim Emergency Law on the Constitutional Court that revises 
provisions concerning requirements and mechanism for selecting constitutional justices. Thus, the 
Constitutional Court has annulled various provisions that limit its powers, causing outrage from the 
DPR and the President. They contended the only way to limit the powers of the Constitutional Court 
was to revise the powers contained in the Constitution through a constitutional amendment.  
Based on several decisions, as discussed above, there are indications that the Constitutional Court has 
been struggling to maintain its constitutional powers, encountering attempts made by the DPR and 
the President to limit them by revising the Constitutional Court Law. Without adequate powers, the 
function of the Constitutional Court to strengthen separation of power systems between the branches 
of government cannot run effectively. The Court also seeks to maintain its independence by 
invalidating the powers of the Judicial Commission in overseeing the conduct of the Constitutional 
Court Justices, including annulling various provisions stipulating other branches of government to sit 
in the Honorary Board of the Constitutional Court and the provisions concerning constitutional 
justices’ selection requirements and mechanism. However, those decisions have been under strong 
criticisms by academics, practitioners and NGO activists because it is perceived that the 
Constitutional Justices do not want any external institution oversight.   
E   Constitutionality of Interim Emergency Law (Perppu) 
One of the constitutional powers possessed by the President under the Constitution is to issue the 
Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang, or 
Perppu), or the Interim Emergency Law.245 The Indonesian Constitution only requires the ‘emergency 
circumstance’ (kegentingan yang memaksa) to declare the Interim Emergency Law. In addition, it 
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must obtain approval from the DPR in its subsequent session.246 If the DPR does not grant approval, 
the Interim Emergency Law is revoked.247 No further requirements or mechanism are regulated in the 
Constitution for declaring the Interim Emergency Law.  
In the Forestry Perppu (2005) case, the Constitutional Court formally reviewed Law Number 19 of 
2004 concerning the Enactment of Interim Emergency Law Number 1 of 2004 on the Amendment of 
Law Number 41 of 1999 on Forestry. In its decision, the Court interpreted that ‘emergency 
circumstances’, as referred in Article 22(1) of the Constitution, is the subjective assessment of the 
President, while the DPR assesses the objectivity of this decision in the next session, where it either 
accepts or rejects the Interim Emergency Law. Although, in this case, the application was dismissed, 
the Court sent an implied message to the President that, in the future, the grounds for declaring an 
Interim Emergency Law should be based on the objective conditions for the benefit of the nation.248 
Moreover, in the KPK Perppu (2009) case, the Constitutional Court ruled, for the first time, that they 
have a power to review the constitutionality of the Interim Emergency Law. The Court reasoned that, 
while the Interim Emergency Law is issued based on the subjective assessment of the President, it 
does not mean that the Interim Emergency Law is absolutely dependent on the subjective assessment 
of the President. In its decision, the Court provided three requirements as a parameter of ‘emergency 
circumstances’: (1) There is an urgent need to resolve legal issues immediately under a law; (2) The 
law needed is not available or deemed inadequate, thus creating a legal vacuum; and (3) The legal 
vacuum cannot be overcome by formulating a law through a regular procedure, since considerable 
time is required while the urgent conditions demand resolution with certainty.249  
The two decisions above confirm that the Constitutional Court has the power to examine other cases 
relating Interim Emergency Law.250 Thus, the Constitutional Court has limited the President’s rights 
and power to act arbitrarily in issuing the Interim Emergency Law. On this basis it may be inferred 
that this restriction has a direct implication in the strengthening the separation of power systems 
between the executive and the legislative power, particularly in the law-making function.  
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F   State Financial Conflicts 
Common institutional conflicts in Indonesia include conflicts related to planning, spending and 
controlling of state finances. Such conflicts not only involve the President and the DPR, but also the 
Supreme Audit Board (Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, or BPK). For instance, in the Newmont 
Divestment (2012) case, the President argued with the DPR concerning the divestment plan to 
purchase of a 7 per cent stake in gold and copper mining of PT Newmont Nusa Tenggara (NNT). 
According to the DPR and the BPK, the government must obtain approval from the DPR in advance. 
In contrast, the government, through the Ministry of Finance, believed it held constitutional authority 
to purchase of a 7 per cent stake as its role in governing the state administration. They considered the 
requirement of obtaining DPR approval obstructed and reduced the constitutional powers of the 
executive branch. This state financial conflict escalated into a political conflict because the political 
parties in the DPR had their own interests. 
The conflict finally ended after the Constitutional Court made a decision that the policy for purchasing 
a 7 per cent stake is a constitutional power of the President in governing the state. However, it can 
only be done through three requirements: (1) it must obtain an approval of the DPR, either through 
the mechanism of the State Budget Law or a specific consent; (2) transparency and accountability are 
in place for the greatest prosperity of the people; and (3) it is conducted under the monitoring of the 
DPR.251 
Furthermore, in the DPR Budgetary Board or the DPR Banggar (2013) case, the Constitutional Court 
curtailed the DPR’s power in exercising its budgetary function. The Court interpreted that the DPR’s 
power in budgetary function is limited to the approval and supervision of the budget only, but does 
not include the arrangements in the draft of the state budget because it would violate the principle of 
checks and balances incorporated in the Constitution. It means that the budgetary function of the DPR 
is only to approve or not approve the state budget bill proposed by the President but not making 
changes or amendments.  
Additionally, the Constitutional Court decided that the DPR could not delay the disbursement of the 
budget by putting ‘asterisk’ (tanda bintang) signs on certain budget items preventing budget to be 
spent. The Court ruled that this practice is not a form of the DPR oversight function towards the 
government.  
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When the DPR, through the Budgetary Board, has the power to discuss in details the draft 
of state budget up to the level of activities and type of expenditures, then at that time the 
DPR has surpassed its power in performing the budgetary function and has gone too far into 
the implementation of the budget planning which is the domain of the executive power.252 
The two different decisions, as discussed above, illustrate the role of the Constitutional Court in 
determining the powers of state institutions in the matters of state finances according to the 
Constitution. In terms of the oversight function, the Constitutional Court confirmed the importance 
of obtaining an approval from the DPR if the Government plans to make important economic policies 
using state finances that are not clearly included in the state budget. However, the Constitutional 
Court limits the budgetary and oversight functions that have been regularly exercised by the DPR, 
where the DPR no longer has a role in arranging and discussing the state budget in details, including 
delaying the disbursement of the budget. To sum up, the Constitutional Court decisions ensure a 
balance between legislative and executive powers in accordance with their respective functions. 
II   PRACTICES OF REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 
Another major element of constitutional government is a representative democracy,253 the most 
common model of democracy worldwide. This model creates a system in which representatives are 
elected democratically by the people to make policies and to govern the state. Mark Bevir argues that 
representative democracy is a form of government in which ‘the citizens of the state exercise their 
popular sovereignty through legitimately elected representatives.’254  
The election of representatives in this democratic model is usually conducted by one of two 
alternative election mechanisms, i.e. the plurality-majority method or the proportional-representation 
method. The latter method differs greatly with the plurality-majority method in that it uses an election 
system of winner takes all. In the proportional-representation, the ultimate goal is to provide 
opportunities for minorities and to avoid ‘wasted’ votes.255 However, in the representative democracy 
practices, the majority elected in the general election is not always able to make policy freely. There 
are rules that limit the powers of elected representatives within the framework of constitutional 
government, in which fundamental rights and freedoms serve as limitations to actions or decisions 
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254 Mark Bevir, Key Concepts in Governance (Sage Publications Ltd, 2009) 179. 
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made by the representatives.256 In addition, representative democracy is not only limited to the 
electoral process, but also post elections. One of the post-election mechanisms is carried out through 
public participation that can influence government policies. 
Indonesia has been holding general elections since 1955 as a mechanism for implementing 
representative democracy. Nevertheless, it is perceived that elections are limited only to achieve a 
form of procedural democracy, not the substantive democracy where the majority of people should 
have a real role in national political affairs. In addition, the electoral process has been carried out on 
a regular basis, but in practice manipulations and frauds were prevalent. Ironically, before the 1998 
political reform, no single court or state institution existed had the jurisdiction to resolve electoral 
disputes. In this context, the constitutional reform has brought changes to the practices of 
representative democracy in Indonesia. Currently, general elections are held by an independent state 
institution, called the General Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, or KPU). The 
numbers of political parties participating in elections are no longer limited to three political parties; 
and the President and the Vice President, as well as the local leaders, are elected directly by the 
people. Finally, the Constitutional Court, as a judicial institution, was established to resolve electoral 
disputes. 
In addition to the process of free and fair elections, the implementation of representative democracy 
can also be assessed from the policies and laws made by the elected legislators and the government. 
Various laws related to the representative democracy system have been reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court. This section will specifically analyse the Constitutional Court’s decisions that 
influenced and impacted the implementation of representative democracy in Indonesia. 
A   Regional Head Elections 
One of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdictions in dealing with electoral disputes had expanded, not 
only for presidential and legislative elections, but also for regional head elections. However, in an 
important decision, the Court has declared that the Constitutional Court no longer has the 
constitutional power to handle the regional head electoral disputes.257 Despite of the event, it remains 
necessary to assess the role of the Constitutional Court in addressing the regional head electoral 
disputes.  
                                               
256 Paul Wincfield Nesbitt-Larkinc, ‘Representative Democracy’ in Kenneth F. Warren (ed), Encyclopedia of U.S. 
Campaigns, Elections, and Electoral Behavior (Sage Publications, 2008) 708-9. 
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The Constitutional Court’s decision in regional head electoral disputes created important 
jurisprudences in resolving electoral disputes, including presidential and legislative electoral disputes. 
Initially, the Court’s competence to examine electoral disputes was limited to quantitative vote 
counting errors. However, the Court made a breakthrough by no longer only examining vote counting 
errors, but also any violation that occurred during elections. In other words, the Court stated that they 
are not a ‘Calculator Court’ (Makamah Kalkulator), referring to a court that merely re-checks the 
accuracy of the vote count. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Constitutional Court created a basic framework for granting an 
electoral complaint, namely, violations that are deemed ‘structured, systematic and massive.’ In the 
East Java Gubernatorial Election (2008) case, the Court, for the first time, ordered the Provincial 
Electoral Commission to conduct re-votes and recounts in several districts in the East Java Province. 
This progressive step was taken by the Court to enforce substantive justice and to provide broader 
benefits in upholding constitutional and democratic principles. This decision became the first and 
main jurisprudence for resolving other electoral disputes, demonstrating a shift in the Court’s 
paradigm from one of a merely procedural justice into a substantive justice. 
In the Timor Tengah Selatan Mayoral Election (2008) case, in addition to the structured, systematic 
and massive violations, the Constitutional Court also provided an additional parameter for granting 
an electoral complaint, which is ‘significant’. It means that violations must be able to affect the final 
results of the votes obtained by candidates. Moreover, in the Tanjungbalai Mayoral Election (2010) 
case, the Constitutional Court defined the structured, systematic and massive violations as violations 
impacting many people, which are well designed and involving state officials and/or election officials 
over time. 
Furthermore, in the Pandeglang Mayoral Election (2010) case, the Constitutional Court also declared 
another jurisprudence concerning the three categories of violations that may occur in electoral 
disputes. First, violations that are not influential or its effect is unpredictable upon the election results. 
For example, campaign materials and simulation papers that do not comply with the regulations. 
According to the Court, this type of violation cannot be used as a basis for invalidating the election 
results.258 Second, significant violations which are structured, systematic and massive that affect the 
election results, such as money politics, involvement of government officials or civil servants and 
allegations of criminal acts. According to the Court, violations that are insignificant, sporadic, partial, 
individual and that cannot be proven to influence the voters’ choice, would not be used as a basis to 
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invalidate the election result.259 Third, violations related to principle requirements for candidacy, that 
can be measured, such as the requirement for candidates to have never been sentenced to prison and 
requirements for independent candidates to demonstrate valid support. This type of violation can 
invalidate the election result because a candidate maybe ineligible to participate in the election.260 
Thus, electoral violations not only occur on the day of an election, but also before and after. Based 
on the Constitutional Court hearings, forms of violations that occurred in the regional head elections 
include manipulation of administrative requirements for candidacies, money politics, politicisation of 
the bureaucracy and partiality of state officials, negligence, infringement, and the partiality of the 
Electoral Commission and the Election Supervisory Committee, mistakes and manipulations in vote 
counting, threats, intimidation and mass mobilisation.261 
Based on the resolutions of hundreds of regional head electoral dispute cases, it is believed that the 
Constitutional Court has been contributing to building a healthy local democracy. Several landmark 
decisions on regional head electoral disputes have also been used by the Court for settling legislative 
and presidential election disputes. Nevertheless, as discussed in previous chapter, the Constitutional 
Court will examine regional head electoral disputes only until another institution is established to 
handle such disputes. The Constitutional Court’s decision to amputate its own power in handling 
regional head electoral disputes is considered unfortunate by many. In this view, the Court is 
considered to place greater concern on internal case management and lacks regards for local 
democracy in need of a reliable court as a guarantor for local election results. 
B   Legislative Elections 
The legislative elections in Indonesia aim to elect members for the DPR, the DPD and the DPRD. At 
the time of this writing, the Constitutional Court has handled 2004, 2009 and 2014 legislative election 
cases. The Constitutional Court’s power in resolving legislative electoral disputes has an important 
meaning for guarding democratic principles in Indonesia. The Court serves as a gatekeeper for the 
election process, often deemed undemocratic due to the miscalculations of vote counting, electoral 
violations and mismanagement of the KPU. 
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260 Ibid. 
261 For further discussion of this issue, see M. Mahrus  Ali et al, ‘Tafsir Konstitusional Pelanggaran Pemilukada yang 
Bersifat Sistematis, Terstruktur dan Masif’ [Constitutional Interpretation of ystematic, Structured and Massive Violations 
of the Regional Head Elections] (Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, 2011) 6-16; Butt, above n 91, 15. 
73 
 
 
The percentage of legislative electoral disputes granted by the Constitutional Court decreases with 
every election: 15% (2004), 11% (2009) and 1% (2014). This trend may be attributed by several 
reasons. First, election processes have relatively improved every year, as votes counting mistakes and 
electoral violations that can be proven in Constitutional Court have declined. Second, the 
Constitutional Court has become more selective in examining the evidences submitted to the Court. 
The electoral violations that do not meet the criteria of ‘structured, systematic and massive’ will not 
be granted by the Court. Third, the legislative candidates have better understanding of Constitutional 
Court’s procedures in dealing with electoral disputes, particularly in refuting evidences from the 
opposing parties. 
In its role as mediator of post-election political conflicts, the Constitutional Court has also become a 
judicial institution that serves as the final assessor of general elections, to ensure a free and fair 
process. Therefore, independence of Constitutional Court Justices is critical for both legislative 
candidates and the public who entrust the final process of electoral dispute resolutions to the 
Constitutional Court. Thus, the consolidation of democracy and the legislative elections in Indonesia 
will have stronger legitimacy when Constitutional Court is able to resolve legislative election disputes 
professionally and accountably.262 
C   Presidential Elections 
The 2004 Presidential Election was conducted directly by using the ‘one person, one vote’ system, 
for the first time in the history of Indonesia. Prior to 2004, presidential elections were carried out 
indirectly, as MPR members elected the President and the Vice President. The fourth principle of 
Pancasila, concerning the inner wisdom of deliberation and representation, was used as the main 
philosophy in carrying out indirect presidential elections at that time. The year 2004 also marks the 
first time the Constitutional Court handled the presidential electoral dispute. This section will describe 
the presidential election cases decided by the Court in 2004, 2009 and 2014. 
The first presidential election dispute was filed by Wiranto and Salahuddin Wahid (Wiranto-
Salahuddin) in 2004. They argued that there were mistakes and errors in the vote counting, either 
intentionally or unintentionally by the KPU, causing them to lose a significant amount of votes.263 In 
the presidential election system in Indonesia, if there is no candidate who obtaining more than 50% 
of the total valid votes, then the candidates who obtain the first and the second most votes will be 
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contending in the second round.264 In their petition, Wiranto-Salahuddin claimed they lost 5,434,660 
votes in the first round of the presidential election. Wiranto-Salahuddin ranked third with 26,286,788 
votes (22.15%), but if their claim could be proven, they could defeat Megawati Soekarnoputri and 
Hasyim Muzadi (Megawati-Hasyim) who ranked second, with 31,569,104 votes (26,61%).  
In its decision, the Constitutional Court found that the petitioners did not manage to prove their claims 
concerning the mistakes and errors of vote counting, so that the request was denied. In the second 
round, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jusuf Kalla (SBY-JK) won the presidential election with 
60.62% of the total votes, defeating Megawati-Hasyim with 39.38%. Megawati-Hasyim did not file 
an electoral dispute because of the wide margin existing in the numbers of votes that the two 
candidates had received, namely 24,275,646 votes. 
In the 2009 Presidential Election, the KPU announced the first round results: (1) Megawati 
Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto (Megawati-Prabowo) received 32,548,105 votes (26.79%); (2) 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Boediono (SBY-Boediono) received 73,874,562 votes (60.80%); 
and (3) Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto (JK-Wiranto) received 15,081,814 votes (12.41%). Given that SBY-
Boediono obtained more than 50% of the total votes, the second round of the presidential election 
would not be held. However, in the Presidential Election Dispute (2009) case, both Megawati-
Prabowo and JK-Wiranto filed election complaints to the Constitutional Court on the grounds of 
qualitative and quantitative mismanagement, such as a foreign intervention – through assistance 
provided by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) – to the KPU;  elimination or 
reduction of polling stations (TPS); chaos in the preparation of the voters list (DPT); irregularities in  
vote counting; and various administrative or criminal violations.265 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court found that procedural breaches were in fact committed by the 
KPU. However, the Court reasoned that these breaches were not categorised as structured, systematic 
and massive violations. According to the Court, the administrative procedural breaches could be 
tolerated because the conduct was aimed at giving more opportunities to eligible voters, who were 
not yet registered, to exercise their rights to vote. The Court concluded there was insufficient evidence 
to declare the 2009 Presidential Election legally flawed and invalid. However, the Court gave 
recommendations for the KPU to be more professional in organising elections in the future.  
The 2014 Presidential Election was the toughest presidential election because there were only two 
pairs of candidates: (1) Prabowo Subianto and Hatta Rajasa (Prabowo-Hatta); and (2) Joko Widodo 
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and Jusuf Kalla (Jokowi-JK). Indeed, there was only a small margin in the final results of the 2014 
Presidential Election, where Jokowi-JK received 70,997,833 votes (53.15%) and Prabowo-Hatta 
received 62,576,444 votes (46.85%). On the day when the vote counting results would be announced 
officially by the KPU, Prabowo ‘withdrew’ himself from the presidential election and rejected the 
results of the election because he believed that there were election violations which were structured, 
systematic and massive. At that moment, there was a confusion as to whether Prabowo withdrew 
himself as a Presidential Candidate or withdrew his team from the final vote counting process 
conducted in the KPU building.266 This question was answered after Prabowo-Hatta lodged a 
presidential electoral dispute with the Constitutional Court in the Presidential Election Dispute 
(2014) case. In other words, Prabowo-Hatta stated they were still in the presidential and vice 
presidential bid, and that the Constitutional Court should recognise their legal standing. 
In their motion, Prabowo-Hatta argued that there were vote counting irregularities; the KPU was 
considered as committing structured, systematic and massive violations concerning voters list (DP4, 
DPS, and DPT); election logistical problems; electronic security loopholes; mobilisation of voters 
through supplementary and special voter lists; suppressions by two governors in Central Java and 
Central Kalimantan; manipulation in the use of ink for voters who had used their right to vote; money 
politics or vote buying for Jokowi-JK; and the KPU was accused of damaging evidences inside ballot 
boxes throughout Indonesia.267 In its decision, the Court decided that the petitioners’ arguments were 
weak and could not be proven by witnesses presented before the Court; also, they lacked adequate 
additional evidence. If the arguments presented by the applicant were true, however, the Court found 
it still could not change the ranking of votes obtained by the two candidates. At the time of writing, 
this decision became the thickest decision in the history of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, 
consisting of 5,837 pages. 
In all three presidential elections discussed above, it can be said the Constitutional Court provides a 
forum to resolve political and electoral disputes prone to inflicting social conflicts between 
presidential candidates’ supporters.268 In other words, the process of political conflict resolution in 
the Constitutional Court has prevented the occurrence of prolonged political conflicts after 
presidential elections. Furthermore, in the Presidential Election Dispute (2014) case, the 
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Constitutional Court is considered successful in saving the future of Indonesian democracy by 
mitigating political and social conflicts between the two competing poles. Indeed, the success in 
handling the legislative and presidential election disputes has restored public trust in the 
Constitutional Court, which had declined sharply after the former Chief Justice Akil Mochtar was 
caught red-handed taking bribes relating to regional head electoral cases a year earlier.269 
D   Electoral and Parliamentary Threshold 
The government’s objective in consolidating democracy in Indonesia is to have a natural 
simplification of the number of political parties. This objective is attained through various 
approaches, including implementation of an electoral threshold (ET) or a parliamentary threshold 
(PT) and creation of strict requirements for political parties to participate in elections.270 In this 
context, the Constitutional Court becomes an open forum for state policy debates concerning the 
simplification of political parties, considered detrimental to the existing political parties.  
In the Electoral Threshold (2007) case, the Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality of 
provisions concerning electoral threshold contained in the 2003 Legislative Election Law. This 
electoral threshold became a requirement for political parties to participate in the next election. It 
required political parties to have at least 3% of seats in the DPR, or to merge with other political 
parties. Thirteen political parties not meeting the electoral threshold in the 2004 Legislative Election 
considered their rights impaired because they could not directly participate in the 2009 Legislative 
Election.  
The Constitutional Court found that the electoral threshold was a policy made by legislators to achieve 
a simple multiparty system in Indonesia. According to the Court, the legal policy governing political 
parties and elections remained objective because the threshold constitutes democratic and natural 
selection intended to simplify the multiparty system, a system revived in the reform era. Previously, 
a three-party system had been established in the New Order era (1977-1997) through the government 
imposed merger of political parties.271 In addition, the Court ruled that the electoral threshold does 
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not affect the freedom of association and assembly, including the rights to establish political parties. 
Also, the policy is non-discriminatory, therefore the provisions concerning electoral threshold are not 
contrary to human rights guaranteed in the Constitution.272 Interestingly, several political parties that 
filed the petition were also involved in deciding the electoral threshold system when they held seats 
in the DPR of 1999-2004. In this context, those political parties were not consistent in implementing 
the policy that they made, especially if the policy was disadvantageous to their parties. 
Furthermore, upon mutual agreement between the DPR and the President, the electoral threshold (ET) 
was changed to the parliamentary threshold (PT) based on the 2008 Legislative Election Law. In 
order to manage the transition period from the electoral threshold system to the parliamentary 
threshold system, the DPR created a provision stating that political parties participating in the 2004 
Legislative Election, that did not meet the electoral threshold under the 2003 Legislative Elections, 
could participate in the 2009 Legislative Elections as long as they still had seats in the DPR, although 
they held less than 3% of the DPR seats required in the electoral threshold system. 
This provision was challenged by seven political parties contended in the elections in the Electoral 
Threshold Transition (2008) case. The petitioners argued that the provision caused unequal treatment 
of political parties participating in the 2004 Legislative Elections. Many considered this provision as 
merely supporting political parties in the DPR, who did not meet the electoral threshold, to participate 
directly in the 2009 Legislative Elections. 
The Constitutional Court declared that the provision lacked a clear reason (ratio legis) and 
consistency in regulating the transition from the electoral threshold to the parliamentary threshold. 
According to the Court, political parties that do not meet the requirements of an electoral threshold 
should be in equal position, because unequal treatment would cause legal uncertainty and injustice 
among political parties contending in the 2004 Legislative Elections.273 Thus, the Court invalidated 
the provision. 
Moreover, provisions regarding the parliamentary threshold brought about another constitutional 
issue. In the Parliamentary Threshold (2009) case, 11 political parties participated in the 2009 
Legislative Elections, 186 candidates for members of the DPR and 306 members of political parties 
lodged a constitutional review case concerning the parliamentary threshold set out in the 2008 
Legislative Elections Law. This provision requires political parties to obtain at least 2.5% of the total 
votes nationally in the legislative elections in order to sit in the DPR. According to the petitioners, 
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the parliamentary threshold requirement has resulted in the loss of votes and deflated aspirations of 
citizens who voted for political parties below the threshold. Therefore, they argued that the 
parliamentary threshold violated the principle of popular sovereignty.  
In its ruling, the Constitutional Court stated that in comparison with the electoral threshold, the 
parliamentary threshold, stipulated in the 2008 Elections Law, provides greater guarantee for the 
participation of existing political parties in the following legislative elections.274 The Court reasoned 
that the legislature can determine the type of threshold as a legal policy, governing existence of 
political parties, both in the form of the electoral threshold or parliamentary threshold. According to 
the Court, such policy is allowed by the Constitution to simplify the number of political parties, 
including in determining the percentage of threshold, as the policy becomes the authority of 
legislature that cannot be interfered with by the Constitutional Court as long as it does not conflict 
with political rights, popular sovereignty and rationality.275 However, the Court sharply criticised the 
legislators who are not consistent in making election-related policies; since they initiated policy 
experiments without a clear design for the creation of a simple multiparty system. As a result, each 
election is followed by a new legislation pertaining the Indonesian political system.276 
The aforementioned criticism, given by the Constitutional Court to the DPR, is very reasonable. In 
2012, the DPR and the President created another new Legislative Elections Law to replace the 2008 
Legislative Elections Law. This new Law was also challenged in the Constitutional Court. In the 
Presidential Threshold (2012) case, seventeen political parties challenged the new regulations on 
presidential threshold stipulated by the 2012 Legislative Elections Law. The applicants argued that 
the provisions created unequal treatments as requirements for political parties participating in the 
elections between those who have met or have not met the parliamentary threshold in the previous 
election differed. Based on these provisions, the political parties that have met the parliamentary 
threshold in previous elections can be validated through the next election, while the new political 
parties or the political parties that do not meet the parliamentary threshold in the previous election 
must meet requirements and strict verifications for participating in the 2014 Legislative Election.277  
In addition, the petitioners also challenged the provision requiring a 3.5% parliamentary threshold for 
valid votes nationwide. This provision did not only determine political parties that can sit in the DPR, 
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but also in the DPRD. In other words, a political party that does not meet the 3.5% parliamentary 
threshold in the DPR will automatically lose all their seats in the Provincial/Regency/City DPR.278 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court stated that the requirements for new political parties in the 
2014 Legislative Election were stricter than in the previous election. Therefore, the Court ruled the 
requirements for verification is unfair for political parties meeting the parliamentary threshold in the 
preceding 2009 Legislative Election. The Court found that the parliamentary threshold is not intended 
to be a requirement for political parties to participate in the elections, but is a requirement for a 
political party participating in the elections to be able to sit in the DPR.279 In addition, the Court stated 
that the simplification of a political party is not achieved by determining the administrative 
requirements that differ between political parties. Therefore, imposing unequal requirements or 
treatment, is contrary to the Constitution. Thus, the Court decided that all political parties in the 2014 
Legislative Elections, were to follow the same verification procedures.280 Further, the Court reasoned 
that the application of a national parliamentary threshold, as the legal effect incurs loss of political 
party seats in the DPRD, the threshold would impede the representation of political aspirations at the 
local level. Hence, it is contrary to the diversity and distinctiveness of political aspirations, which 
vary in each region.281 The Court decided that the parliamentary threshold will only apply for 
determining political party seats in the DPR. 
Based on the four different decisions discussed above, it can be concluded that the Constitutional 
Court supports the simplification of political parties represented in the DPR. The simplification of 
political parties is necessary at the current stage of Indonesian democratic consolidation in order to 
avoid profound political parties’ fragmentation potentially leading to an ineffective system of 
government. This simplification can be achieved through the electoral threshold or the parliamentary 
threshold as an open legal policy option to the legislators. However, based on the Parliamentary 
Threshold (2009) case, the Constitutional Court prefers the parliamentary threshold system, as it 
provides greater opportunities for political parties to participate in the general elections. 
Nevertheless, the Court imposes limitations applying to parliamentary threshold and a verification 
process for political parties participating in the elections. In the last 15 years, efforts to simplify the 
number of new political parties have shown significant results. In the 1999 Legislative Election, 44 
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political parties contested in the legislative election and 24 political parties in the DPR. In the 2014 
Legislative Election, there were 12 political parties contesting in the election and 10 political parties 
in the DPR. 
The strict administrative requirements have led to the decreasing number of contesting political 
parties, while the parliamentary threshold system has led to the reduction of political parties in the 
DPR. These policies have driven politicians to think twice before establishing a new political party 
and participating in the elections, because if their political parties do not meet the parliamentary 
threshold requirements, their efforts to send their members to the DPR will be useless. Most voters 
have also been increasingly aware that they would prefer to choose political parties with relatively 
stable performances and existence, compared with new political parties that do not have clear track 
records. The development of simplification of political parties can be seen in the figure below.282 
 
E   Independence of General Election Organisers 
General elections organiser also determines electoral processes and the establishment of democratic 
governance through representative democracy system in Indonesia. Independence and 
professionalism of the KPU, both at national and regional level, greatly affects the process of free 
and fair elections. The Constitutional Court has examined several constitutional review cases related 
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to provisions in the Elections Law potentially harming the independence and professionalism of the 
KPU.  
In the Regional Elections Commission (2004) case, the Court revoked some provisions in the 
Regional Government Law relating to the relationship between the Regional Elections Commission 
(KPUD) with the Regional DPR (DPRD), especially regarding the independence of the KPUD. First, 
the Court annulled the provisions stating that the KPUD is responsible to the DPRD. According to 
the Court, the elections organiser would not be able to deliver the principles of elections - which are 
direct, general, free, confidential, honest, and fair - as well as being an independent, if the KPUD is 
responsible to the DPRD. According to the Court, the DPRD consists of political parties who become 
the actors in the elections, therefore the KPUD should be responsible to the public, not to the DPRD. 
The Court ruled that the KPUD is only required to submit a report to the DPRD concerning the 
implementation of its duties in organising the elections.283 
Second, the Court annulled the provision holding the KPUD responsible to the DPRD for elections 
expenditure. According to the Court, the KPUD shall not be responsible to the DPRD because funds 
used in the elections is not only derived from the regional budget, but also from the state budget. 
Therefore, accountability for the election budget expenditure should follow state finances 
legislations. The Court considered that holding the KPUD accountable to the DPRD for elections 
budget threatens the independence of the KPUD, because of political interests and competition for 
powers in the DPRD at the regional level.284  
Third, the Constitutional Court revoked the provision granting authority to the DPRD to impose 
sanctions for regional head candidacy withdrawal. According to the Court, since Election 
Commission determines regional head candidates’ eligibility, the authority to impose sanctions shall 
rest with the KPUD, not the DPRD. The revocation of the DPRD’s power by the Court is intended to 
maintain KPU’s independence in organising elections, as mandated by the Constitution.285 
Furthermore, KPU independence was questioned in the KPU and DKPP Members (2011) case, 
because there were provisions in the General Elections Organiser Law considered threatening their 
independence. The petition was filed by 23 NGOs concerned with elections, democracy and public 
policy as well as 136 individuals from various professions. The petitioners reviewed the 
constitutionality of provisions allowing members of political parties to become KPU members, 
                                               
283 See Regional Elections Commission (2004) case, 112. 
284 Ibid 113-4. 
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conditional upon their resignation as political party members during nomination. The applicants also 
challenged the composition of the Honorary Board of General Elections Organiser (Dewan 
Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu, or DKPP) consisting not only of KPU, the Indonesia Elections 
Oversight Body (Badan Pengawas Pemilu or Bawaslu) elements and community leaders, but also 
representatives of each political party in the DPR and a representative of the government. 
In its decision, the Court found that the provisions are not in line with the logic and fairness 
requirements. If the general elections are held by the institutions consisting of political parties 
contesting in the elections, as their involvement with general elections organiser will create conflicts 
of interests.286 Although the Elections Law required members of political parties, who would be 
candidates for the KPU, to resign from their political parties, the provision did not specify the 
minimum period for such resignation. According to the Court, this provision is a loophole potentially 
taken advantaged by political parties to place their cadres in the KPU.287 Therefore, the Court stated 
that the period of resignation from a political party would be at least five years prior to their 
nomination as a candidate for KPU membership. 
In an effort to maintain the independence of the general elections commission from pragmatic 
attempts by political parties participating in the general elections, the Court is of the opinion that 
the requirement for resignation from membership of a political party as stipulated in the Law a 
quo must be provided with a time limit … According to the Court, the time limit for resignation 
from political parties is proper and appropriate if determined to be at least 5 (five) years prior to 
the self-nomination of candidates for the general election commission membership. The five-
year period is considered proper and appropriate by the Court because it coincides with the 
periodisation of the general elections.288 
Furthermore, the Court found that the independence of the Honorary Board of the General Elections 
Organiser (Dewan Kehormatan Penyelenggara Pemilu or DKPP), handling code of ethics violations 
by the general elections organiser, is also determined by the composition of the DKPP. If the DKPP 
membership is predominantly representatives of political parties, independence of the general 
elections organiser is compromised as political parties participating in the elections can switch their 
roles to control the general elections organisers, consisting of the KPU and the Bawaslu.289 Therefore, 
the Court overturned the provisions concerning the composition of the DKPP membership from 
                                               
286 See KPU and DKPP Members (2011) case, 56. 
287 Ibid 57. 
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representatives of political parties and the government. Thus, the DKPP membership only consists of 
elements of KPU, Bawaslu and community leaders. 
According to the two cases discussed above, it can be concluded that general election organisers are 
guardians of representative democracy system implementation. Therefore, the independence of the 
KPU, either at national or regional levels, and the DKPP, becomes very critical in the election process. 
When general elections organisers are siding with one of the participants in the elections, this would 
create distrust and trigger unfair process and results. Consequently, this would diminish the meaning 
of representative democracy in general elections in Indonesia. In short, the Constitutional Court has 
made attempts to prevent conflicts of interests and interventions from political parties towards the 
independence of the KPU and the DKPP. 
III   CONCLUSION 
The constitutional amendments that occurred in 1999-2002 have changed the powers of various state 
institutions in Indonesia. In exercising their powers, conflicts between within the three branches of 
government often arose. The Constitutional Court was established to resolve these conflicts. In 
addition, the Court aims to strengthen the separation of powers and the presidential system according 
to the Indonesian Constitution. 
Based on various cases and decisions analysed in this chapter, the Constitutional Court has played a 
crucial role in mediating many conflicts of constitutional powers between the executive, the 
legislative and the judiciary. In this context, there are several important contributions of the 
Constitutional Court in strengthening the separation of powers and the presidential system in 
Indonesia over the past twelve years. 
The first thing to be addressed is that the Constitutional Court began to limit the powers of the DPR, 
considered excessive after the reform in selecting high state officials for other state institutions, such 
as the Supreme Court Justices and the Judicial Commission members. After the Constitutional Court 
declared its decisions, the DPR no longer has an absolute power to select several high state officials, 
but they will only approve, or not approve, the candidates proposed by the Selection Committee based 
on a rigorous selection process. This change of power will indirectly reduce political interventions 
from the DPR to the other branches of government. 
Furthermore, the amended Indonesian Constitution was deliberately designed by politicians to form 
a parliamentary system with power imbalances between the DPR and the DPD, in which the DPR has 
stronger powers than the DPD. Indeed, the DPD powers had been increasingly restricted by national 
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laws drafted by the DPR and the President. In this context, the Constitutional Court decisions have 
strengthened the position of the DPD, particularly in terms of its legislative powers. Although their 
powers cannot be equated with the DPR due to limitations of the Constitution, the DPD is now able 
to contribute and be more actively involved in the law-making process. 
In addition, the Constitutional Court has strengthened the presidential system in Indonesia by 
sharpening the presidential oversight function of the DPR. With the revocation of the Inquiry Law, 
the Court asserted that the President cannot freeze or dissolve the DPR. Also, the Court has restored 
the DPR’s rights to deliver opinions in accordance with the requirements provided in the Constitution, 
including requirements related to the impeachment of the President and/or the Vice President. 
Moreover, against the executive power, the Court limits the president’s power to act in subjective 
terms when declaring an Interim Emergency Law. In its decision, the Court provided objective 
requirements that must be met by the President before declaring an Interim Emergency Law. These 
requirements were made in order to avoid abuse of power by the President in making legislations. 
Another contribution of the Constitutional Court is associated with state finance related conflicts 
frequently transgressing into constitutional issues. On one hand, the Court has strengthened DPR’s 
power to oversee the implementation of government economic policies that potentially impacting the 
national economy. In this case, the Court asserted that the President must obtain an approval from the 
DPR before implementing those policies. On the other hand, the Court reduced DPR’s power in 
exercising its budgetary function by limiting their involvement in preparing state budget and delaying 
disbursement. Both decisions demonstrate that the Constitutional Court is playing its role in 
maintaining the checks and balances between the executive and the legislative. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court undertakes a controversial role in interpreting the separation 
of powers – as illustrated by several decisions related to its independence and powers. The Court 
earned positive appreciation from academics for blocking the DPR’s efforts in curtailing the Court’s 
powers in order to be ineffective, but the Court also received strong criticism for invalidating the 
Judicial Commission’s power to oversee Constitutional Court Justices. On one hand, the Court 
believes that the Judicial Commission is an auxiliary state organ unable to perform the oversight 
function against primary state organs within the context of the separation of powers. On the other 
hand, legislators and the public desired for a special institution to perform external oversight function 
towards judicial institutions. 
In my view, the interpretation that disregards the role of auxiliary state organs in the implementation 
of the separation of powers should be re-examined. In the context of Indonesia, which recently 
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emerged from a three decades long authoritarian regime, the system of separation of powers requires 
an adjustment corresponding to social and political developments. The auxiliary state organs and 
public participation are prerequisites to ensure the main state organs truly work in exercising their 
functions. 
In the context of representative democracy, the Constitutional Court is a judicial institution that plays 
a pivotal role in guarding democratic transition and consolidation in Indonesia. In the elections 
process, the Court becomes a credible institution able to determine whether the process and outcome 
of elections are meeting the requirements of free and fair principles. Thousands of electoral dispute 
cases have been settled by the Court in presidential elections, legislative elections and regional head 
elections. Thus, the Court has contributed significantly in improving both the quality of democracy 
in general and the electoral process in particular. In addition, the Court has a strategic role for 
determining and developing the direction of democracy and the electoral system in Indonesia. 
Although the Court does not have a legislative function, its decisions can strengthen or change 
political policies made by the DPR. For instance, the Court supports the simplification of political 
parties without violating the rights of political parties. Also, the Court maintains independence of the 
elections commission by invalidating several provisions providing opportunities for political parties 
to intervene the election organisers and in the elections process. 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court successfully managed to resolve all electoral disputes cases 
through effective and efficient processes. The Court’s decisions are generally accepted and respected 
by various parties, including political parties, elections committees, related parties and the public. 
This acceptance becomes the main capital in attaining political legitimacy and stability in Indonesia’s 
developing democratic system. Nevertheless, the impact of Mochtar’s bribery case on electoral 
disputes provoked distrust from the parties. They assumed that the cases handled by Mochtar were 
not decided in impartial manner so they asked the Court to re-examine their cases. The Court did not 
re-examine those cases because it was decided by full bench of nine Constitutional Justices, not by 
Mochtar alone.  
Furthermore, the Court is not only a judicial institution that examines electoral disputes, but also 
defuses and channels emotions and political frustrations of political candidates dissatisfied with 
election results. The Court’s role is important in this regard because it has changed the nature of 
political conflicts which were previously resolved through street violence, to an elegant way of 
courtroom resolution and based on relevant evidence. 
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A further point is that the Constitutional Court had a breakthrough in examining electoral disputes 
which previously were based solely on quantitative problems related to counting errors. Since 2008, 
the Court has examined electoral irregularities and violations that could alter election results, both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms. If evidence indicates occurrence of structured, systematic and 
massive violations, then the Court may order the election commissions to hold re-elections, revotes 
or recounts in particular regions. 
Although election disputes granted by the Constitutional Court amount to less than 10% of all cases, 
this does not mean that electoral violations are not rampant. Almost every election case handled by 
the Court had irregularities and/or violations. The difference between such is whether those violations 
are significant and affect the election results. In this context, the Court only grants the requests if the 
violations have met the structured, systematic and massive criteria. This means that requests are not 
granted if violations are partial, sporadic or individual. In fact, these types of violations occurred in 
every election, and will certainly continue to happen. Therefore, the Constitutional Court cannot be 
expected to be the only institution that can prevent and reduce potential electoral violations.  
Moreover, the candidates who have been convicted of serious violations which are considered as 
structured, systematic and massive, could still be re-elected during the re-election or revotes ordered 
by the Court. In fact, they could receive more votes than before. In my view, this condition shall be 
a critical note to the Constitutional Court and other relevant stakeholders to consider sanctions or 
consequences which are more firm and assertive for candidates or their supporters proven to commit 
electoral violations. Thus, both candidates and voters will acquire enhanced political consciousness, 
and learn not to repeat their mistakes. 
In conclusion, the role of the Constitutional Court has clearly strengthened the two main elements of 
constitutional government in Indonesia, namely the separation of powers and the representative 
democracy. The Court’s decisions in resolving constitutional conflicts between state institutions and 
political conflicts between candidates in the elections have created a relatively more stable system of 
government in Indonesia, both at the central and local level. Although the Constitutional Court will 
no longer handle regional head electoral disputes, the jurisprudences made by the Court will form a 
solid foundation for the new institution established to resolve those disputes. In addition to decisions 
regarding elections, the Constitutional Court also made many important decisions related to the 
human rights protection directly affecting democracy in Indonesia. The implications of these 
decisions will be discussed in the next chapter. 
***
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS BY  
THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
As explained in previous chapters, the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms is an important 
element in protecting and promoting constitutional government. The amended Indonesian 
Constitution has a special chapter on fundamental rights and freedoms that encapsulates almost all 
rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), also referred to as the 
Constitutional Bill of Rights. In order to protect those fundamental rights and freedoms, the 2nd 
framers of the Constitution, who amended the 1945 Constitution, established the Constitutional Court 
as a separate and independent court from the Supreme Court. In this Chapter, I will analyse the 
influences and implications of the Indonesian Constitutional Court decisions in protecting 
fundamental rights and freedoms, particularly on civil and political rights. This chapter begins by 
discussing the development of fundamental rights and freedoms in the Constitution since pre-
independence. 
I   FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE CONSTITUTION 
The idea to include fundamental rights and freedoms in the original 1945 Constitution was discussed 
by the framers of the Constitution. However, some founding fathers opposed and rejected the concept 
of rights and freedoms, which were considered to reflect western individualistic and liberal views, 
closely associated with colonialism and imperialism at that time.290 According to Soekarno and 
Soepomo, two leading national leaders at that time, the Indonesian Constitution should be based on 
the principle of family/brotherhood collectivism (asas kekeluargaan), entirely contrary to the 
principle of liberalism and individualism. Although Muhammad Hatta and Muhammad Yamin agreed 
with the family principle, they still proposed some rights and freedoms be incorporated into the 1945 
Constitution to ensure that the citizens are free from fear when expressing opinions and taking part 
in peaceful assembly, as well as to prevent the state becoming a rule of power - state.291 A heated 
debate between the founding fathers led to a compromise to include seven provisions guaranteeing 
fundamental rights and freedoms in the Indonesian Constitution declared on 18 August 1945, a day 
after the Indonesian Independence. 
                                               
290 See, eg, Jimly Asshiddiqie, Gagasan Kedaulatan Rakyat dalam Konstitusi dan Pelaksanaannya di Indonesia [The Idea 
of People’s Sovereignty in the Constitution and Its Implementation in Indonesia] (Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 1994). 
291 The debate in the drafting of the first Indonesian Constitution, see Muhammad Yamin, Naskah Persiapan Undang-
Undang Dasar 1945 [The Manuscript Preparation of the 1945 Constitution] (Prapanjta, 1959). 
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Along the course of history, the 1945 Constitution was replaced by a new constitution named the 
Constitution of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (the RIS Constitution) on 27 December 
1949. The RIS Constitution was heavily influenced by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR); declared on 10 December 1945. Therefore, the RIS Constitution, consisting of 197 articles, 
provided all the provisions on human rights contained in the UDHR. Thus, Indonesia became one of 
the first countries to comprehensively incorporate guarantees of rights and freedoms in their 
Constitution. 
Eight months later, the 1950 Provisional Constitution replaced the RIS Constitution on the grounds 
that the RIS Constitution was driven by foreign pressures and influences and not by a special 
Assembly representing the interests of Indonesian citizens. Also, the federal system was considered 
incompatible and inconsistent with the principles of the declaration of Indonesian independence, with 
the intent to establish a Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. The 1950 Provisional Constitution 
was drafted by a joint committee consisting of the Working Committee of the Central National 
Committee, the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Republic of the United States of 
Indonesia.292 The word ‘Provisional’ implies that Indonesia at that time needed a new and permanent 
Constitution that would be formulated by the Constituent Assembly.293 The 1950 Provisional 
Constitution, which consists of 146 articles, also contained guarantees of rights and freedom, which 
were almost identical to the RIS Constitution. These guarantees were stipulated in two parts: (1) Part 
V concerning Basic Rights and Freedoms of Human Beings from Article 7 to Article 34; and (2) Part 
VI concerning Basic Principles from Article 35 to Article 43. 
Unfortunately, the Constituent Assembly, based on the results of the 1955 General Elections, did not 
succeed in producing a permanent Constitution. A deadlock ensued when they had to decide a crucial 
and sensitive issue concerning the relationship between state and religion, particularly in deciding the 
system of the state. Given that the Assembly could not reach an agreement on the draft of a new 
Constitution,294 President Soekarno issued Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959. There were three major 
decisions in the Presidential Decree of 1959: First, dissolving the Constituent Assembly; Second, re-
enacting the original 1945 Constitution and repealing the 1950 Provisional Constitution; and Third, 
planning to establish a Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly and the Provisional Supreme 
                                               
292 Ibid 68. 
293 Article 134 of the 1950 Provisional Constitution says, ‘Constituent Assembly (Session of Framers of the Constitution) 
together with the government immediately formulate the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia that will replace this 
Provisional Constitution.’ 
294 The Constituent Assembly never reached the requirements for making decision based on Article 137(2) of the RIS 
Constitution which says, ‘The new Constitution applies, if the draft has been accepted by at least two-thirds of votes from 
members who present and [it] is subsequently enacted by the Government.’ 
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Advisory Council. Thus, rights and freedoms guarantees for Indonesian citizens reverted to the seven 
provisions contained in the 1945 Constitution, as the case from 5 July 1959 until the end of New 
Order regime under President Soeharto (1966-1998). 
The fall of Soeharto’s regime significantly impacted constitutional reform in Indonesia. The 1945 
Constitution was amended for the first time in 1999, followed by four stages of amendments from 
1999 to 2002. In 2000, the second amendment of the 1945 Constitution, guarantees of fundamental 
rights and freedoms were set up specifically in Chapter XA concerning Human Rights from Article 
28A to Article 28J. It was created without amending the original seven provisions on guarantees of 
rights and freedoms as granted in the 1945 Constitution.295 These fundamental rights and freedoms 
stipulations are not only influenced by the UDHR, but also by various international conventions and 
international law instruments. 
In addition to guaranteeing human rights, the Indonesian Constitution stipulates citizens’ obligations 
to respect the human rights of others, as stated in Article 28J. Moreover, every person, in exercising 
their rights and freedoms, is limited by laws in accordance with considerations pertaining morality, 
religious values, security and public order. This special constitutional provision provides the primary 
distinction between fundamental rights and freedoms recognised in Indonesia and those of other 
countries.  
II   PROTECTION BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The debate regarding the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms and limitations, often occurs 
before the Constitutional Court. This section will analyse the Constitutional Court’s decisions 
affecting the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in Indonesia. While this topic lends itself 
to extensive discussion, the scope of this chapter will be limited to the analysis of landmark decisions 
of the Constitutional Court. These decisions are classified into five categories: (1) freedom of 
assembly and association; (2) freedom of opinion, speech and expression; (3) freedom of religion; (4) 
rights to life; and (5) due process of law. 
A   Freedom of Assembly and Association 
The promulgation of the Community Organisations Law, enacted on 22 July 2013, sparked 
controversies in Indonesia.296 The DPR and the President passed this law in order to strike a balance 
                                               
295 For further discussion of human rights in the Indonesian Constitution, see, eg, Satya Arinanto, Hak Asasi Manusia 
dalam Transisi Politik di Indonesia [Human Rights in the Political Transition in Indonesia] (Pusat Studi HTN FHUI, 
2003). 
296 According to Article 1(1) of the Community Organisations Law, ‘community organisation’ is defined as an 
organisation that was founded and formed by the voluntary community based on shared aspirations, will, needs, interests, 
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between the freedom of assembly and association and respect for rights and freedoms of others as 
well as to achieve legal order. Just two months after the law was enacted, the Muhammadiyah 
Association (Persyarikatan Muhammadiyah) filed a constitutional review against twenty-one 
Articles contained in the Community Organisations Law. In the Community Organisations (2013) 
case, the applicant argued that the Law had stunted the meaning of freedom of association. According 
to this view, the government intervened too much in the practices of freedom of association, since the 
Law regulated excessive restrictions and did not provide legal certainty.  
The Constitutional Court partially granted the request, citing four main legal reasons in its decision. 
First, the provision regulating that any community organisation shall have eight goals cumulatively, 
as mentioned in Article 5 of the Community Organisation Law, was deemed to violate the freedom 
of association. The Court ruled that the provision should be interpreted as merely alternative goals, 
not cumulative goals. Second, the Court found that the provisions, differentiating the community 
organisations in national, province or regional levels, would limit the development and activities of 
the organisations. Also, the community organisations cannot be obliged to self-register to a 
government institution. While non-registered organisations cannot be banned, they would not be 
eligible to receive services from the state.  
Third, the Court annulled the provision requiring every member of community organisations to have 
the same rights and obligations. The Court reasoned that membership is an internal and autonomous 
matter of each organisation that should not be regulated by law. Fourth, the Court overturned the 
provisions regarding the role of government to undertake empowerment for the community 
organisations. According to the Court, such government role can intervene in the freedom and 
independence of the community organisations. Therefore, assistances rendered by the government to 
community organisations cannot be enforced; rather, each organisation has a freedom to accept. The 
Court reasoned that state intervention, albeit intended to empower community organisations, would 
threaten expressions of creativity in exercising their freedom of assembly and association, as 
guaranteed by Article 28(3) of the Constitution.297 
Furthermore, the Community Organisations Law was reviewed by NGOs, such as the Indonesian 
Forum for Budget Transparency (FITRA), Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW), YAPPIKA and other 
human rights activists in the Community Organisations (2014) case. The applicants challenged ten 
Articles in the Community Organisations Law, considered to have narrowed the scope of protection 
                                               
activities, and goals to participate in the development in order to achieve the purpose of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia 
based on Pancasila. 
297 See Community Organisation (2013) case, 127-8. 
91 
 
of the freedom of association. The Court also partially granted the petition. In its decision, the Court 
decided that the procedure of decision-making in the organisations should not be based only on a 
system of deliberation and consensus (musyawarah mufakat) according to the Pancasila democracy, 
but also through a decision by majority votes. The Court ruled that the imposition of decision-making 
systems, through deliberation and consensus according to the Community Organisations Law, would 
create legal uncertainty and injustice. 
The freedom of association and assembly is an absolute prerequisite to constitutional democracy and 
must be protected in the constitutional government system. However, based on the two cases 
discussed above, it can be concluded that the Indonesian government still has the tendency to restrict 
freedom of association and assembly of its citizens. In this context, prohibitions and restrictions on 
the freedom of assembly and association can threaten democratic values in a developing country like 
Indonesia. Thus, the role of the Indonesian Constitutional Court, in this issue, is very important in 
interpreting and reviewing laws and regulations that may hinder the freedom of association and 
assembly, which are not in accordance with the Constitution. 
B   Freedom of Opinion, Speech and Expression 
One of the fundamental rights and freedoms, that laid the groundwork for the most cases filed with 
the Constitutional Court, relates to the freedom of opinion, speech and expression. Motivated by 
political and social change after the authoritarian regime was overthrown in 1998, guarantees for 
freedom of opinion, speech and expression, contained in Article 28 and Article 28E(3) of the 
Constitution, are used as the basis for reviewing laws considered to restrict these freedoms. For 
example, in the State Symbol (2012) case the applicant reviewed provisions restricting the use of the 
state symbol, Garuda Pancasila, because it did not conform with the spirit of the freedom of 
expression.  
This provision has been criticised as triggering discrimination and criminalisation among citizens, 
without considering their sense of nationalism. In its decision, the Court ruled that the restrictions on 
the use the state symbols are a form of restraint on the public’s expression and appreciation of their 
identity as Indonesian citizens. According to the Court, such restraints can reduce a sense of belonging 
and nationalism, which is contrary to the purposes of the establishment of the Law.298 
Artists and film directors took similar action in the Film Censorship (2007) case. They reviewed 
provisions in the Film Law considered to restrict their freedom of expression, since every movie must 
pass through various stages of censorship. In its decision, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the 
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Film Law limited the freedom of expression. However, the Court stated that such restrictions are 
allowed by Article 28J(1) and (2) of the Constitution. The Court declared that, while the Film Law is 
constitutional, the procedures for regulating the Film Law and corresponding institutions are not in 
accordance with current development. Therefore, the Court recommended formulation of a new Film 
Law to regulate a new movie ratings system to be more in line with the spirit of democratisation and 
respect for human rights. This reviewed provision was deemed conditionally constitutional. Thus, the 
provision remains constitutional only if it meets certain requirements provided by the Constitutional 
Court: (1) the implementation mechanism shall be adjusted to the spirit of the era, (2) the film 
community shall be given a chance to defend their films when censored; and (3) the nuances that 
restrain creativity in the field of arts and cinema shall be lessened.299 
Another interesting decision that attracted public attention was the controversial Pornography Law 
(2009) case. In its petition, the applicants argued that the provisions in the Pornography Law restricted 
the freedom of expression by limiting the rights of indigenous peoples to express their cultural 
identity. In addition, they believed the formulation contained in the Pornography Law is ambiguous 
and open to multiple interpretations, leading to problems in its application, particularly in 
criminalising women who often become the object of pornography. In its decision, the Constitutional 
Court denied the petition using the provisions set forth in Article 28J of the Constitution. The Court 
found that restrictions on rights and freedoms are acceptable in a democratic society when based on 
laws in accordance with considerations of morality, religious values, security and public order. 
However, the Court made an important constitutional interpretation by stating that there are five areas 
that cannot be categorised as pornography, namely arts, literature, custom, science and sport. 
As long as they take the form of drawings, sketches, illustrations, photographs, texts, voice, 
sounds, moving pictures, animations, cartoons, conversations, gestures, or other forms of 
messages through various forms of communication media and/or performances in public, in the 
framework of art, literature, custom, science and sports, then they do not constitute any act of 
pornography as referred to in the [Pornography] Law.300 
Several provisions in the Criminal Code were also deemed to restrict the freedoms of speech and 
expression. In the Leste Majeste (2006) case filed by Eggi Sudjana and Pandapotan Lubis, the 
Constitutional Court invalidated Article 134, Article 136 and Article 137 of the Criminal Code that 
regulated specific defamations against the President and the Vice President. The Court ruled that the 
provisions are incompatible with the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by Article 28 and 
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Article 28E(2) and (3) of the Constitution. According to the Court, these provisions were used to 
protect the Dutch colonial rule. Additionally, these provisions were commonly used by law 
enforcements to silence protests. Hence, freedoms of speech and expression may be violated.301 
Therefore, based on the rule of law and democratic principles adopted in Indonesia today, the Court 
declared that the three provisions shall not be applied as they create legal uncertainty and multiple 
interpretations as to whether or not a protest is a statement of opinion or defamation against the 
President and the Vice President.  
Furthermore, Article 154 and Article 155 of the Criminal Code, stipulating the expression of hostility, 
hatred or contempt against the Government of Indonesia, were also revoked by the Constitutional 
Court in the Hate Showing (2007) case filed by Panji Utomo. According to the Court, these criminal 
provisions, known as haatzai artikelen or ‘rubber (elastic) article’, created a tendency for abuse of 
power because it can easily be interpreted according to the interests of the ruling power.302 Therefore, 
the Court ruled that the provisions are contrary to the freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed 
by the Indonesian Constitution. 
However, not all constitutional review cases related to the freedom of opinion, speech and expression, 
as contained in the Criminal Code, were granted by the Constitutional Court, such as in the Incitement 
(2009) case. Rizal Ramli, an Indonesian politician and prominent economist, lodged a constitutional 
review of Article 160 of the Criminal Code related to an act of incitement in public because the 
provision could be used by the government to arrest any person who criticises the government. In its 
decision, the Court stated that the substance of Article 160 is still in line with the rule of law because 
it contains the principle of universal norms, which prohibit inciting people to commit criminal acts. 
However, the Court declared Article 160 to be conditionally constitutional, meaning it would remain 
constitutional as long as it is interpreted as material offences which consider the result of criminal 
acts based on prohibited acts.303 
Moreover, in the Defamation (2008) case, Risang Bima Wijaya and Bersihar Lubis applied for 
constitutional review of provisions relating to defamation in the Criminal Code considered contrary 
to the freedoms of thoughts, conscience, speech and communication. In addition, the applicants 
argued that the provision was easily misused by those who do not like the freedoms of thought and 
opinion, freedoms of expression and freedoms of the press. In its legal reasons, the Constitutional 
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Court stated that the Indonesian Constitution guarantees the rights and freedoms mentioned by the 
applicant, so the state must protect them.  
Nevertheless, the state, at the same time, is also obliged to protect the constitutional rights of others, 
equal to the applicant’s rights, as guaranteed by Article 28G of the Constitution and international law 
under the rights to honour and dignity. According to the Court, under an obligation to protect the 
constitutional rights of others, the state is allowed to make restrictions as expressly stated in Article 
28J(2) of the Constitution. Interestingly, the Court considered the legal issue raised by the applicants 
to be concerned with implementation of the provision in question. Thus, the Court argued that it was 
more closely related with a constitutional complaint case, rather than a constitutional review case.304  
Similar decisions by the Constitutional Court can be found in the Online Defamation cases in 2008 
and 2009. The provisions reviewed were related to actions conducted in cyberspace. In both cases, 
the applicants, consisting of journalists, human rights activists and NGOs, filed a constitutional 
review for Article 27(3) of the Information and Electronic Transactions (ITE) Law, considered 
contrary to the principles of the rule of law and the spirit of democracy guaranteeing freedom of the 
press and freedom of expression as basic human rights.305 The Court ruled that the article is 
constitutional on the grounds that it is still necessary for balancing between freedoms of expression 
and the rights of honour and dignity of other people, equally guaranteed by the Constitution and 
international laws, inter alia, in Article 12 of the UDHR and Article 17 and Article 19 of the ICCPR. 
Based on the various decisions relating to the freedom of opinion, speech and expression, as discussed 
above, it can be concluded that the Constitutional Court plays an important role as the only court that 
can review the constitutionality of laws against the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed in 
the Constitution. The decisions made by the Constitutional Court determine the direction and 
development of freedom of opinion, speech and expression in Indonesia, as an emerging country.  
In the Leste Majeste (2006) case and the Hate Showing (2007) case, which placed citizens in 
opposition to the government, the Court made strong decisions by invalidating several provisions in 
the Criminal Code considered as hampering the development of democracy in Indonesia. 
Nevertheless, in the Defamation case and the Online Defamation cases, which concern the rights and 
freedoms of a person in relationship to the rights and freedoms of others, the Constitutional Court 
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tends to make compromises to maintain harmony and balance between the interests of law and the 
rights and freedoms of the diverse parties in the community.  
Another important point to be underlined is that the Constitutional Court also confirmed that 
restrictions on the freedoms of opinion, speech and expression are permitted by the Constitution and 
international laws on the grounds that they are aimed ‘to guarantee the recognition and the respect 
for the rights and freedoms of others and to fulfil fair demand in accordance with the considerations 
of morality, religious values, security, and public order in a democratic society.’306 
In the future, the debate on freedoms of opinion, speech and expression will remain important in 
protecting fundamental rights and freedoms in Indonesia. Special attention should be given to 
provisions contained in the ITE Law. With the rapid development of information, communication, 
and technology, the implementation of the ITE Law has led to many people being charged with 
defamation.307 
C   Freedom of Religion 
The Indonesian society practice different religions, including Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, 
Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. Interestingly, although Indonesia is a country with the 
largest Muslim population in the world with 207,176,162 people (87.21%),308 Indonesia is neither an 
Islamic state nor a state based on a particular religious ideology. In contrast to many other countries, 
one of the Indonesian core ideologies of Pancasila is ‘belief in the One and Only God’ (Ketuhanan 
Yang Maha Esa), contained in the fourth paragraph of the Preamble of the Constitution. The second 
paragraph of the Preamble specifically mentions the phrase, ‘With the blessing of God the Almighty’. 
In addition, based on Article 24(2) of the Constitution, Indonesia has religious courts for Islamic 
citizens to settle certain cases.309 
Before the 1945 Constitution amendment, the provision on freedom of religion was only contained 
in Article 29(2). Currently, freedom of religion is strengthened in a special Human Rights chapter in 
the Constitution in Article 28E(1) and Article 28I(1). Constitutional provisions on religion are not 
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only related to the freedom of religion, but also stipulate restriction of rights and freedoms that can 
be limited in accordance with religious values.310 
The first case decided by the Indonesian Constitutional Court relating to the freedom of religion was 
the Polygamy (2007) case. An applicant, named M. Insa, reviewed the constitutionality of provisions 
in the Marriage Law because he considered it to restrict his freedom of worship as a Muslim. The 
Indonesian Marriage Law recognises the principle of monogamy, while the practice of polygamy 
requires legal consent from the religious court with strict requirements. According to the applicant, 
these provisions violated his freedom of religion as polygamy is allowed in Islam.  
In deciding this petition, apart from using provisions in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
referred to the verses of Al-Quran in providing legal reasons. According to the Court, the provisions 
in the Marriage Law, which stipulates the reasons, conditions and procedures of polygamy, are merely 
efforts ensuring a husband’s obligations to fulfil rights for the first wife and other prospective 
wives.311 The Court reasoned that the state, as the highest organisation in a community based on 
political consensus, is not only authorised to regulate, but also obliged, to ensure the realisation of 
justice through legal instruments under its control and enforcing them through the courts.312 Thus, the 
Court denied the petition. 
Furthermore, in the Religious Court (2008) case, a woman named Suryani lodged a constitutional 
review application concerning the religious court’s jurisdiction limiting the scope of examinations for 
deciding and resolving cases for Muslims to the specific areas i.e. marriage (perkawinan), inheritance 
(waris), wills (wasiat), gifts (hibah), endowments or waqf (wakaf), mandatory alms (zakat), liable 
alms (infaq), voluntary alms (shadaqah) and the Shari’ah economy (ekonomi syari’ah). According to 
the applicant, Religious Court Law constitutes the state’s restriction of freedoms of religion and 
worship. The applicant requested additional jurisdictions for the religious courts based on other 
Islamic laws, including Islamic criminal law (jinayah). The Constitutional Court found that the 
Religious Court Law did not diminish freedom of religion and worship of the applicant, as guaranteed 
by the Constitution. The most interesting legal reason for rejecting the applicant’s argument in this 
case was the Constitutional Court’s explanation of the relationship between the state and religion in 
Indonesia. 
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The Court is of the opinion that the applicant’s argument is not in accordance with the 
statesmanship view of Indonesia concerning the relationship between the state and religion. 
Indonesia is not a religion-based state solely based on one particular religion, nor is Indonesia a 
secular state which does not pay attention to religions and religious affairs are left entirely to 
individuals and the people. Indonesia is a state based on the God Almighty which protects every 
believers of religions to worship in accordance with his/her religions.313 
…If the problem of the imposition of Islamic law is related to the source of law, accordingly it 
can be said that Islamic law actually becomes the source of the national law, but Islamic law is 
not the only source of national law, because besides the Islamic law, customary law, and western 
law, as well as other sources of law traditions have also become sources of the national law. 
Therefore, Islamic law can become one of the material sources of formal laws and regulations. 
Islamic law as a source of law can be used together with other sources of law, so that it becomes 
the material component for the formulation of laws and regulations to be enforced as national 
law.314 
The constitutional case that has attracted the most public attention, concerning the freedom of 
religion, was the Blasphemy Law (2010) case, not only because the case was complex, but also 
because it was highly sensitive as it directly related to religions. The applicants comprised seven 
human rights NGOs and several Muslim intellectuals, including former President Abdurrahman 
Wahid, better known as Gus Dur. They filed a constitutional review against Law Number 
1/PNPS/1965 on Preventing the Abuse and Dishonouring of Religion (hereinafter the Blasphemy 
Law) because it was deemed to cause religious discrimination, restrictions on religious interpretation, 
prohibition against one’s beliefs, criminalisation of religion and creation of legal uncertainty.  
During the court hearings, the Constitutional Court received ad informandum from 24 related parties 
consisting of religious and national groups or organisations. In addition, the Constitutional Court 
invited 17 experts, with diverse perspectives, to give their opinions in open hearings. At the time of 
this writing, the Blasphemy Law (2010) case is recorded as the case with the highest number of experts 
invited by the Court. Therefore, this case presents important interpretations concerning limitations of 
state intervention on the freedom of religion in Indonesia. This sub-section will outline the 
Constitutional Court’s legal reasons in more details through the following five salient arguments. 
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First, the Court stated that religious practices in Indonesia differ from religious practices in other 
countries and cannot be equated.315 In addition, the principles of negara hukum (law state) in 
Indonesia should not be the same as the principles of rechtsstaat and the rule of law. The Court 
reasoned that the principles of negara hukum must be viewed from the perspective of the Indonesian 
Constitution that places the God Almighty as the foundation of the nation and the state through 
religious principles and values. Thus, the Court ruled that Indonesia does not follow the concept of 
separation of state and religion, nor does it hold the principles of individualism and communalism.316 
Second, the Court confirmed that the Indonesian Constitution does not provide for the possibility of 
campaigning without holding a particular religion or promoting freedoms without religion. In other 
words, the advocacy of atheism is indirectly prohibited, although no clear prohibition is stated within 
the law. Additionally, people are prohibited from insulting religious teachings, holy books that 
provide sources of religious belief and the name of God. According to the Court, these elements make 
Indonesia distinct from other western countries. For example, in governing the state, implementing 
state administration, creating laws and exercising the courts, the basic divinity and teachings, as well 
as religious values, become instruments for determining good laws or bad laws, or even in deciding 
whether a law is constitutional or unconstitutional. Thus, restriction on the basis of religious values, 
as mentioned in Article 28J(2) of the Constitution, is one of the ways that human rights may be 
restricted in Indonesia. The Court showed that this concept is different from Article 18 of the ICCPR, 
which does not include religious values as basis for limiting freedom of individuals.317 
Third, the Court reasoned that freedom of belief could not be restricted or prosecuted by any 
imposition. According to the Court, this freedom exists in people’s minds and hearts through their 
beliefs. In this context, the Court defined it as a forum internum, unable to be restricted, but influenced 
by certain environments. In contrast, the freedom to express thoughts and attitudes related to the 
relationship with others on religious matters, known as a forum externum, may be restricted by the 
state.318 According to the Court, the Blasphemy Law does not limit a person’s beliefs (forum 
internum), but only limits the statement of thoughts and conscience in public (forum externum) 
deviating from the principal teachings of religion professed in Indonesia, and the expression of a 
feeling or action that is essentially hostile to, misusing or blasphemous to a religion.319 
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Fourth, the Court stated that, although religious interpretation is part of freedom of religion 
categorised as forum internum, it shall conform to the principal religious teachings and follow correct 
methodologies, based on the relevant source of religious teaching dictated by the holy book. Thus, 
freedom to interpret a religion is not an absolute freedom. The Court stated that when interpretations 
are not based on a common methodology recognised by the adherents of a religion or relevant sources 
from the holy book, public order is in threatened, if presented or performed in public. In this case, the 
Court reasoned that such limitations can be carried out in accordance with Article 18(3) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) which states, ‘Freedom to manifest one’s 
religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.’320 
Fifth, another important issue raised by the applicants is that the state should not have authority to 
determine religious interpretations, because the interpretation of the majority will always negate the 
minority interpretation that can lead to discrimination and repression of freedom of religion. In 
response, the Court reasoned that every religion holds common principals internally accepted by 
adherents of a religion. The state does not autonomously determine the principal teachings of a 
religion. However, the state, through the Ministry of Religious Affairs, only serves to facilitate 
various opinions and agreements. Thus, according to the Court, there is no control by the state 
(étatisme) in determining the principal teachings of a religion under the Blasphemy Law.321 
Furthermore, the Court explained, the deviation of interpretation or activity from the principal 
teachings of a particular religion is not based on state interpretation, but on the interpretation of 
religious leaders from the respective religion where the process of interpretation should involve 
experts knowledgeable of the issues being discussed.322 Thus, the Court held that the Blasphemy Law 
is still needed and does not conflict with human rights protection stipulated in the Constitution. 
However, the Constitutional Court found that the Blasphemy Law should be formally and 
substantially revised to provide clearer interpretations of its practice. The Court addressed this 
recommendation to legislators through legislative review. It can be said that this decision is another 
compromise that where the ‘middle path’ is taken where the Court did not invalidate the Blasphemy 
Law, yet it did take into consideration the current relationship between the state and religion in 
Indonesia.323 In addition, the Court suggested improving the Blasphemy Law through legislation to 
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answer doubts and concerns about the Blasphemy Law. Nevertheless, the Court did not specify which 
matters in the Blasphemy Law would have to be revised. 
It can be concluded that the Constitutional Court has given extensive interpretations on freedom of 
religion, as seen in the three different cases discussed above, particularly in the Blasphemy Law 
(2010) case. However, despite the guarantee of freedom of religion since the reform era, there exists 
a growing number of cases brought to the ordinary courts based on the violations of the Blasphemy 
Law and Article 156a of the Criminal Code concerning to blasphemy of religion. Crouch noted that 
there were less than 10 cases of blasphemy during the New Order Era (1996-1998). In contrast, there 
were 47 cases in which 120 people were convicted under the Blasphemy Law during the Reform Era 
from 1998 to 2012.324 
As a response to this phenomenon, five applicants filed another constitutional review on the 
Blasphemy Law before the Constitutional Court in the Blasphemy Law (2012) case. One of the 
applicants in this case had been found guilty based on Article 156a of the Criminal Code, another 
applicant had been charged over his provocative status on Facebook and three other applicants were 
Shi’ite (Shi’ah) Islam who felt threatened by the criminal provisions concerning blasphemy in the 
Blasphemy Law and the Criminal Code. In its decision, the Court found that the provisions are 
constitutional based on the same arguments given by the Court in the Blasphemy Law (2010) case. 
The Court stated that ordinary courts have the absolute jurisdiction to enforce the provisions. In other 
words, the case was not a matter of the constitutionality of norms handled by the Constitutional Court. 
Regardless of the pros and cons in the Blasphemy Law cases, there is a mutual agreement that the 
Constitutional Court could serve as a forum for peaceful and open dialogue between various parties, 
with different beliefs and views on the freedom of religion interpretation. Indeed, the issues discussed 
were very sensitive and often triggered social conflicts between the diverse religious adherents. By 
using the concept of a religious nation state,325 I believe that Indonesia still seeks the best format for 
enforcement and protection of religious freedom. At the time of this writing, the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs is working on the Bill of Religious Harmony (Kerukunan Umat Beragama) in response to the 
Constitutional Court’s recommendation to replace the Blasphemy Law, considered no longer in 
accordance with the development in society. In general, this Bill will regulate the protection of all 
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religions and beliefs in Indonesia. However, the Bill also sparks controversy between religious 
organisations and individuals both demonstrating support and opposition.326 This indicates that the 
debate on religious freedom and corresponding restrictions will continue in Indonesia. 
D   Right to Life 
The Indonesian Constitutional Court’s decision on the constitutionality of the death penalty has 
attracted the most attention from the international community. In the Death Penalty (2007) case, three 
Australian citizens involved in a drugs smuggling syndicate, known as ‘the Bali 9’, and two 
Indonesian nationals filed for constitutional review of the death penalty contained in the Narcotics 
Law. According to the applicants, the imposition of the death penalty was contrary to Article 28A 
and Article 28I(1) of the Constitution, which states that the right to life is a human right that cannot 
be undermined under any circumstances. The applicants based their arguments on the UDHR and 
Article 6 of the ICCPR, as well as several other conventions, as well as the current trend in the 
international community to abolish death penalty. According to these arguments, death penalty is 
contrary to the philosophy of punishment in Indonesia; and it is doubtful that death penalty has a 
deterrent effect on the number of criminal acts. 
The Court found that foreign nationals do not have the legal standing to file a case with the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court. Given that two of the applicants were Indonesian citizens, however, the Court 
examined the main case and provided legal reasons. The main constitutional question in this case was 
whether or not human rights, as set forth in Article 28(1) of the Constitution known as non-derogable 
rights, is an absolute right cannot be undermined under any circumstance. Based on the original intent 
of Article 28J of the Constitution, the Court reasoned that everyone has the obligation to respect 
other’s rights in exercising their own human rights, so that human rights, according to the Indonesian 
Constitution, is not absolute. In other words, human rights are subject to limitation as far as the 
restrictions are established by laws and such fulfil fair demand in accordance to Article 28J. The 
Court referred its arguments to international legal instruments, in particular to Article 6(2) of the 
ICCPR that explains that the right to life is not absolute, but it can still be applied to ‘the most serious 
crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime...’ In addition, 
Indonesia is not a State party to the Second Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, which aims to abolish the death penalty. 
                                               
326‘Ministry Prepares Religions’ Followers Protection Bill’, The Jakarta Post (online), 16 June 2015 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/06/16/ministry-prepares-religions-followers-protection-bill.html>. 
102 
 
The next question is whether or not drug crimes constitute one of the most serious crimes and 
deserving of the death penalty. The Court reasoned that Indonesia is obliged to enforce international 
law as a State party to the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (1988). According to the Court, the Narcotics Law imposes death penalty 
for limited criminal acts, considered in accordance with Article 3(6) of the Convention, with the 
objective ‘to maximise the effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences, 
and with due regards to the need to deter the commission of such offences.’  
Thus, the Court has included the possession of narcotics as one of the most serious crimes, along with 
the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity, because it ‘adversely affects the economic, 
cultural and political foundation of society,’ and also causes ‘a danger of incalculable gravity.’327 
Therefore, the Court ruled that the death penalty provisions in the Narcotics Law remain 
constitutional.328 However, the decision was not unanimous. One Constitutional Justice argued that 
foreign nationals should be given legal standing; another Constitutional Justices said that the death 
penalty provisions in the Narcotics Law were unconstitutional; and two other Constitutional Justices 
argued that foreign nationals should have legal standing and that death penalty provisions were 
contrary to the Constitution.329 
Based on its legal reasons, the decision only concerned the constitutionality of death penalty 
provisions in the Narcotics Law, but did not address the Criminal Code or other laws. Therefore, the 
constitutionality of other death penalty provisions can still be reviewed, or even invalidated by the 
Constitutional Court. However, the Court did not apply the same standards in assessing the criteria 
of the most serious crimes in the Death Penalty (2012) case. Two applicants filed a constitutional 
review case regarding the death penalty provision contained in the Criminal Code. They had been 
sentenced to death based on Article 364(4) of the Criminal Code concerning the burglary with 
violence or threat of violence resulting in serious physical injury or death. According to the applicants, 
such crime could not be categorised as the most serious crime, so that the death penalty provision was 
contrary to the Constitution.  
Regrettably, without explaining in details or referring to any international law instrument stating a 
crime of burglary with violence is a form of the most serious crime, the Constitutional Court simply 
referred to the previous decision in the Death Penalty (2007) case and declared that the imposition of 
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the death penalty for such crime is constitutional. Indeed, the Court only provided one paragraph of 
legal reason to explain why such crime should be categorised as one of the most serious crimes. 
According to the Court, the crime of burglary violence resulting in the death of the victim, is a 
serious crime (the most serious crime); because its perpetration causes the same psychological 
effects [with drug crimes], thus it is reasonable that the punishment be the same. The punishment 
for these two crimes is expected to create deterrent effects and prevention of crimes, both for the 
accused and society.330 
In this case, the Constitutional Court should be more selective in assessing criminal acts categorised 
as the most serious crimes. The arguments regarding what criteria distinguishes the most serious 
crimes should not be based on national laws and psychological assumptions only, but also held to 
international law based standards. In my view, a violent crime of burglary, however, cannot be 
equated with drug crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity classified as the most serious crimes. 
In the future, the Constitutional Court will be faced with different applications for constitutional 
reviews of death penalty provisions, which are spread throughout several laws, such as in the Anti-
Corruption Law, the Anti-Terrorism Law and the Criminal Code, e.g., crimes against security of the 
state or friendly countries, aircraft piracy and premeditated murder. In this context, the Court should 
not directly apply the same legal reasons for different types of crimes. 
To sum up, the Constitutional Court decisions related to the right to life have created pros and cons. 
Human rights activists have the strongest voice in opposing the death penalty. The Court affirmed 
that the right to life can be limited under Article 28J of the Constitution, so that the death penalty can 
be imposed on most serious crimes. However, it is clear that the Constitutional Court is 
oversimplifying and inconsistent in applying the standards or criteria for most serious crimes, as seen 
in the Constitutional Court decisions in the Death Penalty cases in 2007 and 2012.  
E   Due Process of Law 
Another category pertaining to the fundamental rights and freedoms, which is often used as the basis 
for constitutional review, is due process of law. However, the Indonesian Constitution does not 
explicitly express any constitutional guarantee on due process of law. A provision relating to due 
process of law is contained in Article 28D(1) of the Constitution, which reads, ‘Every person shall 
have the right to the recognition, guarantee, protection and legal certainty of just laws as well as equal 
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treatment before the law.’ Therefore, it can be said that the Constitutional Court interprets the 
fundamental rights and freedoms more extensively than what is written explicitly in the Constitution. 
In the Broadcasting Law (2003) case, the Court used the principle of due process of law for the first 
time to strike down a provision in the Broadcasting Law, obliging broadcasters to make corrections 
if the content is refuted. The Court reasoned that this provision contains an assumption that any denial 
or refutation means that a broadcast is definitely wrong, thus violating the principle of presumption 
of innocence. According to the Court, this provision can be interpreted as a violation of due process 
of law.331 The Constitutional Court referred to the principle of due process of law based on the 
conception of rule of law or negara hukum (law state) adopted by Indonesia, as stated in Article 1(3) 
of the Constitution which says, ‘The state of Indonesia is a law state.’ 
The Constitutional Court’s decisions relating to the due process of law can also be found in the Book 
Banning (2010) case. Based on Law No. 4/PNPS/1963, the Attorney General has an authority to ban 
a book or to seize printed materials when contents potentially interfere with public order. According 
to the Constitutional Court, it is absolutely necessary to implement a due process of law through the 
judicial system in enforcing laws. In order to act against an unlawful act, the decision to act must be 
made only after court hearings – and this includes act of book banning. In other words, an institution 
cannot declare a book ban without a court ruling. Although such acts are allowed by the Indonesian 
Constitution, the Court found that to restrict human rights without due process of law is clearly not 
the intent and scope of restrictions on rights and freedoms as referred to Article 28J(2) of the 
Constitution.332 
A more comprehensive argument concerning the general principles of negara hukum, characterised 
by due process of law guaranteed in the Constitution, can be found in the Pre-trial (2014) case. 
According to the Constitutional Court, the other principles of negara hukum are recognition, 
guarantee of protection, a fair legal certainty and equal treatment before the law. Therefore, the Court 
confirms that due process of law is the embodiment of the human rights recognition in a criminal 
justice system and must be upheld by all parties, especially by law enforcement agencies.333 In 
addition, the Court explicitly stated that the Indonesian Criminal Procedure Law had not fully 
implemented due process of law principles.334 In this statement, the Court referred to the weakness 
of pre-trial (praperadilan) jurisdictions – which are limited to the legality of an arrest, detention, 
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termination of investigation or prosecution as well as the demand for compensation and/or 
rehabilitation for a person whose criminal case is terminated during investigation or prosecution.335 
The Court tried to overcome this problem by expanding the jurisdictions of pre-trial to include the 
determination of suspects, searches and seizure for objects examined in a pre-trial. According to the 
Court, these objects should also be protected through a legal mechanism in pre-trial proceedings.336 
In the Bibit and Chandra (2009) case, the Constitutional Court examined the constitutionality of 
provisions in the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) Law which stipulating that KPK 
Commissioners may be dismissed if they are named as defendants of a criminal act. In its legal 
reasons, the Court emphasised the importance of due process of law principle as fundamental rights 
that must be protected by the state. 
…due process of law is a principle which is fundamental and constitutional guarantees that all 
legal processes must be fair where people should be informed about the presence of a legal 
process against them and be granted a right for them to be heard before taking a decision on 
deprivation of their rights, freedoms and properties. Every person should not be deprived of the 
rights to life, freedoms, properties and other rights without any notice and opportunity to defend 
themselves.337 
The Constitutional Court reasoned that the provision had violated the presumption of innocence and 
negated the principle of due process of law that requires a fair, just and impartial trial.338 However, 
the Court made a conditionally unconstitutional decision. It means that the provision is 
unconstitutional unless it is interpreted that the KPK Commissioners shall be dismissed after 
sentenced by a binding court decision.  
Referring to the four different decisions above, it could be concluded that the principle of due process 
of law has been recognised as one of the fundamental rights in Indonesia based on the interpretations 
made by the Constitutional Court on the concept of negara hukum contained in Article 1(3) of the 
Constitution.339 Given that the Indonesian criminal justice system is still plagued with problems, as 
Criminal Code created during the Dutch colonial government still prevails, enforcement of due 
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process of law becomes very important in dealing with criminal cases. In this context, the 
Constitutional Court serves as the final bastion for criminal prosecutions considered violating 
fundamental rights and freedoms, in particular the principle of due process of law. However, the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is limited to the review of abstract norms, therefore the Court is 
unable to directly examine concrete cases under the criminal justice system. 
III   CONCLUSION 
The guarantees to fundamental rights and freedoms in the Indonesian Constitution has experienced 
unprecedented development since pre-independence. In the original 1945 Constitution, there were 
only seven provisions related to fundamental rights and freedoms, while the 1949 Provisional 
Constitution and the 1950 RIS Constitution contained comprehensive fundamental rights and 
freedoms. However, the latter Constitutions were only valid for a few years. In 1959, Indonesia re-
enacted the 1945 Constitution based on a Presidential Decree declared by President Soekarno. This 
Constitution was in force in the Old Order of Soekarno (1959-1965) and the New Order of Soeharto 
(1966-1998). During that time, protection of fundamental rights and freedoms was only a slogan used 
by the ruling government. There was no clear mechanism for citizens to defend their fundamental 
rights and freedoms. 
Drastic changes occurred after President Soeharto stepped down from power in 1998. Almost all 
provisions of human rights contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) were 
incorporated into the amended Indonesian Constitution. Presently, the Indonesian Constitution has a 
special chapter on Human Rights, contained in Article 28A to Article 28J. This chapter can be said 
to be a constitutional bill of rights. However, the upholding and protection of those fundamental rights 
and freedoms are subject to restrictions according to Article 28J(2) of the Constitution. Although 
Article 28I(1) of the Constitution contains rights that cannot be limited under any circumstances, 
known as non-derogable rights, such as the rights to life, the rights to be free from torture, the rights 
to freedom of religion and the rights of freedom of thoughts and conscience, Article 28J(2) becomes 
a key provision to limit those rights. According to the Indonesian Constitution, any human right can 
be restricted solely to protect the rights and freedoms of others based on moral considerations, 
religious values, security and public order in a democratic society. 
Moreover, though the Indonesian Constitution recognises universality of human rights principles. 
Applications thereof are designed to adapt to and to consider local values. In my view, it is the main 
case for emerging vigorous debates regarding the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in 
Indonesia. The debates, in particular highlight a paradigm of human rights implementation which 
differs from western perspectives, which generally do not take into account religious values and local 
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norms. The major problem in considering these values is that implementation is often highly 
subjective and understood differently from one person to another. 
Indonesian Constitutional Court often applies provisions contained in the constitutional bill of rights 
as basis for reviewing constitutionality of laws related to fundamental rights and freedoms. Building 
on discussion of various decisions in this chapter, it can be concluded that the Constitutional Court’s 
contribution in protecting fundamental rights and freedoms in Indonesia is significant. The citizens 
now have a legal mechanism to protect their fundamental rights and freedoms that never existed prior 
to reform. Additionally, the Court in several cases also interprets other fundamental rights and 
freedoms that must be protected for the citizens, although not stated explicitly in the Constitution, 
such as due process of law. In short, the role played by the Constitutional Court represents a step 
forward for human rights protection and democracy. Nonetheless, Constitutional Court is considered 
as not providing optimum protection of some rights and freedoms, particularly freedom of opinion, 
the right to life and the freedom of religion. 
In terms of the relationship between citizens and the state, the Constitutional Court seems to be more 
assertive in making decisions in order to protect the citizens from state interventions by invalidating 
various provisions threatening rights and freedom of citizens. However, when dealing with conflict 
of rights and freedoms between citizens, such as in the Defamation cases, the Constitutional Court 
often makes compromises in its decisions to provide a balance between the reputation of citizens and 
the freedom of citizens based on Article 28J of the Constitution. 
In terms of the right to life, the Constitutional Court, with a 5:4 decision declared that death penalty 
is constitutional for most serious crimes. However, the Court did not provide the same standards and 
criteria for the most serious crimes in the two different cases discussed above. This inconsistency has 
caused the Court decisions to appear less justifiable. In this context, the debate on constitutionality of 
the death penalty in Indonesia will continue and will only end when the Government or the 
Constitutional Court declares death penalty unconstitutional in all cases. 
Another sensitive issue, also reviewed before the Constitutional Court, is related to freedom of 
religion. In several cases, the Constitutional Court made broad interpretations concerning the 
relationship between the state and religion, and the scope of freedom of religion. Indonesia is defined 
as a religious nation state where restrictions on freedom of religion may occur in certain conditions, 
taking into consideration other people (forum externum), based on Article 28J(2) of the Constitution 
and Article 18(3) of the ICCPR. The current freedom of religion conditions in Indonesia has raised 
concern that the majority can obstruct religious freedom of minorities, both within the same religion 
or a different religion. This condition is exacerbated when law enforcements are hesitant in carrying 
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out their functions and obligations to protect security and safety of all citizens, regardless of their 
religions or beliefs, from threat of violence triggered by pressure from majority power.  
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court’s power is limited to only to reviewing constitutionality of 
laws, which presents a weakness in the system of fundamental rights and freedom protection for 
citizens. I believe that potential violations of fundamental rights and freedoms are not only present in 
national laws, but often originate from regulations and decisions made by both central and regional 
governments, and by various public officials. Due to jurisdictional limitation, the Constitutional Court 
has been silent on these problems.  
***
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CHAPTER 5 
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
Over the past twelve years, decisions made by the Indonesian Constitutional Court have been 
intensively discussed by academics, politicians, bureaucrats, NGO activists and the public. The 
intensity of attention can be understood through the central role that Constitutional Court play in 
maintaining constitutional norms. In order to fulfil this role, the Court frequently trespasses 
procedural limitations in making decisions. Consequently, polemics over the Court’s decisions often 
trigger controversy. Those who believe the protection of human rights and democracy principles have 
been strengthened as a result of the Court’s decisions consider the decisions appropriate and justified. 
In contrast, those who conclude that the Constitutional Court has surpassed its powers by putting 
aside the rules limiting its powers, argue that the Court has turned into a power expansion seeking - 
judicial institution. In this view, the Constitutional Court exercise of judicial activism through its 
decisions are uncontrollable and unacceptable. 
The question is: could the criticisms, stating that the Constitutional Court ignores the limitation of its 
powers, be justified? To what extent the practice of judicial activism by the Constitutional Court is 
accepted? In civil law systems, such as in Indonesia, where judges are not allowed to make laws 
through their decisions, does the practice of judicial activism garner public support? This chapter will 
answer these important questions by focusing on the concept of judicial activism and the shift of the 
Constitutional Court’s role from a negative legislator to a de facto positive legislator. 
I   CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Before analysing the practice of judicial activism in the Indonesian Constitutional Court, the concept 
of judicial activism needs to be discussed. Arthur Schlesinger first introduced the term judicial 
activism in January 1947 in Fortune.340 Judicial activism is often embedded in a context where a 
judge’s decision creates a law. Galligan defines judicial activism as judicial control or influence over 
political and administrative institutions.341 According to Black’s Law Dictionary, judicial activism is: 
A philosophy of judicial decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about 
public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions, usu. with the suggestion that 
                                               
340 Keenan D. Kmiec, ‘The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”‘ (2004) 92(5) California Law Review 
1441, 1446. 
341 Brian Galligan, ‘Judicial Activism in Australia’ in Kenneth M. Holland (ed), Judicial Activism in Comparative 
Perspective (Macmillan, 1991) 71. 
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adherents of this philosophy tend to find constitutional violations and are willing to ignore 
precedent.342 
The practice of judicial activism has evolved from one of negative connotation and limited to the 
misuse of the judge’s authority to that of positive connotation. Most criticism directed towards 
judicial activism has been associated with judicial intervention leading to representative democracy 
system degradation by a judicial autocracy. William Marshall argued that judicial activism threatens 
democratic functions, which he described as the ‘seven sins of judicial activism’.343 Another criticism 
regards activist judges who exercise judicial discretions are contradicting general principles stating 
that judges should simply perform their functions to enforce laws made by the legislators. These 
judges are considered likely to position themselves to influence social and economic policies.344 In 
contrast, positive opinions of judicial activism usually come from the perspective of protection of 
fundamental rights and freedom. In addition, it is believed that judicial activism is a legal adaptation 
for social change to develop values taken from the text of the Constitution and the existing decisions, 
in order to implement the basic values of the Constitution.345 
Parameters or limitations of judicial activism are not the same from one country to another. This 
dissimilarity is generated from the different systems and constitutional structures, the history of 
judiciary roles and current public expectations towards the judiciary. According to Robert S. French, 
the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, judicial activism that has legitimacy in a particular 
society may lack legitimacy in a different society. Thus, the concept of judicial activism is not 
monolithic.346 
In this context, a leading concept of judicial activism was created by Canon who suggested that the 
concept and public structure of judicial activism could be categorised into six dimensions:347 
 
(1) Majoritarianism that analyses to what extent the policies, taken and adopted by the democratic 
process, turned out to be negated by the judicial process;348 
                                               
342 Bryan A. Garner and Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary (West Group, 2004). 
343 William P. Marshall, ‘Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism’ (2002) 73(4) University of Colorado 
Law Review 1217, 1220. 
344 Christopher G. Buck, ‘Judicial Activism’ in Gary L. Anderson and Kathryn G. Herr (eds), Encyclopedia of Activism 
and Social Justice (SAGE Publication, 2007) 785. 
345 Ibid. 
346 See Robert S. French, ‘Judicial Activism – The Boundaries of the Judicial Role’ (Paper presented at LAWASIA 
Conference, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, 10 November 2009) 1.  
347 Bradley C. Canon, ‘Defining the Dimensions of Judicial Activism’ (1982) 66(6) Judicature 236, 239. 
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(2) Interpretive stability that considers to what extent decisions, doctrines and previous 
interpretations of the court have been altered;349 
(3) Interpretive fidelity that illustrates to what extent the articles of the Constitution are interpreted 
differently than the articles clearly intended by the framers of the Constitution or clearly legible 
from the language used;350  
(4) Substance/Democratic process distinction that measures to what extent court decisions have 
shaped substantive policy compared to decisions that maintain democratic political processes;351 
(5) The specificity of policy that analyses to what extent a court decision has formed policies that are 
contrary to the principle of discretion owned by other institutions or individuals;352 
(6) Availability of an alternate policymaker that considers to what extent a court decision replaces 
important considerations made by other governmental institutions for the same problem.353 
These six dimensions will be used as the main theory in this Chapter for analysing the judicial 
activism found in various cases decided by the Indonesian Constitutional Court. The next question is: 
to what extent can judicial activism be justified? Buck suggested that judicial activism must be based 
on legal principles and not on the court’s discretion alone.354 In addition, judicial activism occurring 
in some cases can be justified when principles for deciding a case, taken from the theory of judging 
known as ‘virtue jurisprudence’, are held:355 
(1) Principled implicationism: In the Constitution, there are rights of citizens which are not 
technically written. This principle gives a broader view of the Constitution providing further 
protection of the rights and freedoms not explicitly defined by the founding fathers, yet wisely 
predicted by them;356 
(2) Principled minoritarianism: This principle gives special attention to minority groups negatively 
impacted by the majority-based democratic process; especially when there is a violation of the 
equal protection principle. This principle is also interpreted as an intervention against a failure 
of a representative system that can result in legal processes discriminatory to the minorities;357 
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(3) Principled remedialism: This principle is closely related to the principle of justice that aims to 
right an injustice. The court has discretionary power to restore the rights of individuals or groups 
that have been violated. An affirmative action policy is included in this category;358 
(4) Principled internationalism: In considering the development of international law, judicial 
activism can generate decisions to keep pace with the global context using the methodology of 
comparative law and the implementation of principles and provisions of international law.359 
In my view, the above principles should only be considered on a case-by-case basis. Thus, this theory 
will also be used to analyse whether the judicial activism played by the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court in deciding cases can be justified. 
II   CASES ON JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
Categorising Constitutional Court decisions based on the subjective nature of judicial activism is not 
an easy task. Moreover, the legitimacy of such decisions differs from one society to another. To 
overcome these differences, the six dimensions of judicial activism introduced by Canon and the 
virtue jurisprudence theory will be used for analysing the Court’s decisions. This section will show 
the systemic practice of judicial activism by the Indonesian Constitutional Court in making decisions. 
A   Majoritarianism 
The principle of majoritarianism can be found in the Constitutional Court decision on the Majority 
Vote (2008) case. In the 2008 Election Law, through a democratic process the DPR determined that 
legislative candidates could only be elected if they acquire 30% of determined quota (Bilangan 
Pembagi Pemilih, or BPP). In this system, eligible voters can vote either for a candidate or a political 
party. If the voters vote for a political party, their votes will be ascribed to candidates based on their 
ranking in the party list. In addition, the BPP is determined by dividing the total valid votes by the 
number of seats available in the same constituency. If there is no candidate achieving 30% of the 
BPP, but the total votes of a political party are reaching the BPP, the seat will be given to candidates 
based on their ranking order within their political party list, regardless of the number of votes they 
obtained. 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court stated that the provision is unconstitutional because it 
conflicts with the substantive meaning of popular sovereignty and the principle of fairness guaranteed 
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by Article 28D (1) of the Constitution.360 According to the Court, the basic philosophy of every 
election is to determine the elected candidate by a majority vote, not based on the ranking in candidacy 
list set by political parties. The Constitutional Court also reasoned that the provision based on the 
ranking order violated the people’s rights to vote and undermined the level of political legitimacy of 
candidates acquiring majority vote.361  
Most candidates have welcomed this decision because they believed that their efforts to get as many 
votes as possible were useless if they were at the bottom of the candidacy list. They also argued that 
the decision could lessen acts of nepotism and bribery among political party leaders, both at the 
national and local level. However, some elites in the DPR, particularly from the PDI-P, condemned 
the Court’s decision.362 They asserted that the decision has transformed the Indonesian electoral 
system from an open-list proportional system, based on the ranking order, to an absolute majority 
vote. According to them, the change has weakened the political party ideology. As a result, they 
claimed that the decision has created rivalries between individuals, and political party activists are 
replaced by other candidates such as popular artists and business leaders whose individual campaigns 
benefit from having greater resources and capital. 
In my view, this argument is correct to some extent. In general, each candidate must now obtain 
sizeable campaign funds to compete in elections, not only against other political parties, but also 
against candidates from the same political party. Nonetheless, this does not imply an electoral system 
based on the ranking order should be maintained. The reason is that the ranking order system will 
disadvantage any candidate in the lower list who worked hard during the campaign, regardless of the 
number of votes they obtained. Additionally, votes become less meaningful, because despite choices 
made by voters, votes will always be transferred to the top list candidates. This stands against the 
principle of minoritarianism. Thus, a majority absolute system is better in this context. 
B   Interpretive Stability 
The Constitutional Court decisions containing the dimension of interpretive stability can be found in 
cases such as the Jurisdiction on Regional Head Electoral Dispute. As explained in Chapter 2, the 
Constitutional Court originally only held power to settle national elections disputes consisting of 
presidential elections and legislative elections; while the Supreme Court handled the regional head 
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electoral disputes. In 2005, the DPR and the President transferred the power to settle regional head 
electoral disputes from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Court inspired by the Constitutional 
Court decision in the Jurisdiction on Regional Head Electoral Disputes (2005) case. In this decision, 
the Court interpreted that legislators can decide whether a regional head election was part of a general 
election, because it is an open legal policy. If it is considered to be part of a general election, as based 
on Article 22 of the Constitution, then regional head electoral disputes should be settled by the 
Constitutional Court.  
Nevertheless, in the Jurisdiction on Regional Head Electoral Dispute (2013) case, the Court altered 
its interpretation. The Court stated that the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction could not be expanded 
or reduced by any law or decision. Therefore, the Court declared that the additional jurisdiction to 
resolve regional head electoral disputes, by expanding the meaning of general elections, is 
unconstitutional. This decision obviously has a different meaning to the previous decision in 2005. 
In fact, the Court has decided 698 regional head electoral dispute cases since 2008 without any 
constitutional issue. This decision demonstrates Constitutional Court’s lacked consistency in deciding 
comparable constitutional cases. 
Although the decision is welcomed to ‘purify’ the powers of Constitutional Court, its legal 
considerations are contrary to those of the previous decision. Also, this decision does not meet the 
elements of virtue of jurisprudence. In addition, there were three Constitutional Justices who 
expressed dissenting opinions against the majority. These Constitutional Justices wanted to hold the 
Court’s power in settling regional head electoral disputes.363  
C   Interpretive Fidelity 
The dimension of interpretive fidelity of judicial review can be found in the series of Education 
Budget cases. The amended Indonesian Constitution explicitly states that the state budget and the 
regional budget should prioritise and allocate at least 20% for education.364 There are not many 
countries that include education budget as a specific percentage in their Constitutions.365 The 
inclusion of a specific percentage of education budget aims to accelerate the development of national 
education. However, the Indonesian Government has faced difficulties in implementing its 
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constitutional obligation for many years. The state budget allocation for education was 7% in 2005, 
9.1% in 2006, 11.8% in 2007 and 15.6% in 2008. 
In the National Education System (2005) case, the Court stated that the implementation of the 
Constitution shall not be delayed. The reason was that the minimum allocation for education budget 
from the state budget and the regional budget had been explicitly written into the Constitution. In 
other words, the Constitutional Court said that gradual increase of education budget was not 
acceptable. However, the Court reasoned that, although the allocated education budget was less than 
20%, the State Budget Law could not be declared unconstitutional because it would lead to 
‘governmental disaster’, legal uncertainty and an even lower education budget.366 
The budget allocation for education finally reached 20% in the 2009 State Budget. However, this 
allocation was reached after the Constitutional Court made a decision that the salary of educators was 
included in the education budget. As a result, the total allocation for education budget increased 
sharply.367 In contrast, as stated in its previous decision, the Court welcomed, in good faith, the 
agreement between the President and the DPR advising that the education budget shall not include 
the salary of educators.368 Therefore, in their dissenting opinions, three Constitutional Justices argued 
that the achievement of a 20% allocation of the education budget, through inclusion of the salary of 
educators, was a misleading constitutional interpretation and would not have much effect in 
improving the national education system.369 
In my view, the Constitutional Court faced a constitutional dilemma. On the one hand, the Court has 
to uphold the norms clearly enshrined in the Constitution. On the other hand, this norm, which 
includes a minimum of 20% of the state budget and regional budgets for education, is very difficult 
for the government to meet if it does not include the salaries of educators. Moreover, in most countries 
the budget for education would include salaries and other recurring expenditures. If these items were 
not included, 20% of the education budget would never be reached. In addition, the Court faced a 
major problem where they had been unable to force the President and the DPR to execute its decision. 
Therefore, the last Constitutional Court decision can be considered as a way to deal with the deadlock 
in implementing constitutional norms. Another alternative solution is amending the provision 
concerning education budget in the Constitution by lowering the percentage required. In this way, its 
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implementation would not require inclusion of salary of educators, thereby preventing the 
government from violating the Constitution. 
D   Substance/Democratic Process Distinction 
In terms of the dimension of substance/democratic process distinction, the practice of judicial 
activism of the Indonesian Constitution Court can be found, for example, in the KPK Commissioner 
Tenure (2011) case. This case originated from the selection process of Busyro Muqqodas, a new 
Commissioner of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), replacing incumbent 
Commissioner Antasari Azhar, who was dismissed in the middle of his tenure. During the selection 
process, a democratic consensus taken by the DPR and the President deemed that the newly selected 
Commissioner should continue the remaining term of the incumbent Commissioner. In Busyro’s case, 
he would serve for one year only because Azhar had held his office for three years. 
However, anti-corruption activists opposed the consensus referring to Article 34 of the KPK Law 
which states, ‘Commissioner of the Corruption Eradication Commission holds office for four years 
and may be reselected only for another term.’ They lodged a constitutional review with the 
Constitutional Court against the KPK Law. According to them, the provision should apply both to 
newly appointed Commissioners as well as to those who replace Commissioners dismissed in the 
middle of their tenure. 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court negated the consensus of the DPR and the President by 
making a conditionally unconstitutional interpretation. This means that the provision would be 
considered unconstitutional unless its implementation follows the interpretation or guidelines given 
in the Constitutional Court decision. In this case, the Court interpreted that KPK Commissioners, 
regardless of the reason for their appointment, shall hold tenure for four years, and can only be 
renewed once.370 Interestingly, although Article 47 of the Constitutional Court Law expressly 
provides that the Constitutional Court decision effect to be prospective, the Court made an exception 
in this case by declaring a retroactive decision. The Court reasoned that any misinterpretation on the 
application of the KPK Law would lead to legal uncertainty and constitutional impairments; thereby 
it must be stopped by declaring a retroactive decision. Thus, the tenure of Busyro Muqoddas was 
interpreted as a full four-year upon his selection.371 
Based on this decision, it can be concluded that the Constitutional Court changed a political decision 
made democratically by the DPR. Although the Court came under fire from the DPR for not 
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respecting a democratic political process, the Court decision received broad support from civil society 
and NGOs.372 In my view, this decision for retroactive enforcement can be justified based on 
principled remedialism. Also, I believe that restrictions against the Constitutional Court decision, 
which only has a prospective effect, may pose an obstacle for protecting constitutional rights of 
citizens. The decision has therefore made the Constitutional Court Law provision on non-retroactivity 
of the Court’s decisions no longer absolute. 
E   Specificity of Policy 
An example of a Constitutional Court decision that can be categorised into the dimension of the 
specificity of policy is the KPU and DKPP Members (2011) case. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
case began when applicants filed a constitutional review of the General Elections Law regarding the 
candidacy requirements for General Election Commission (KPU) Commissioners. Article 11(i) of the 
2011 General Elections Law stated, ‘Candidacy requirement for members of the KPU, the Provincial 
KPU or the Regency/City KPU is ... resignation from political party membership... at the time of 
registering as a candidate.’ According to the applicants, the absence of a time interval between 
resigning from political party membership and registering as a candidate of the KPU Commissioners 
was contrary to the independence principle of the KPU as stated in the Constitution.373 In addition, 
the applicants suspected the presence of hidden agendas from political parties sending members to sit 
in KPU to influence election process. 
In its decision, the Constitutional Court reasoned that a time interval requirement between resignation 
and joining the KPU would break the affiliation link for nominated members of political parties, 
thereby maintaining KPU independence. However, the Court did not annul the provision, instead the 
Court created a new provision through constitutional interpretation. According to the Court, it is 
proper and appropriate if the time interval is determined to be at least five years before the nomination 
for the KPU Commissioner coinciding with the general election periodisation.  
Based on this case, it is important to point out that the Constitutional Court decision has formed a 
policy contrary to the policy decided by the President and the DPR. The Court formulated a specificity 
of policy by determining a time limit for resignation from political office to the nomination for the 
KPU. The Court’s decision was questioned by the DPR, for creating a policy beyond the Court’s 
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power. Nevertheless, democracy activists and the public welcomed the decision.374 In my opinion, 
regardless if the Court’s decision was considered ultra vires or beyond the powers, the output of this 
decision has strengthened KPU’s independence and democratic system in Indonesia. 
F   Availability of an Alternate Policymaker 
A Constitutional Court decision that illustrates how the Court has acted as an alternative policy maker 
can be found in the Voters List (2009) case. In the Indonesian election system, citizens can only 
exercise their rights to vote if their names are registered in the final voters list (Daftar Pemilih Tetap, 
or DPT). The Government and the KPU are the two state institutions fully responsible for creating 
the voters list throughout Indonesia. In the Voters List (2009) case, two Indonesian citizens who had 
not been registered in the final voters list, Refly Harun and Maheswara Prabandono, lodged a petition 
of constitutional review with the Constitutional Court. They argued that their constitutional rights 
would be violated if they could not exercise their right to vote in the 2009 Presidential Election. Even 
though they had taken the initiative to register themselves with the KPU, they remained unregistered 
in the final voters list. 
In its decision, the Court stated that the right to vote and the right to be a candidate are guaranteed by 
the Indonesian Constitution, laws and international conventions. According to the Court, any 
restrictions, deviation, elimination and abolition of those rights would constitute a violation of the 
citizens’ constitutional rights.375 The Court considered that the registration of voters in the voters list 
was an administrative procedure and should not negate the substantive rule of the citizens’ right to 
vote.376 
In deciding this case, the Court faced a difficult situation, as the 2009 Presidential Election would be 
held within three days of the first court hearing. At that time, citizens who were eligible to vote, but 
who had not been registered in the final voters list, extended well beyond those two applicants. It was 
estimated that millions of people had not been registered.377 At that moment, the Government and the 
KPU did not have enough time to register them. In responding to this critical condition, the 
Constitutional Court’s decision led to the creation of new technical provisions. These provisions 
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essentially allowed all citizens to exercise their voting rights by only showing their ID cards and 
family cards or passports on Election Day. The Court also provided specific regulations for technical 
requirements to be met by unregistered voters intending to vote. For instance, such voters could only 
vote one hour prior to the completion of the voting at the polling station.378 
In my view, there are three important things to be noted in this case. First, the decision-making process 
in the Voters List (2009) case is the fastest court hearing in the history of the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court. The first court proceeding was held in the morning, for the hearing of the applicant’s 
arguments, and the decision was declared in the afternoon on the same day. Second, the Court did not 
request any information or explanation from the President, the DPR or the KPU during the court 
hearing. The Court reasoned, that according to the Constitutional Court Law, there is no obligation 
for the Court to request information or explanation from the state institutions in making a decision.379  
Third, the Chief Justice Mahfud MD explained afterwards, in a public forum, that an important 
consideration, not stated in the Constitutional Court decision, was the call for urgency in making its 
decision. At that time, two of the three pairs of the presidential candidates, who were Megawati 
Soekarnoputri and Prabowo Subianto as well as Jusuf Kalla and Wiranto, planned to withdraw their 
candidacies before the Presidential Election Day if the voters list problem had not been resolved. 
Mahfud MD argued that if there was only one pair of presidential candidates, namely Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) and Boediono, democratic turmoil could potentially ensue due to prolonged 
political chaos.  
Therefore, I believe that the Court’s decision was taken not only based on constitutional grounds, but 
also political grounds not written in the legal reasons. In making this decision, the Constitutional 
Justices considered the negative impacts to the ongoing Presidential Election and the future of 
democracy in Indonesia if the Constitutional Court did not make a decision immediately. It clearly 
shows that judicial activism was applied in making the decision. Additionally, it has met the 
principled implicationism for protecting the rights to vote for citizens. Thus, this case shows that 
judicial activism does not necessarily pose a threat to democracy as claimed by William Marshall. In 
contrast, judicial activism, in some forms, may rescue democracy from political conflicts and 
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democratic turmoil. Indonesia is one of the countries to have benefited from judicial activism in the 
context of democratic consolidation.  
III   REACTION TOWARDS JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court, as a separate court that handles constitutional cases 
and political disputes, is a phenomenon and development of judicialisation of politics. Escalating 
political dynamic is therefore an inevitable result of the Court exercising its powers.380 Various 
landmark decisions declared by the Court have always concerned academics, public authorities and 
NGO activists, expressing with mixed reactions. Public attention was drawn to a strong reaction by 
the DPR and the President who attempted to curb judicial activism by the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court. Both the DPR and the President stated that the Court had acted beyond its limited powers, as 
specified in the Constitutional Court Law. Therefore, the DPR and the President sought to curtail the 
Court’s powers and reinforce its restrictions by amending the Constitutional Court Law in 2011. This 
amendment was triggered by the DPR’s disappointment with the Court’s performance, for reasons 
stated below. 
First, significant number of laws made by DPR through long and difficult law-making processes were 
revoked by the Constitutional Court. In the first decade after its inception, the Court granted more 
than 125 constitutional review cases against laws. In addition, there have been five laws entirely 
overturned by the Court. Second, the Court frequently makes decisions beyond what has been 
requested, known as ultra petita. Consequently, the DPR considers the Court to have exceeded its 
powers.381 Third, the Constitutional Court does not have an external supervisory institution, like the 
Judicial Commission, to uphold the honour and dignity of Constitutional Justices or oversee their 
conduct. The revocation of several provisions in the Judicial Commission Law by the Constitutional 
Court in 2006 resulted in the absence thereof, as discussed in Chapter 3. In its decision, the Court 
interpreted that the Supreme Court Justices and the Constitutional Court Justices are not subject to 
supervision by the Judicial Commission.382 Fourth, the DPR assessed that the Chief Justice Mahfud 
MD had expressed too many public comments on various issues unrelated to the Court’s powers and 
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functions, such as critics against other state institutions, comments on recent developments in 
corruption cases and his nomination to for President for the 2014 Elections.383 
Based on those grounds, the DPR amended the Constitutional Court Law. Some of the fundamental 
revisions aimed to establish elements of external supervision and to limit the Court powers in deciding 
cases:  
[In order] to enforce the Code of Ethics and Code of Conduct of the Constitutional Court Justices 
as mentioned in paragraph 1, the Honorary Council of the Constitutional Court is established 
which its membership consists of: 
a. one person of a Constitutional Court Justice; 
b. one person of a Judicial Commission member; 
c. one person from the DPR element; 
d. one person from the Government element exercising government affairs in law; and 
e. one person of a Supreme Court Justice.384 
Moreover, in order to restrict the Court’s powers in making ultra petita decisions, the DPR added the 
following provision. 
The Constitutional Court decision shall not contain any verdict that is not requested by the 
applicant or exceed applicant’s request, except for certain matters relating to the principal 
application.385 
In addition, the DPR also restricted the Court’s ability to issue Court orders to the DPR or to create 
new norms. 
The Constitutional Court decision shall not contain: 
a. a verdict other than those referred in paragraph 1 and paragraph 2; 
b. an order to legislators; and 
c. a formulation of a new norm as a replacement of norm stated in the law declared contrary to 
the 1945 Constitution.386 
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Constitutional Court Justices avoided involvement in the law making processes, from drafting to 
enactment of Constitutional Court Law amendment in 2011; although they had been invited and 
requested several times to provide opinions to the Law Commission of the DPR.387 This position was 
motivated by the fact that there is a potential for the Court to review the amended Law after 
enactment. In my view, this is surely how it should be. Not long after the enactment of the amended 
Constitutional Court Law legal academics and activists lodged two separate applications to review 
the constitutionality of several provisions contained within. 
Less than three months after the applications were lodged, the Constitutional Court decided to 
partially grant the applications. The Court revoked several provisions in the amended Constitutional 
Court Law, particularly provisions concerning external supervision by establishing the Honorary 
Council of the Constitutional Court (Article 27A(2)), the prohibition to make ultra petita decision 
(Article 45A), and the restrictions on the types of decisions (Article 57(2a)). In its legal reasons, the 
Constitutional Court argued, as follows: 
The presence of elements of the DPR, the Government, and the Supreme Court Justices could 
potentially create a conflict of interest because the DPR, the Government and the Supreme Court 
as well as the Judicial Commission may become litigants in the Constitutional Court.388 
Therefore, if the public interest requires, the Constitutional Court must not be fixated only on 
request or petition filed.389 
The presence of Article 57(2a) of Law Number 8 of 2011 has resulted in the obstruction of the 
Court in: (i) reviewing the constitutionality of norms; (ii) filling a legal vacuum as a result of the 
Court’s decision that declares a norm contrary to the Constitution and not legally binding. 
Meanwhile, law-making process requires a long time, so that it cannot immediately fill the legal 
vacuum; and (iii) exercising the Constitutional Justices’ obligation to explore, follow and 
understand legal values and sense of justice in society.390  
This decision immediately sparked controversy. Some public authorities resented the decision for 
presenting a conflict of interest, as the Court examined a case potentially preventing restriction of 
their own powers. The DPR expressed strongest disappointment, arguing that the Constitutional Court 
disrespected their powers by overturning a law recently enacted by them. The DPR also felt that they 
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had failed to adequately limit the powers of the Constitutional Court in deciding cases. However, the 
public majority did not support the views of the DPR. Therefore, the DPR could not do much with 
the Court’s decision other than plan future revisions to the Constitutional Court Law or to amend the 
Constitutional Court’s powers enshrined in the Constitution. 
In contrast to the DPR, the applicants, consisting of academics and NGO activists, accepted the 
decision. According to them, the revocation of provisions limiting the Constitutional Court’s powers 
restored the constitutional mechanism, thereby protecting constitutional rights of citizens. 
Nevertheless, they were disappointed with the Court’s decision to eliminate the Judicial 
Commission’s role in supervising the dignity and behaviour of the Justices, both from the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court. Negating the Judicial Commission’s function to monitor 
the Constitutional Justices was deemed tantamount to creating a Constitutional Court without 
supervision from any external institutions. Moreover, an internal supervision system alone is believed 
to be insufficient for maintaining and supervising the conduct of the Constitutional Justices. 
IV   FROM NEGATIVE TO POSITIVE LEGISLATOR 
The controversy that occurred during the twelve years of the establishment of Indonesian 
Constitutional Court raises a fundamental question. Can the Constitutional Court be justified in 
creating new norms in a law under review? Hans Kelsen established the first Constitutional Court in 
Austria in 1920, which was only intended to function as a ‘negative legislator’.391 This means that the 
Constitutional Court could only annul laws or rules and could not take over the powers of the 
Parliament or the Government in making laws or regulations, as briefly discussed in Chapter 1.  
In contrast, the Indonesian Constitutional Court not only can overturn laws, but also often creates 
new norms based on the interpretation of the Constitution. The majority of Court decisions resulting 
in the creation of new norms through the use of ‘conditionally constitutional’ or ‘conditionally 
unconstitutional’ models. This means that the laws reviewed by the Court will be declared 
constitutional or unconstitutional if the implementations of the laws or its regulations are in 
accordance with the interpretation or guidelines given by the Court in its decisions. 
In this context, the basic doctrine stating that the Constitutional Court can only act as a negative 
legislator has gradually changed and evolved in many countries. A recent development suggests that 
the theory of negative legislator, as introduced by Hans Kelsen, can only be effectively applied if the 
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Constitution of a country does not clearly contain constitutional rights.392 In order to interpret and 
enforce these rights, however, the judges have to interpret the Constitution in ways that may create 
new norms.393 Presently, almost all countries have a written Constitution guaranteeing the protection 
of constitutional rights. Therefore, the Constitutional Courts in many countries play the role of both 
negative legislator as well as positive legislator. 
Brewer-Carías concluded that there have been fundamental changes concerning the role of the 
Constitutional Courts from a negative legislator into a positive legislator. He categorised four trends 
or tendencies of the Constitutional Courts as a positive legislator: (1) Constitutional Courts interfering 
with the constituent power; (2) Constitutional Courts interfering with the existing legislation; (3) 
Constitutional Courts interfering with the absence of legislation or with legislative omissions; and (4) 
Constitutional Courts as legislators on matters of judicial review.394 In this context, the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court has made decisions that can be categorised into those four trends. The next 
section presents several examples of such decisions based on Brewer-Carías’s categorisation. 
A   Interfering with the Constituent Power 
In Austria, if the Constitutional Court decides a dispute concerning the power of state institutions, 
including between the Federation and the Länder, the Constitutional Court is considered to be acting 
as a positive legislator.395 The Indonesian Constitutional Court is clearly given constitutional power 
to settle disputes of authorities between state institutions whose powers are granted by the 
Constitution, as discussed in Chapter 2.396 Moreover, the Indonesian Constitutional Court, in several 
decisions, has tried to protect the fundamental rights of citizens not explicitly contained in the 
Constitution, such as due process of law, as discussed in the previous chapter, as well as the rights 
for legal aid and fair trial in the Advocates Law case (2004). Such protection comes about through the 
interpretation of the idea of a state law or rule of law. Butt and Lindsey refer to these rights as implied 
rights.397 According to Brewer-Carías, this type of interpretation has become a trend in many 
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countries, such as Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, India, Poland, Portugal, Switzerland 
and the United States.398 
Brewer-Carías also provides examples whereby the Constitutional Court of Austria and the 
Constitutional Court of Greece each made a decision by creating a new constitutional framework that 
has to be followed by their Parliaments, including the processes and restrictions on privatisation. 
Similar decisions were also made by the Indonesian Constitutional Court in several cases relating to 
the principles of state control over natural resources, and the principles of privatisation, such as in the 
Electricity (2003) case, the Oil and Gas (2003) case and the Water Resources (2004) case. In its 
decision, the Indonesian Constitutional Court explicitly created frameworks and suggestions for the 
legislatures and the executive stating, ‘Given that based on the considerations and suggestions that 
constitute an integral part of this decision that is addressed both to the legislators and the executive, 
then...’399 
Based on the cases discussed above, it is clear that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has been 
practicing judicial activism to interfere with constituent power. In terms of constitutional disputes 
between state institutions, the Constitution directly grants the Court power to resolve it. 
B   Interfering with the Existing Legislation 
In the Child Born out of Wedlock (2010) case, the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the 
Marriage Law created new meaning concerning the civil relationship between a child and his/her 
father. In its decision, the Court created an additional provision in Article 43(1) of the Marriage Law 
concerning the civil relationship between children born out of wedlock and both parents. The 
provision originally stated, ‘A child born out of wedlock only has a civil relationship with his/her 
mother and his/her mother’s family.’ According to the Court, this provision negated the rights to 
protection and legal certainty as well as eliminated the rights of the child from a man who is his/her 
biological father. Therefore, the Constitutional Court reinterpreted the case and added a new provision 
so that Article 43(1) should be read as: 
A child born out of wedlock has a civil relationship with his/her mother and his/her mother’s 
family as well as with a man as his/her father who can be proved by science and technology 
and/or other evidence according to the law that [they] have blood relations, including civil 
relationship with his/her father’s family.400 
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As the result, the civil relationship of a child born out of wedlock is no longer limited to his/her 
mother, but also includes his/her father, apart from their marriage, which is not registered under the 
law.  
The Indonesian Constitutional Court also often makes decisions which apply temporal effects of 
legislation affecting validity of a law for a specific period. However, according to the Constitutional 
Court Law, a Court decision has a permanent and immediate legal effect following declaration of 
decision.401 In the Anti-Corruption Court (2006) case and the Simultaneous Elections (2013) case, 
the Court decided to defer the unconstitutionality of provisions until a given period. This means that 
the decisions declared provisions unconstitutional, but would come into effect at a specific time 
determined by the Court, not immediately on the day the decisions were announced.  
Moreover, the Constitutional Court also made decisions with both prospective effect and retroactive 
effect, such as in the Parliamentary Seats Phase III (2009) case and the KPK Commissioner Tenure 
(2011) case, as discussed above. The Court reasoned that exceptions and discretions to impose 
retroactive decisions under certain conditions remain necessary to provide specific legal protections 
and to maintain public order. Additionally, the Court also revived laws previously revoked by the 
DPR, such as in the Electricity (2003) case and the Water Resources (2013) case. In its decisions, the 
Court entirely annulled both laws. In order to avoid a legal vacuum, the Court ordered that the laws 
revoked by the DPR would be reinstated until new laws are promulgated complying with the 
Constitutional Court decisions. 
C   Interfering with the Absence of Legislation or with Legislative Omission 
In the Attorney General’s Tenure (2010) case, the Constitutional Court made a decision to fill the 
absence of provisions regulating the end of the Attorney General’s tenure in the Attorney General 
Law. The original provision in Article 22(1)(d) of the Attorney General Office Law states, ‘Attorney 
General is honourably dismissed from his/her position because: ... d.  his/her tenure ended.’ However, 
there is no provision governing end of tenure for the Attorney General. In its decision, the Court 
stated that the absence of the provision was not an object of judicial review in the Constitutional 
Court, but rather an object of legislative review in the DPR. However, the Court argued that because 
the provision had multiple interpretations, which could lead to legal uncertainty, and because 
legislative review required a long procedure and was time consuming, the Constitutional Court 
declared a conditionally constitutional decision to fill the omission.402  
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Referring to the constitutional convention in Indonesia, in which the Attorney General is an appointed 
position equivalent to a Minister, the Constitutional Court ruled that the tenure of the Attorney 
General ends coinciding with the end of President’s term in one period simultaneously with that of 
cabinet members; or, the Attorney General is dismissed in his/her tenure by the President in the same 
period.403 At the time of this writing, the Attorney General Office Law has not been revised by the 
DPR based on the Constitutional Court decision. Given that it is a binding order, however, the 
decision is in effect and followed by the President in appointing or dismissing the Attorney General. 
Another example can be found in the Blasphemy (2009) case. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
although the Blasphemy Law was declared constitutional, the Constitutional Court provided 
recommendations in its decision that the DPR should revise the Blasphemy Law. In its legal 
considerations, the Court stated: 
... [there is] a necessity for revision of the Blasphemy Law both in the formal scope of legislation 
as well as in the substance in order to have clearer material elements so [it] does not cause 
misinterpretation in practice.404  
In contrast with other decisions, such as the Voter List (2009) case and the Child Born out of Wedlock 
(2010) case, the Constitutional Court stated in the Blasphemy (2009) case that the Court did not have 
the power to improve the provisions and the coverage of substance in the Blasphemy Law.405 
However, this argument is contrary to practices frequently undertaken by the Constitutional Court in 
making decisions. In various decisions, the Court often did not hesitate in creating new norms. This 
indicates that the Constitutional Court lacks consistent practices concerning the extent to which the 
Court can modify or create new norms in a law under review for constitutional interpretation. 
D   Acting as a Legislator on Matters of Judicial Review 
The Indonesian Constitutional Court can also be classified as a legislator in matters of judicial review, 
particularly in decisions deemed conditionally unconstitutional. This is exemplified by the Age of 
Criminal Liability (2010) case, the Court made a decision by modifying an article in the Juvenile 
Court Law related to the age of criminal responsibility for children. Prior to the Constitutional Court 
decision, Article 4(1) of the Juvenile Court Law reads, ‘The age limit of juvenile delinquency that 
subject to be heard at juvenile court hearing is at least eight years old but he/she has not reached 18 years 
old and he/she has never been married.’ 
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In its decision, the Court declared that the article is conditionally unconstitutional. This means that 
the article is unconstitutional unless the age limit of criminal responsibility is interpreted as twelve 
years. In other words, the Court did not annul the article, yet it clearly modified the age limit by 
increasing it from eight years to twelve years.406 
In this case, the Court raised the age limit citing three main reasons. First, the Court refers to the 
international conventions and other international legal instruments that have set the age limit of 
twelve years. Second, the Court also considers emotional intelligence, mental and intellectual health 
to align with child psychology and culture of Indonesia. Third, the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility for children in the Juvenile Court Bill and in the draft of the Criminal Code is also 
twelve years. In my view, it is clear that the Constitutional Court has acted as a de facto legislator by 
raising the age limit of criminal responsibility for children from eight years to twelve years. 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court has made decisions containing directives to legislators. For 
instance, in the Death Penalty (2007) case, although the Court stated that death penalty is 
constitutional, the Constitutional Court issued non-binding directives or recommendations to 
legislators and ordinary judges to harmonise Criminal Code and the draft of Criminal Code with the 
Constitution.  
…the formulation, application and implementation of capital punishment in the Indonesian 
judicial system should carefully consider the following matters:  
a. capital punishment shall no longer be a principal punishment, but rather a special and 
alternative punishment;  
b. capital punishment shall be imposed with a probation period of ten years that if the convicts 
demonstrate good behaviours, [sentence] may be changed into a life imprisonment or 20 
years;  
c. capital punishment shall not be imposed on underage children;  
d. the execution of capital punishment on pregnant women and mentally-ill persons shall be 
postponed until the pregnant women deliver their babies, and the mentally-ill convicts recover 
their sanity.407 
The legal reasons cited by the Constitutional Court in the Death Penalty (2007) case were based on 
provisions contained in the draft Criminal Code (RUU KUHP) undergoing decades long deliberation 
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in the DPR, but with no enactment yet. In this case, the Constitutional Court made efforts to expedite 
the law-making process through its decision.408 
E   Constitutional Court as a Positive Legislator 
Using the four trends categorised by Brewer-Carías, and based on examples of decisions as discussed 
above, it is evident that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has frequently acted as a positive 
legislator. In his doctoral thesis, a former Indonesian Constitutional Court Justice Maruarar Siahaan 
writes that the Court not only acts as a negative legislator, but also as a positive legislator. Based on 
his experience as a Constitutional Justice, he concludes that: 
In exceptional cases - although this is rare, and this is seen as controversial - it has been a fact 
that the Constitutional Court has a positive legislator role by formulating norms in several 
decisions. Initially it was formulated in its legal reasoning, then for reasons of legal certainty, in 
its development, the Constitutional Court formulates it in its final holding.409 
According to Siahaan, such decisions are declared to prevent disorder or confusion in the enforcement 
of laws. The decisions also aim to provide certainty in a state of urgency because it is predicted that 
there will not be enough time for the enactment of new laws, regulations or rules by other state 
institutions.410 In addition, the 2nd Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court Mahfud MD (2008-2013) 
and the current Chief Justice Arief Hidayat (2014-2019) shared similar opinions that the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court can act as a positive legislator. 
In this case, the Constitutional Court also serves as a positive legislator, which is to explain and 
to write down norms contained [in the Constitution] and not only to declare whether it is contrary 
to the 1945 Constitution or not. If only to declare whether it is contrary or not, then the role of 
the Constitutional Court is only limited as a negative legislator.411 
Thus, it is not true that the Indonesian Constitutional Court only serves as a negative legislator 
following the Kelsen’s doctrine. In practice, many decisions of the Constitutional Court clearly 
formulate new norms or regulations. This new role can be justified under certain and exceptional 
conditions because the negative legislator concept cannot be applied absolutely, particularly in terms 
of protection of citizens’ constitutional rights. Based on the cases discussed above, I believe there is 
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a shift in function of the Indonesian Constitutional Court from a negative legislator to a positive 
legislator, as commonly observed in many countries with either a Constitutional Court or a Supreme 
Court acting as the constitutional arbiter.412 In fact, it started when the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court decided its first case, the Electricity (2003) case, by annulling the entire Electricity Law (2002), 
while at the same time the Constitutional Court also reimposed the old Electricity Law (1985) 
previously revoked by the DPR.413 
V   FACTORS OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
In 2002 Smithey and Ishiyama conducted a comparative study on the level of judicial activism of the 
Constitutional Court and other equivalent institutions in eight former communist countries, namely, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Georgia, Moldova and Russia.414 They 
conducted series of initial hypothesis by creating five factors of judicial activism: (1) the division of 
authority between the central and local governments; (2) the existence of a written constitution or 
documents; (3) the independence of the judiciary; (4) the fragmentation and effectiveness of political 
parties; and (5) the support and legitimacy from the public on the court performance. Their conclusion 
shows that the fragmentation and effectiveness of political parties, as well as the legitimacy and level 
of public support towards the court’s performance, are the two most important factors contributing to 
judicial activism. The three other factors do not show a consistent relation, although it can also 
contribute to judicial activism on a limited basis.415 These results provide the basis of theory about 
causes of judicial activism in Indonesia as a country that has recently emerged from an authoritarian 
regime.  
First, according to Tate and Vallinder, the high levels of competition in general elections, which 
generates fragmentation of the party system and a weak coalition government, tends to cause political 
problems that must be brought before the court. These conditions result in the court becoming an 
important player in determining political decisions.416 In the Indonesian context, the party system is 
built on a multi-party system. After the reform era in 1998, there were more than nine political parties 
with seats in the DPR. At the time of writing, there are ten political parties in the DPR, but no single 
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political party holding parliamentary dominance.417 This has led to the absence of a major power 
among political parties that are not well consolidated. In addition, the DPR and the President select 
the Constitutional Court Justices, in which some of them are former members of political parties in 
the DPR. Therefore, it is believed that the Indonesian Constitutional Justices consider not only 
constitutional or legal aspects, but also social and political context in making decisions influencing 
public policies. 
Second, rampant corruption implicating members of the DPR and government officials, including the 
ministers of the Cabinet and the chairpersons and the secretary general of political parties, has led to 
low public trust against political parties in the legislative and the executive branches.418 Furthermore, 
unsatisfactory performance by the DPR members in exercising their functions, particularly in law 
making, also leads to the declining legitimacy of the DPR. In this situation, the Constitutional Court 
garners better public support and legitimacy compared to the legislative.419  
Third, another specific factor of judicial activism in the Indonesian Constitutional Court is the shift 
of a legal paradigm by the Constitutional Justices, from merely applying procedural justice to 
defending substantive justice. This paradigm is concerned with how Constitutional Justices evaluate 
substantive justice in providing fair treatment concerning rights and obligations.420 In Indonesia, 
Satjipto Rahardjo, a prominent professor of law, has greatly influenced the theory of substantive 
justice and introduced progressive legal thoughts to many legal academics.421 In this context, the 
Constitutional Justices, who openly acknowledged that the Indonesian Constitutional Court has been 
acting as a positive legislator, are greatly influenced by the progressive legal theory taught by 
Rahardjo at the Faculty of Law at the University of Diponegoro.  
For instance, former Justice Maruarar Siahaan, also known as ‘the greatest dissenter’ in the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court, wrote his doctoral thesis under Rahardjo’s supervision at the 
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University of Diponegoro. Another example, the current Chief Justice Arief Hidayat, a former Dean 
of the Faculty of Law at the University of Diponegoro, and the 2nd Chief Justice Mahfud MD, one of 
the closest fellows of Rahardjo, often cited Satjipto’s progressive law theory in making Court 
decisions. In his writing on progressive law, Mahfud MD explicitly stated that the Constitutional 
Court did not hesitate to put aside procedural laws when deadlock occurred in the need to provide 
solutions. 
This position has created Constitutional Court decisions breaking rigidity of laws by making a 
new interpretation that marginalises the domination of old legal interpretation, even in some 
cases the Court puts aside general principles of law that have been held strongly by the jurists.422 
When existing laws had been unable to provide a solution to a constitutional issue, the progressive 
law paradigm had been the underlying cause for the Indonesian Constitutional Court to perform 
judicial activism in making constitutional review decisions. Moreover, the Court also applied this 
paradigm in dealing with electoral disputes. In the East Java Gubernatorial Election (2008) case, the 
Court expanded its power, for the first time, to examine electoral cases, not only limited to vote 
counting errors, but also any type of violations occurring during the elections.  
In the context of constitutional interpretation, Craven suggested that the progressive law paradigm is 
closely associated with ‘activism’ and ‘progressivism’.423 According to him, this paradigm of 
constitutional interpretation requires the Court to keep pace with latest developments of the 
Constitution in order to comply with the wishes of the community and social expectations, rather than 
just reading the text of the Constitution or adjusting to meet the intent of the framers.424 Thus, when 
the Indonesian Constitutional Justices applied a progressive law approach as the basis for making its 
decision, it can be said that they also indirectly exercises a form of judicial activism. 
VI   CONCLUSION 
In contrast to other developed countries, the practices of judicial activism exercised by the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court have resulted in more political debate, rather than academic debate. The primary 
criticism came from politicians in the DPR who consider that the Constitutional Court exercised 
powers beyond the proper limitations through judicial activism. The DPR also complained that their 
power to make laws is taken by the Court, as a positive legislator. Moreover, Indonesia adopted a 
                                               
422 Mahfud MD, above n 34, 13. 
423 Greg Craven, ‘Reflections on Judicial Activism: More in Sorrow than in Anger’ (Paper presented at the Ninth 
Conference of the Samuel Griffith Society), Perth, 24-26 October 1997. 
424 Ibid. 
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civil law system principles dictating judges to implement laws, but not to make laws. However, the 
principles have not been fully implemented by the Indonesian Constitutional Court that often makes 
new norms. The decisions made by the Court often reflect the principle of ‘judge-made law,’ as 
practiced in common law countries. 
Furthermore, although the Constitutional Court decisions often creates controversy, the decisions 
taken by the Court which constitutes judicial activism are relatively appreciated when able to provide 
protection for the constitutional rights of citizens. In strengthening protection of human rights and 
overcoming the democratic stagnation, judicial activism, in support of the reform process in 
Indonesia, is tolerable. It is even necessary to consolidate Indonesia’s democracy that has recently 
emerged from an authoritarian regime. However, judicial activism will face challenges and lose 
justification if a decision taken by the Constitutional Court is unaccountable or it does not contain 
proper legal reasons and rationality. 
As shown in this chapter, the Indonesian Constitutional Court has performed judicial activism based 
on various decisions. Under certain conditions, the Court also acts as a positive legislator. However, 
this practice is nothing new in the context of the Constitutional Court development in many countries. 
Constitutional Courts in various countries exercise their role, not only as negative legislators, but also 
as positive legislators or temporary legislators.  
In the context of Indonesia, in its ongoing efforts to strengthen a constitutional government, I am in 
the opinion that the practice of judicial activism should not be prohibited, as prohibition will force 
the Constitution become a non-living organism. As the result, the Constitution would be obsolete and 
the constitutional rights of citizens more difficult to protect. However, judicial activism in the 
Constitutional Court should not be exercised without limits. If this were the case, it could create 
judicial tyranny.  
Therefore, the most appropriate option is to allow judicial activism to be carried out by the 
Constitutional Court, including the Court serving as a positive legislator, but only in exceptional 
circumstances and in order to meet certain limitations, such as to protect the rights and freedoms of 
citizens guaranteed in the Constitution, but also beyond the written Constitution; to provide more 
protection to minority groups suffering adverse impacts from the majority-based decision-making 
process; to restore the rights of citizens, both individuals and groups, who have been violated; and to 
adjust to emerging global justice applying comparative law and international law. 
Most of the Constitutional Court decisions discussed in this chapter have met one or more of those 
exceptional circumstances and limitations, despite weaknesses in citing legal reasons. Such evidence 
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demonstrates that the practice of judicial activism and the positive legislator role of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court in the first twelve years are relatively accepted. Nevertheless, this issue has not 
been a major concern for legal academics or constitutional experts. Criticism and further study of the 
judicial activism in Indonesia are required, both in general terms and case-by-case. Indeed, the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court lacks consistent practices as to when and under what conditions 
judicial activism should be exercised in deciding a case. 
***
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CHAPTER 6 
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS OF  
THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
In this chapter, I analyse the performance of the Indonesian Constitutional Court by scrutinising its 
jurisdictional limitations. I begin by discussing the absence of Court powers for handling cases of 
constitutional complaint and constitutional question. In absence, therefore, complications arose in the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in Indonesia. Moreover, dualism of judicial review 
system has led to constitutional adjudication mechanism problems, when laws and regulations are 
involved. In such system, the Indonesian Constitutional Court can only review the constitutionality 
of laws, while the Supreme Court reviews other regulations of lower hierarchy. These issues are 
discussed in the two sections below by evaluating the system and offering suggestions to tackle the 
problems. Another important discussion in this chapter concerns non-judicial roles played by the 
Constitutional Court for building constitutional awareness in various segments of Indonesian 
societies through cooperation and activities conducted. In the context of the judiciary, it is uncommon 
for a court to play such roles. Ideally, a court only exercises its powers to examine and decide cases 
under its jurisdiction. However, academics and the public have been very accepting of the non-
judicial roles of the Constitutional Court. This chapter comprehensively analyses several factors 
influencing such public acceptance. 
I   CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS 
From the perspective of constitutional government, the current jurisdiction of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court cannot optimally protect fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. One of 
the main reasons for this weakness is the Court’s limited jurisdiction to review the constitutionality 
of laws. There is no direct mechanism available to the Court when citizens feel their fundamental 
rights and freedoms have been violated by decisions, policies or actions made by public authorities 
or state institutions. In addition, the Indonesian constitutional adjudication system does not provide a 
mechanism for ordinary judges to come forward with questions to the Constitutional Court 
concerning the constitutionality of laws or regulations serving as basis for examining their cases. 
Based on a comparative study of constitutional courts from different countries, the two mechanisms 
explained above are known as constitutional complaint and constitutional question. The following 
section explains what constitutional complaint and constitutional question are and how the 
mechanisms could be adopted into the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. I highlight 
several aspects that should be considered if these mechanisms are to be adopted in the future. 
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A   Constitutional Complaint 
Constitutional complaint provides one of the major powers of constitutional courts to protect the 
fundamental rights of citizens. It is defined as a complaint to a constitutional court, lodged by 
individuals who feel their fundamental or constitutional rights are being violated by public 
authorities.425 In some circumstances, municipalities or associations of municipalities, on the basis of 
their right to self-government, may also lodge a constitutional complaint.426 Dannemann suggests that 
constitutional complaint has several characteristics determined by four factors: (1) availability of 
legal remedies against violations of constitutional rights; (2) existence of a separate process that only 
examines constitutional issues of an act, not other legal issues; (3) it can be submitted by individuals 
who are directly affected by that act; and (4) the court that decides a constitutional complaint has a 
power to restore the rights of victims.427 
The constitutional complaint can only be accepted by a constitutional court if all available legal 
remedies have been exercised or exhausted through the judicial process. In addition, all possibilities 
to correct or prevent violations of the Constitution must exhausted. This requirement is also identified 
as subsidiarity of the constitutional complaint.428 In some countries, the constitutional complaint can 
be directed towards an act of public authority, the constitutionality of laws or court decisions.429 The 
constitutional court only examines conformity of an act against the Constitution, while the assessment 
of legal issues and other facts remain the authority of ordinary courts. As long as there is no violation 
of fundamental rights or constitutional rights, the constitutional court is bound by decisions of 
ordinary courts. 430 
Constitutional Court power to examine constitutional complaint cases is present in many countries. 
This power is also known by different terms. For instance, in Western Europe, the Austrian 
Constitutional Court uses the term of Individualbeschwerde,431 the German Constitutional Court 
                                               
425 Victor Ferreres Comella, ‘The Consequences of Centralizing Constitutional Review in a Special Court: Some Thoughts 
on Judicial Activism’ (2004) 82(7) Texas Law Review 1705, 1710. 
426 Article 93(1)(4b) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany. 
427 Gerhard Dannemann, ‘Constitutional Complaints: The European Perspective’ (1994) 43(1) The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 142, 142. 
428 See The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Constitutional Complaint <http://www.bundesverfassungs 
gericht.de/EN/Verfahren/Wichtige-Verfahrensarten/Verfassungsbeschwerde/verfassungsbeschwerde_node. html>. 
429 See The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Instructions on Lodging a Constitutional Complaint with the 
Federal Constitutional Court <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de>. 
430 Palguna, above n 76, 1. 
431 Article 139, Article 140 and Article 144 of the Austria Constitution and § 82 of the Austrian Constitutional Court Law. 
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knows it as Verfassungsbeschwerd432 and the Spanish Constitutional Court refers to this power as 
recurso de amparo.433 A constitutional complaint mechanism is also practiced in Central and Eastern 
European countries, such as Croatia,434 Czech Republic,435 Hungary,436 Poland,437 Russia438 and 
Ukraine.439 In Asia, several constitutional courts hold a power to examine constitutional complaint 
cases, such as in Azerbaijan,440 South Korea,441 Thailand442 and Turkey.443 Furthermore, many 
constitutional courts in Latin America have similar constitutional complaint power known as juicio 
de amparo or writ of amparo, for example Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela.444 
Currently, some countries, such as France, Italy, Lithuania and Macedonia, are lacking constitutional 
complaint mechanisms and are working towards developing such to be adopted to their constitutional 
courts as additional power.445  
                                               
432 Article 93(1)(4a) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany and §§ 90 et seq. of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court Law. 
433 Article 53(2) of the Spanish Constitution and Article 41 to Article 47 and Article 50 of the Spanish Constitutional 
Court Law. 
434 Article 128 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia; Article 62 to Article 80 of the Constitutional Court Law of 
the Republic of Croatia; and Article 24 to Article 25 and Article 80 to Article 82 of the Rule of Procedure of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia.  
435 Article 87(1) of the Constitution of the Czech Republic and Article 72 to Article 84 of the Constitutional Court Law 
of the Czech Republic.  
436 See Article 24(2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (as enacted on 25 April 2011); Article 26 to Article 31 of the 
Constitutional Court Law of Hungary (2011); and the Decision 1001/2013. (II. 27.) AB Tü. on the Constitutional Court’s 
Rules of Procedure.  
437 Article 79(1) and Article 188 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland; Article 27 and Article 46 of the 
Constitutional Tribunal Law of the Republic of Poland.  
438 Article 125 (4) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation and Article 3 of the Federal Constitutional Law of the 
Constitutional Court of Russian Federation. 
439 Article 150 of the Constitution of Ukraine (as amended by the Law № 2952-VI dated 1 February 2011) and the Law 
№ 586-VII dated 10 September 2013; Article 13, Article 42, Article 43, and Article 82 to Article 85 of the Constitutional 
Court Law of Ukraine dated 17 May 2012.  
440 Article 130 para V of the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan (as result of Referendum held on 18 March 2009) 
and Article 34 of the Constitutional Court Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan. 
441 Article 111(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea; Article 68(1) and (2) of the Constitutional Court Law of 
the Republic of Korea. 
442 Section 212 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand.  
443 Article 148 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey (as amended on September 12, 2010; Act No. 5982); Article 
45 to Article of Law on the Establishment and Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of Turkey (Law No: 6216, 
adopted 30 March 2011).  
444 For further discussion of writ of amparo in Latin America, see Gianluca Gentili, ‘A Comparative Perspective on Direct 
Access to Constitutional and Supreme Courts in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America: Assessing Advantages for the 
Italian Constitutional Court’ (2011) 29(4) Penn State International Law Review 705, 710-5. 
445 Ibid 735-53; Otto Pfersmann, ‘Concrete Review as Indirect Constitutional Complaint in French Constitutional Law: 
A Comparative Perspective’ (2010) 6(2) European Constitutional Law Review (EuConst) 223; Aušra Kargaudienė, 
‘Individual Constitutional Complaint in Lithuania: Conception and the Legal Issues’ (2011) 4(1) Baltic Journal of Law 
& Politics 154; Tanja Karakamisheva, ‘Constitutional Complaint- Procedural and Legal Instrument for Development of 
the Constitutional Justice (Case Study – Federal Republic of Germany, Republic of Croatia, Republic of Slovenia and 
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In Indonesia, the Constitutional Court does not have a power to examine constitutional complaint 
cases. However, in a draft constitutional amendment, the Constitutional Commission (Komisi 
Konstitusi) proposed a constitutional complaint mechanism to the MPR, suggesting that the 
Constitutional Court should hold a power to examine constitutional complaint cases.446 According 
Palguna, a current Constitutional Justice of the Indonesian Constitutional Court who involved in 
amending the Constitution, there was no further discussion in the MPR concerning this issue. The 
MPR members did not follow up the Constitutional Commission’s proposal.447 There is no clear 
explanation for why the MPR rejected this idea. Neverthelesss, there are several possible reasons to 
explain the MPR’s stance. 
First, the constitutional amendment process establishing the Constitutional Court was marked by 
political factions’ interests seeking to maintain influence and power. Thus, the amendment process 
was not predominantly led by profound discussions with intent to form a robust constitutional 
adjudication system. Second, the MPR did not want a Constitutional Court with full authority to 
protect fundamental rights or constitutional rights of citizens due to concerns that the Court would 
examine the human right violations committed during the New Order, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
Third, the MPR considered that introducing a constitutional complaint mechanism, with aims to 
challenge actions and decisions of the government, would undermine authorities of state officials and 
public authorities to act and make decisions, or create policies. Fourth, the MPR also believed the 
Court would be burdened with too many cases when granted jurisdiction to examine constitutional 
complaint cases, as compared to other countries with a similar mechanism. 
Now, more than twelve years after the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the MPR’s reasons 
in rejecting proposed constitutional complaint mechanism are no longer relevant. A constitutional 
complaint mechanism should be adopted to the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia; 
Indonesia is a state with strong constitutionalism principles and placing the Constitution as the 
supreme law of the land.448 In realising such principles, Indonesia is committed to implement a system 
                                               
Republic of Macedonia)’ (Paper presented at the World Conference on Constitutional Justice, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa and the Venice Commission, Cape Town, 24 January 2009). 
446 The Constitutional Commission was an ad hoc body formed by the MPR to conduct a study and provide 
recommendations on the 1945 Constitutional amendment. However, recommendations submitted by the Constitutional 
Commission to the MPR were not binding. 
447 I Dewa Gede Palguna, “Overcoming Constitutional Obstacles in Dealing with Constitutional Complaint Issues: 
Indonesia’s Experience” in M. Guntur Hamzah et al (eds), Proceeding of International Symposium on Constitutional 
Complaint, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015, p. 148. See also Hamdan Zoelva, ‘Pengaduan 
Konstitusional (Constitutional Complaint) dalam Sistem Peradilan di Indonesia [Constitutional Complaint in Judicial 
System in Indonesia]’ (2010) 16 Jurnal Negarawan 45, 53. 
448 Article 1 (2) of the Constitution states, ‘Sovereignty is in the hands of the people and is implemented according to the 
Constitution.’ Moreover, Article 1(3) states, ‘The state of Indonesia is a law state.’ 
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of constitutional government. One of the major elements derived from a constitutional government 
system is protection of fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, as explicitly contained in Chapter 
XA of the constitutional bill of rights in the Indonesian Constitution.449 However, the inclusion of 
fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution certainly does not suffice. It needs a reliable 
mechanism to protect, adhere to and enforce those rights.  
Currently, Indonesia only provides limited protection for citizens who feel that their fundamental 
rights have been violated. Only the Constitutional Court can examine an individual constitutional 
rights violation, albeit limited to reviews of constitutionality of laws. Given that the violations of 
constitutional rights not only occur because of the substance of laws, but also because of actions or 
decisions taken by public authorities or state institutions, the absence of a constitutional mechanism 
able to protect the constitutional right of Indonesian citizens is tantamount to negating an essential 
element in implementing the system of constitutional government. Therefore, adopting a 
constitutional complaint mechanism is imperative to strengthen the implementation of a 
constitutional government system, particularly in providing full protection of citizen’s constitutional 
rights. 
The need for establishing a constitutional complaint mechanism in Indonesia is also conceivable in 
various cases lodged with the Constitutional Court having similar characteristics to constitutional 
complaint cases.450 The Constitutional Court Registration Division, without any trial, dismissed most 
of those cases because the applications assessed were beyond the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. 
However, there were also several cases examined by the Constitutional Justices through court 
hearings, even though these cases, in substance, were constitutional complaint cases. This practice 
frequently occurs when petitioners modify a constitutional complaint application into a case of 
constitutional review or dispute between state institutions. I categorise these cases as ‘pseudo-
constitutional complaint’. As a result, many legal arguments constructed by the applicants exemplify 
concrete cases, in contrast to the doctrine held by the Constitutional Court in reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws which is abstract.  
Furthermore, some of the constitutional justices delivered dissenting opinions in a constitutional 
review case where they argued that constitutional complaint cases should be examined and decided 
                                               
449 Article 28 to 28J of the Indonesian Constitution. 
450 Applications and letters received by the Court Registrar in 2005 or two years after the Court establishment showed that 
there were at least 48 petitions that had the characteristics of constitutional complaint cases. This amount was equivalent 
to three times of judicial review applications in the same year. In its development, there have been approximately 106 
petitions regarding constitutional complaint applications in 2010. See Pan Mohamad Faiz, ‘Menabur Benih Constitutional 
Complaint’ [Sowing the Seeds of Constitutional Complaint] <http://panmohamadfaiz.com/ 2006/02/28/constitutional-
complaint>; and Zoelva, above n 447, 54.  
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by the Constitutional Court. Justice Siahaan wrote, ‘Therefore, there are reasons to assess from the 
angle of an individual constitutional complaint that actually has a sufficient legal basis based on the 
principles contained in the 1945 Constitution.’451 Thus, if Indonesia has a strong commitment to 
implement principles of constitutional government, a constitutional complaint mechanism is very 
appropriate for protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution.  
The most ideal way to adopt constitutional complaint is to amend the Constitution by explicitly adding 
a constitutional complaint mechanism as one of the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. Through such, 
constitutional and political legitimacy would be achieved by giving the constitutional complaint 
mechanism the highest place in the constitutional system in Indonesia. In this context, Indonesian can 
learn from the Turkish Constitutional Court. Turkey amended their Constitution in 2010 to 
incorporate constitutional complaint as the newest jurisdiction of the Turkish Constitutional Court. 
As a result, they began receiving individual applications on 23 September 2012.452 
Alternatively, the establishment of constitutional complaint mechanism can be conducted through 
Constitutional Court Law revision in a legislative review process. In addition, the Constitutional 
Court in its constitutional interpretation can establish a legal construct where constitutional complaint 
becomes part of a constitutional review system. However, these options would lack legitimacy. 
Indeed, the Court would be sharply criticised for practicing excessive judicial activism, as discussed 
in the previous chapter. 
Furthermore, if the constitutional complaint is to be adopted into the system of fundamental rights 
protection in Indonesia, the improvement of the Constitutional Court institutional structure is 
imperative. Additionally, limitations placed on constitutional complaint cases that can be examined 
by the Constitutional Court should be regulated. The experiences of other countries show that most 
cases examined by the constitutional courts have been constitutional complaints. For instance, the 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany received 200,482 (98%) constitutional complaints since 
1951. This means that they receive around 5,000 constitutional complaint cases each year. This is 
only 2.5% of all constitutional complaint cases granted by the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany. In 2013, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany received 6,238 constitutional 
complaint cases, but only 91 cases (1.46%) were granted.453 Moreover, the Constitutional Court of 
                                               
451 See PUU Depok Election (2006) case, 77. 
452 See Burhan Üstün, ‘Protection of Human Rights by the Turkish Constitutional Court’ (Paper presented at the 
International Conference on the Role of Constitutional Justice in Protecting the Values of the Rule of Law, the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Moldova, Chişinău, 8 September 2014). 
453 See The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Annual Statistics 2013 <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/ 
SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Statistik/statistics_2013.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1>. 
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South Korea received 26,006 constitutional complaint cases since it was founded in 1988. In other 
words, the Constitutional Court of South Korea receives about 1,000 constitutional complaint cases 
annually.454 Additionally, the Constitutional Court of Turkey received more than 40,000 individual 
application cases since constitutional complaint was implemented on 23 September 2012. The 
backlog is tremendously high. At the time of writing, the numbers of pending cases are roughly 
20,000.455  
In contrast, the Indonesian Constitutional Court only received 1,746 cases over the past twelve years. 
In addition, 52% of the total cases handled by the Indonesian Constitutional Court were related to 
electoral disputes, both at the national and the regional level. Although the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court received fewer cases than other constitutional courts, the Constitutional Justices still felt 
overwhelmed in resolving those cases. Therefore, several prerequisites must be considered if a 
constitutional complaint mechanism is to be adapted to the Indonesian Constitutional Court. 
First, the organisational structure of the Indonesian Constitutional Court should be strengthened, 
particularly by increasing the number of skilled and experienced constitutional researchers in order 
to support the constitutional justices in examining cases and making decisions. Presently, the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court only has 19 researchers and 15 law clerks. With the current 
organisational structure, the Court will definitely face difficulty in handling constitutional complaint 
cases. Therefore, in the future, the structure and various programs of the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court should focus more on the management of case settlement as its primary function.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Human Resources and Finance Bureau of the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
                                               
454 See The Constitutional Court of Korea, Caseload Statistics <www.http://english.ccourt.go.kr/cckhome/eng/ 
index.do>. 
455 See The Constitutional Court of Turkey, Individual Application Statistics <http://anayasa.gov.tr/en/inlinepages/ 
IndividualApplication/Statistics.html> 
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Indonesia can learn from Turkey’s experiences. The 2010 Turkish constitutional amendment 
introduced the individual complaint system and restructured the Constitutional Court organisation. 
For instance, they had 11 Constitutional Justices and 20 Rapporteur Judges assisting the Court. After 
the amendment, the number increased to 17 Constitutional Justices, 77 Rapporteur Judges and 25 
Assistant Rapporteur Judges. Previously, the Court exercised constitutional review in plenary session, 
but with the amendment two Sections were established for the purpose of handling constitutional 
complaint. In addition, three Commissions were established under each section and the administrative 
bureau was strengthened.456 
Second, the Constitutional Court should be given an authority of the dismissal process conducted by 
panel of justices, not by registrars or administrative officers, to sort out whether a case can be 
examined further in court hearings or should be dismissed directly. This filtering mechanism is 
needed to ensure proper caseload handling by the Constitutional Court. 
Third, the Constitutional Court should define clear boundaries regarding constitutional complaint 
cases that can be examined. Some of the main limitations are: (1) the applicant must be an individual 
directly suffering from the loss of their constitutional rights; (2) the application can only be submitted 
after all available legal remedies are exhausted; (3) there must be a time limit for applying a 
constitutional complaint case after a court judgment, actions or decisions made by public authorities 
or state institutions violating the constitutional rights of the applicant.  
In the context of Indonesia, which has a vast territory lacking adequate access to transportation, 
information and communication, the time limit for applying a constitutional complaint case should 
be regulated for at least three months starting from the exhaustion of legal remedies. The comparison 
concerning the time limit for constitutional complaint submission in various countries can be seen in 
the following table. 
Table 1 
Time Limit for Constitutional Complaint Application 
COUNTRY TIME LIMIT SOURCE 
Austria six weeks 
Article 82 of 
the Constitutional Court Law 
Croatia 30 days 
Article 64 of 
the Constitutional Court Law 
                                               
456 Email from Mucahit Aydin (A Rapporteur Judge of the Constitutional Court of Turkey) to Pan Mohamad Faiz Kusuma 
Wijaya, 6 October 2015. 
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Hungary 60 days 
Article 28 of 
the Constitutional Court Law 
Germany one month 
Article 93(1) of 
the Federal Constitutional Court Law 
South Korea 90 days 
Article 68(1) of 
the Constitutional Court Law 
Spain 30 days 
Article 44(2) of 
the Constitutional Court Law 
Turkey 30 days 
Article 47 of the 
Constitutional Court Law 
Source: Compiled by the author 
B   Constitutional Question 
In addition to constitutional complaint, the Indonesian Constitutional Court should adopt 
constitutional question as another jurisdiction. It is a mechanism that allows ordinary judges to review 
the constitutionality of laws or regulations being used to decide cases in ordinary courts. If judges are 
unsure or doubtful about the constitutionality of laws or regulations being used for examining their 
cases, they may delay the examination and question the Constitutional Court. In this matter, the 
Constitutional Court will only decide the constitutionality of the law or regulation in question. The 
ordinary judges will then determine the case based on the Constitutional Court’s decision.457 While 
this mechanism has not been recognised in the Indonesian constitutional adjudication system, in many 
countries, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Spain, constitutional question 
has been implemented.458 
In practice, litigants in ordinary courts file applications for constitutional review to the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court directly without coordination or assistance from the ordinary courts. For 
instance, this practice occurred in the Leste Majeste (2006) case. Eggi Sudjana, a political activist, 
who is also a popular lawyer, was charged, based on Article 134, Article 136 bis and Article 137 of 
the Indonesian Criminal Code, with insulting the President, known as the Leste Majeste. On his 
initiative, Sudjana lodged a constitutional review application with the Constitutional Court against 
those articles. As discussed in the Chapter 4, the Constitutional Court annulled the articles as they 
                                               
457 Victor Ferreres Comella, ‘The European Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation: Toward decentralization?’ 
(2004) 2(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 461, 465. 
458 Ibid. 
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proved to be contrary to the Constitution.459 Although the Court invalidated the articles, the ordinary 
court still sentenced him to three months in prison and probation for six months.460  
The legal reason given by the ordinary court was that the action committed by Sudjana occurred 
before the Constitutional Court declared its decision. According to the Judges who decided the case, 
the effect of Constitutional Court’s decision was not retroactive and only in effect prospectively. The 
Supreme Court strengthened the lower court’s decision.461 Based on this case, the decision of the 
ordinary court or the Supreme Court would be different if the ordinary court held authority, or at least 
had an initiative, to apply a constitutional question to the Constitutional Court. Thus, the 
constitutional rights of citizens would be protected. 
The constitutional question mechanism offers several advantages for the constitutional adjudication 
system in Indonesia. First, the constitutional question mechanism can strengthen the protection, 
respect of and fulfilment of constitutional rights of citizens. Thus, when citizens lack awareness or 
ability to defend constitutional rights, minimum constitutional rights protection is guaranteed even 
without the need for to active application for constitutional reviews by the Constitutional Court. 
Nonetheless, the submission of the constitutional question to the Constitutional Court remains highly 
dependent on the initiative and willingness of ordinary judges. Second, ordinary judges will no longer 
be forced to apply applicable laws or regulations in examining a case when there is doubt of potential 
conflict with the Constitution. Third, the presence of the constitutional question will help to achieve 
a common understanding among ordinary judges of the importance in upholding the principles of the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations. If the mechanism of the constitutional question is adopted 
in Indonesia, the ordinary judges could be more critical of the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations.462  
Four options exist for the adoption of the constitutional question by the constitutional adjudication 
system in Indonesia. First, the best way to expand the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction is by adding 
the constitutional question as an additional power to the Court through a constitutional amendment. 
                                               
459 See also Naomita Royan, ‘Increasing Press Freedom in Indonesia: the Abolition of the Lese Majeste and ‘Hate-Sowing’ 
Provisions’ (2009) 10(2) Australian Journal of Asian Law 290. 
460 ‘Eggy Divonis 3 Bulan Penjara’ [Eggy was sentenced to three months in prison], Hukum Online (online), 22 February 
2007 <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol16258/eggy-divonis-3-bulan-penjara>.  
461 ‘Eggi Sudjana Ajukan PK Perkara Penghinaan Presiden’ [Eggi Sudjana filed a reconsideration of case for insulting 
the insulting the President] Hukum Online (online), 2 July 2010 <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/ 
lt4c2d0148deb5e/eggi-sudjana-ajukan-pk-perkara-penghinaan-presiden>. 
462 See also I Dewa Gede Palguna, ‘Constitutional Question: Latar Belakang dan Praktik di Negara Lain serta 
Kemungkinan Penerapannya di Indonesia’ [Constitutional Question: Background and Practice in Other Countries and the 
Possibility of Its Implementation in Indonesia] (2010) 1(17) Jurnal Hukum 1, 16-7. 
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The main advantage in this method is that there will be a strong constitutional basis for the Court to 
examine cases concerning constitutional questions. 
Second, the Constitutional Court Law could be revised by adding provisions providing flexibility for 
ordinary judges to submit a constitutional complaint to the Constitutional Court. These provisions 
would be included in a specific chapter on constitutional review in the Constitutional Court Law, with 
an interpretation that the constitutional question is a category of constitutional review provided in the 
Constitution.463 Thus, the constitutional question would be part of constitutional adjudication under 
the Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. 
Third, another option is to follow the mechanism adopted in the French system known as the 
exception d ‘inconstitutionnalité. In this system, if there is a judge in lower courts who have questions 
on the constitutionality of laws, they can ask the Constitutional Council. However, the application 
should be presented to and examined first by the Conseil d ‘État or the Cour de Cassation prior to 
the submission to the Constitutional Council.464 This system can also be applied in Indonesia without 
amending the Constitution or revising the Constitutional Court Law. According to the Constitutional 
Court Law, a state institution can apply for constitutional review.465 The definition of state institutions 
here includes the Supreme Court.  
Thus, if there is a constitutional question requested by ordinary judges in Indonesia, the application 
should be submitted to the Supreme Court. Using such constitutional review mechanism, the Supreme 
Court can lodge a constitutional question to the Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, the weakness of 
the French system is that Supreme Court may not follow up the request submitted by ordinary judges 
to the Constitutional Court. To prevent this quagmire, the Supreme Court has to create an internal 
regulation governing the mechanism and procedure to request a constitutional question. This 
regulation provides assurance and certainty that the request will be submitted to the Constitutional 
Court when meeting requirements. This guarantee is necessary so that ordinary judges will not 
hesitate or worry that the Supreme Court will dismiss their constitutional questions without adequate 
reasons. 
Fourth, the Constitutional Court can decide on a constitutional interpretation defining state 
institutions in constitutional review system to include general courts, consisting of public courts, 
religious courts, military courts and administrative courts. Thus, the Court’s constitutional 
                                               
463 Ibid 16. 
464 Fabbrini, above n 44, 1306; Myriam Hunter-Henin, ‘Constitutional Developments and Human Rights in France: One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back’ (2011) 60(1) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 167, 187. 
465 See Article 51(1)(d) of the Constitutional Court Law. 
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interpretation will become a key to introducing a constitutional question mechanism that can be used 
by ordinary judges. The procedures and requirements of this mechanism will be similar to the process 
of constitutional review of laws. However, the Constitutional Court should create a new regulation 
concerning special procedures and requirements for a constitutional question. 
The fore mentioned four options offer alternatives for adopting the constitutional question into the 
constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. Nevertheless, there is also a serious challenge to be 
addressed before constitutional question can be adopted. The length of time in deciding a 
constitutional question case by the Constitutional Court should be an important concern. In some 
countries that have implemented this mechanism, the length of time in deciding a constitutional 
question case has become an obstacle for the ordinary courts in making their final decision. In this 
context, Comella has compared constitutional court hearings concerning constitutional question cases 
in European countries. He found that the length of time in deciding a constitutional question case 
varies. Luxemburg can resolve a constitutional question case in just a few months; while in Austria 
and Belgium it may take up to one year. In addition, Italy takes one to two years for deciding a 
constitutional question case. Surprisingly, Germany and Spain has taken five to eight years to decide 
constitutional question cases.466 Thus, the time limit for deciding a constitutional question case must 
be regulated, either in the Constitutional Court Law or the Constitutional Court Regulation.467 
II   DUALISM OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW SYSTEM 
In the Indonesian legal system, there exists a hierarchical structure of laws adopted from the pyramid 
of law theory by Hans Kelsen, known as Stufenbau des Rechts.468 Presently, the types and hierarchy 
of laws in Indonesia consists of the Constitution, People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) Decision, 
Law or Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Interim Emergency Law or Perppu), Government 
Regulation, Presidential Regulation, Provincial Regulation and District/City Regulation. The legal 
power of those laws is in accordance with the hierarchical structure ranging from the highest to the 
lowest level.469 
 
                                               
466 Comella, above n 457, 471. 
467 Article 86 of the Indonesian Constitutional Court Law authorises the Constitutional Court to regulate further any 
shortcoming or absence of procedural law to support the implementation of its duties and responsibilities. 
468 See Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, 1967). 
469 Article 7 of Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations. See also Organisation for Economic 
Co-Operation and Development (OECD), OECD Reviews of Regulatory Reform -  Indonesia - Government Capacity to 
Assure High Quality Regulation (September 2012). 
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Figure 10 
Judicial Review System and  
Hierarchy of Laws and Regulations in Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Law No. 12 of 2011 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations 
Indonesia has two separate mechanisms in terms of judicial reviews. The first mechanism prescribes 
the Constitutional Court to only review constitutionality of laws enacted by the DPR. The second 
mechanism mandates the Supreme Court to review the legality of regulations below the level of law, 
which includes Government Regulation, Presidential Regulation, Provincial Regulation and 
District/City Regulation.470 In my view, this dualism has created at least three major problems in the 
constitutional review system in Indonesia. 
First, if the Constitutional Court can only review the constitutionality of laws, while the Supreme 
Court can review regulations against laws, not against the Constitution, no legal mechanism is 
provided to review regulations or decisions against the Constitution. In other words, there is no 
mechanism available to review the constitutionality of regulations and decisions under the level of 
laws. For instance, the constitutionality of 365 regional regulations in Indonesia, considered 
discriminatory by the National Commission on Violence against Women (Komnas Perempuan), 
cannot be reviewed by the Constitutional Court or the Supreme Court.471 
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Second, the dualism of judicial review system in Indonesia creates inconsistency of interpretations 
between laws and implementing of regulations. For example, the Supreme Court declared Decision 
No. 15/P/HUM/2009 on 18 June 2009 concerning judicial review on the National Election 
Commission Regulation Number 15 of 2009. Problematically, the Supreme Court made a different 
interpretation compared to the Constitutional Court’s previous interpretation for the same case. 
Consequently, there was inconsistency of interpretation in deciding the case.472 In the end, the 
Constitutional Court had to declare another decision in the Parliamentary Seats Phase III (2009) case 
to correct the Supreme Court’s interpretation that caused a national political uproar. 
[i]n this decision the Constitutional Court does not assess or review either the Supreme Court’s 
decision or the General Election Commission Regulation ... However, since Article 205(4), 
Article 211(3) and Article 212(3) of Law Number 10 of 2008 has been assessed by the 
Constitutional Court as conditionally constitutional, then by itself all the contents of regulations 
or the court decisions which are not in accordance with this decision become invalid due to loss 
of its basis.473 
After the Constitutional Court declared the decision, indirectly annulling the Supreme Court decision, 
no institutional conflict occurred between them. However, if such inconsistency of interpretation 
occurs frequently, then, most likely, conflict or dispute will result between the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court, as emerged in other countries.474 This conflict may occur because the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court is not granted power to assess or examine the Supreme Court 
decisions. This system is different from, for instance, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany 
which is formally given power to re-examine the Supreme Court decisions related to fundamental 
rights violations of citizens using the constitutional complaint mechanism, as discussed in the 
previous section. 
Third, in the previous judicial review system, the MPR decision had no place in the hierarchy of 
laws.475 Currently, it is in the hierarchy of laws under the Constitution, but it is above the level of 
laws. As a result, the constitutionality of MPR decisions cannot be reviewed by the Constitutional 
Court since the Court can only review the constitutionality of laws or interim emergency laws. The 
                                               
(Online), 20 March 2015, <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2015/03/20/11583441/Komnas.Perempuan.Minta. 
Presiden.Jokowi.Hapus.365.Perda.yang.Diskriminatif>. 
472 See Pan Mohamad Faiz, ‘Quo Vadis Putusan MA? [Quo Vadis the Supreme Court Decision?], Koran SINDO (Jakarta), 
30 July 2009.  
473 See Parliamentary Seats Phase III (2009) case, 108 para [3.37]. 
474 See Lech Garlicki, ‘Constitutional Courts versus Supreme Courts’ (2007) 5(1) (January 1, 2007) International Journal 
of Constitutional Law 44. 
475 See Article 7 of Law No. 10 of 2004 on the Establishment of Laws and Regulations. 
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absence of this mechanism is confirmed by the Constitutional Court’s decision, stating that the Court 
does not have a power to review the constitutionality of MPR decisions.476 Thus, the MPR decisions 
have caused constitutional problem in the hierarchy of laws because it cannot be reviewed by judicial 
institutions, neither the Constitutional Court nor the Supreme Court. 
Based on the three major problems explained above, I am of the opinion that the constitutional review 
of all laws and regulations under the Constitution should be integrated into one judicial institution in 
order to resolve issues stemming from judicial review system dualism in Indonesia. Establishing a 
constitutional review mechanism under a one-roof system can fill a legal remedy vacuum. In addition, 
it can prevent inconsistency of judicial review interpretations between the Constitutional Court and 
the Supreme Court. By considering several factors, such as experiences in deciding constitutional 
review cases,477 the numbers of caseloads that have not been decided,478 and the specificity of 
functions,479 I find the Constitutional Court should carry out the review of the constitutionality of all 
laws and regulations. 
Moreover, the addition and transfer of judicial review from the Supreme Court to the Constitutional 
Court should be performed, ideally, through a Constitutional amendment in order to strengthen its 
legal and constitutional legitimacy. Alternatively, it can be conducted through revisions of the 
Supreme Court Law and the Constitutional Court Law, preceded by an agreement or joint decision 
between the judiciary, legislative and executive. It would therefore become a new constitutional 
convention. However, the constitutionality of the Laws can still be reviewed because the 
constitutional provisions dividing the jurisdictions of judicial review between the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court are clearly written in the Constitution.480 
Furthermore, the need to establish an integrated constitutional review system in the Constitutional 
Court can also be seen in the Water Resources cases. According to the first decision in the Water 
Resources (2004) case, the Constitutional Court declared that the Water Resources Law was 
                                               
476 See Constitutional Review of the MPR Decisions (2013) case. 
477 The Constitutional Court has been deciding 762 cases related to the constitutionality of laws since 2003. Additionally, 
the Constitutional Justices have specialised background and expertise in constitutional law. In contrast, the Supreme Court 
Justices who have diverse backgrounds examined less cases related to legality of regulations and decisions.  
478 Up to February 2015, the Constitutional Court only has 75 pending cases, while the Supreme Court still has 5,361 
pending cases. See Mahkamah Agung Republik Indonesia, Status of the Supreme Court cases on February 2015 
(February 2015) <http://kepaniteraan.mahkamahagung.go.id/images/keadaan-perkara/laporan%20keadaan%20perkara 
%20 februari2015.pdf>. 
479 The function of the Constitutional Court is more focused on examining cases related to constitutional issues while the 
Supreme Court, as the highest institution of general courts, examines various types of cases ranging from criminal, civil, 
religious, military and administrative cases. 
480 See Article 24A(1) and Article 24C(1) of the Constitution. 
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conditionally constitutional. This means that the Water Resources Law was constitutional on 
condition that the implementing regulations would be in accordance with the interpretation of the 
Court. In the second decision in the Water Resources (2013) case, the Constitutional Court examined 
relevant Government Regulations, for alignment with constitutional interpretations and guidelines 
based on the Court’s previous decision. The Court concluded that the Government Regulations did 
not meet the basic principles and restrictions of water resources management created by the 
Constitutional Court. This decision clearly shows that the Constitutional Court has reviewed 
constitutionality of government regulations. However, the Court reasoned that the examination did 
not mean to review the regulations.  
The only available way for the Constitutional Court to answer this question is to examine 
thoroughly the implementing regulations of the Water Resources Law, in this case the 
government regulations. By taking this step it does not mean that the Constitutional Court 
conducts judicial review of regulations made under any law against such law, but solely because 
of the requirements of the constitutionality of law which are being reviewed (c.q. the Water 
Resources Law) are suspended on the obedience of regulations in implementing the 
Constitutional Court interpretation.481 
These cases proved that when the Constitutional Court holds the power to review the constitutionality 
of regulations, the Court does not need to entirely revoke the Water Resources Law. In other words, 
it was sufficient for the Constitutional Court to revoke the implementing regulations that were not in 
accordance with the Constitution without ‘sacrificing’ the Water Resources Law jointly made by the 
President and the DPR. Therefore, an integration of the constitutional review system becomes 
increasingly important. The Water Resources cases also demonstrate that, although a law may not 
conflict with the Constitution, its implementing regulations can be contrary to the Constitution. In 
addition, the Water Resources (2013) decision created a new practice of constitutional adjudication 
in Indonesia, whereby the Constitutional Court can review government regulations indirectly, 
providing that the related laws, used as legal basis for making the regulations, have been declared 
conditionally constitutional or conditionally unconstitutional. This decision also creates jurisprudence 
for the Court as an entry point to examine the constitutionality of government regulations in the future. 
III   NON-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS 
Besides exercising its powers in deciding constitutional cases, the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
also has a non-judicial function. This function is defined as activities exercised by the Court outside 
                                               
481 See Water Resources (2013) case, 143 [para 3.28]. 
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the courtroom.482 This function is based on one of the Court’s missions to build constitutionalism and 
a culture of constitutional awareness in Indonesia through various activities and cooperation fostered 
with many institutions. This section specifically discusses the non-judicial functions of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court as a major influence for Court performance. 
Since Constitutional Court establishment in 2003, human rights guarantees contained in the 
Constitution are no longer merely a paper tiger. Every citizen who feels that his or her constitutional 
rights are violated can defend their rights before the Constitutional Court. For instance, one of the 
landmark cases in 2005 was a constitutional review case filed by parents and teachers without lawyer 
representation. They requested the Constitutional Court to review the constitutionality of the State 
Budget Law of 2005 because the budget allocation for education did not reach 20% of the State 
Budget clearly mandated by the Constitution.483 In another case, a former local security officer, 
named Marten Boiliu, succeeded in convincing the Constitutional Court without assistance from 
lawyers. The Court granted his petition related to the rights of severance money which had not been 
paid by his company.484 These two cases represent some of many cases where applicants filed petition 
without any assistance from lawyers. Several reasons motivated them to file a case with the 
Constitutional Court, as follows. 
First, in the last twelve years the Constitutional Court has been established as a well-known 
institution, considered strategic, not only by state officials, but also by the public. The Court has built 
good relationships with both print and electronic media, and established formal and regular 
cooperation with several national televisions and radios. Therefore, decisions of the Court are often 
published, especially the decisions that attract public attention, such as the Bibit and Chandra (2009) 
case. Thus, the public becomes more aware of the existence, functions and powers of the Court, 
including the opportunity for people to seek justice in the Constitutional Court. 
Second, the Constitutional Court holds seminars and workshops throughout the year to heighten 
public awareness concerning citizen’s constitutional rights. Institutional cooperation undertaken by 
the Court has resulted in systematic and rapid dissemination for the Constitutional Court among 
public officials, academics, students and civil society. I divide this institutional cooperation into 
several categories. 
                                               
482 See Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg, ‘Judicial Roles in Nonjudicial Functions’ (2013) 12(4) Washington University 
Global Studies Law Review 755, 758. 
483 See 1st Education Budget (2005) case.  
484 See Severance Pay (2012) case. 
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A   Institutional Cooperation 
1   Universities across Indonesia 
The Constitutional Court plays an important non-judicial function in establishing and developing the 
Centre for Constitutional Studies, or entities with other similar names, at more than 35 law faculties 
across Indonesia.485 This collaboration enables lecturers and researchers to contribute to 
Constitutional Journals (Jurnal Konstitusi) and organise seminars in each university. These journals 
and seminars encourage academics to further study Indonesian constitutional law, particularly on 
decisions made by the Court. Moreover, the Constitutional Court has funded videoconference 
facilities in those universities to provide alternative courtroom locations for the provinces and cities. 
Therefore, the litigants, comprising of applicants, witnesses or experts, may go to the university in 
their city or province with a videoconference facility rather than directly attend the Constitutional 
Court building, located in the Capital of Jakarta. In addition, the videoconference facilities are used 
to hold online seminars and discussions to facilitate the exchange of ideas and knowledge of speakers 
from different universities. Moreover, the Constitutional Court, with the Association of Lectures on 
Procedural Law of the Constitutional Court (APHAMK), also successfully incorporated a course on 
Procedural Law of the Constitutional Court into the legal curriculum. This course is a new 
requirement at many law faculties in Indonesia. Therefore, law students can specifically learn about 
court proceedings before they engage in actual practice.486 
2   State Institutions and Ministries 
The Constitutional Court has established partnerships with various state institutions and ministries 
with an aim to provide improved understanding to ensure that policies and decisions made by state 
officials are in line with the values of the Constitution. For example, the Court established cooperation 
with the MPR to increase constitutional awareness among state officials and communities. 
Furthermore, the Court conducted various seminars and joint researches in cooperation with 
Indonesia’s central bank, Bank Indonesia. Additionally, the Court established cooperation with the 
Ministry of Education and Culture as well as the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights for organising 
various seminars and researches related to the Constitution, human rights and democracy. In addition, 
the Court engaged with the Ministry of Education and Culture as well as the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs to hold ‘Constitutional Award’ for teachers on civic education. They also foster cooperation 
                                               
485Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, Kerjasama <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/ 
index.php?page=web.Kerjasama&pages=1>. 
486 A textbook published by APHAMK was facilitated by the Constitutional Court, see Muchamad Ali Safa’at et al, 
Hukum Acara Mahkamah Konstitusi (Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraaan Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2010).  
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by publishing a textbook on ‘Constitutional Awareness Education’ that contains the recent 
developments of Indonesian constitutional system for students in primary and secondary schools.487 
3   Law Enforcement Institutions and Election Organisations 
In order to encourage understanding of the Constitutional Court and the constitutional rights of 
citizens, the Constitutional Court works with various law enforcement institutions, such as the 
Supreme Court, the National Police, the Indonesian National Armed Forces, and the Corruption 
Eradication Commission as well as the National Election Commission and the Election Supervisory 
Board. In particular, the Constitutional Court signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with 
the National Police as a basis to transfer criminal cases committed in relations to regional head 
elections, which are proven in the Court hearings. These cases are not handled by the Constitutional 
Court, but by the National Police and the Criminal Court under the Supreme Court. In addition, 
national seminars are regularly held for members of the Election Commission and the Selection 
Supervisory Board from across Indonesia to disseminate current information concerning electoral 
disputes handled by the Constitutional Court. Thus, they will be well prepared to deliver relevant 
evidence to the Constitutional Court. 
4   Political Parties 
The Constitutional Court also fosters cooperation with political parties by organising seminars on the 
development of the Indonesian constitutional structure and technical preparation for the national and 
local elections. Political parties are informed about the Court powers, particularly concerning 
electoral disputes processes, impeachment of the President and/or the Vice President and the 
dissolution of political parties. They are also taught how to apply for an electoral complaint and types 
of evidences that can be presented before the Constitutional Court; as unpreparedness of political 
parties in accepting the elections results will impact the number of election disputes lodged with the 
Court. Such unpreparedness will also affect the lack of clarity in substance of complaints. However, 
this cooperation is quite sensitive because the Constitutional Court, as a judicial institution, will be 
considered to have close relationships with political parties. Thus, there is a serious concern that the 
closer the relationship between constitutional justices and political party members, the greater the 
possibility of intervention and influence from political parties in deciding Constitutional Court cases.  
                                               
487Mahkamah Konstitusi Republik Indonesia, ‘Announcement’ <http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/ 
file_pengumuman/PenerbitBuku.pdf>. 
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5   NGOs, Foundations and Civil Societies 
Most activities conducted by the Constitutional Court to disseminate information about the Court, the 
Pancasila as an Indonesian’s ideology and the Constitution, are carried out with NGOs, foundations 
and civil societies, such as the National Law Reform Consortium (KRHN), Muslimat and Fatayat 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Student Executive Board (BEM), Puan Amal Hayati, Wanita Serikat Islam, 
Muhammadiyah Youth, Institute Leimena and Islamic boarding schools. The activities are 
undertaken in the form of seminars and workshops inviting representatives of board members from 
those various organisations.  
6   International Organisations 
The Indonesian Constitutional Court also established international cooperation with constitutional 
courts from other countries to further develop the Indonesian Constitutional Court system. It has also 
become one of the founding fathers of the establishment of the Association of Asian Constitutional 
Court and Equivalent Institution (AACC). This Association was officially launched in July 2010 with 
the adoption of the Jakarta Declaration signed by seven member countries, namely Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, and Uzbekistan. At time of this writing, AACC 
membership have increased to 14 countries, including Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Turkey.488  The AACC promotes the protection of human rights, the 
guarantee of democracy, the implementation of the rule of law, the independence of the court, and 
the cooperation and exchanges of experiences and information among members.489 Moreover, the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court was elected as the President of the AACC for the period 2014-2016. 
During the 3rd Congress of the AACC held in Bali in 2016, the Board of Members granted mandate 
to the Indonesian Constitutional Court to continue the term as President of the Association for another 
year. A joint permanent secretariat of the AACC was also decided to be situated in Indonesia and 
Korea. 
B   Evaluation of Non-Judicial Function 
Based on the explanation above, various types of cooperation and activities pursued by the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court have led to the enhanced public understanding concerning the Constitution and 
the Constitutional Court. To increase activities’ attractiveness to participants, the Chief Justice or the 
Constitutional Justices often speak at such activities. Furthermore, although the Court already has a 
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489 See Article 3 of the Statute of the Association of Asian Constitutional Courts and Equivalent Institutions. 
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specific unit engaged in research, the Centre for Research and Studies of Cases, the Court established 
the Centre of Education of Pancasila and the Constitution in 2013. This new Centre aims to inculcate 
public understanding of the Pancasila and the Constitution in a more systematic manner. In addition, 
to strengthen public understanding of the history and development of the Indonesian Constitution, the 
Court founded another centre named the Centre of Constitutional History in 2014. It is a museum of 
the Indonesian Constitution, located in the Constitutional Court building.  
Such cooperation and activities, organised by the Constitutional Court, are uncommon. In a judiciary 
system, a court should focus on examining cases and minimise other activities, programs or 
cooperation requiring participation of judges. Nevertheless, based on the following considerations, in 
my view, the dissemination of information concerning the Indonesian Constitution and the 
Constitutional Court have become important due to several reasons: (1) unequal access to education, 
information and transportation in Indonesia; (2) the vast size of the Indonesian archipelago; (3) the 
Constitutional Court’s location i.e. in the Capital of Jakarta, with no representatives in other regions; 
and (4) lack of constitutional awareness among public officials and authorities. As the result, the non-
judicial functions of the Constitutional Court have been well accepted by the majority of the public 
and state officials in Indonesia as the functions reflect supply and demand side theories introduced 
by Garoupa and Ginsburg.490 
Moreover, McKay suggests several reasons for allowing and encouraging non-judicial functions. For 
instance, activities can prevent ‘judicial short-sightedness’ arising from insensitive developments 
outside the court, activities can also provide education and development in law and court 
administration as well as enrich and educate the public through lectures, writings and teachings from 
the judges.491 In this context, the non-judicial functions played by the Constitutional Court create 
benefits, not only to the public, but also enhance the positive image of the Court. The Court has 
transformed from a judicial institution into a learning centre of constitutional law, both in theory and 
practice. Moreover, communities and academics become increasingly close to the Constitutional 
Court as friends of the courts. 
As a positive result, public, academics and the press often provide support to the Constitutional Court, 
including after the arrest of the Chief Justice Akil Mochtar. To my knowledge, the arrest of Chief 
Justice Mochtar was the first incident of its kind in the world.492 In the blink of an eye, the positive 
                                               
490 Garoupa and Ginsburg, above n 482, 761-4. 
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492 The arrest was also reported by various international media. See, eg, Joe Cochrane, ‘Top Indonesian Judge Held in 
Corruption Case’, The New York Times (online), 3 October 2013 <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/04/world/asia/ 
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image of the Court was tarnished. Surprisingly, an independent survey conducted not long after the 
arrest showed that 82.1% of respondents believed that the Court could restore public trust. This means 
that the public tended to make distinction between behaviour of a Constitutional Justice and the 
performance of the Court as a judicial institution.493 Within a few months after the incident, the 
Constitutional Court began to regain trust from the public, although trust level was not equal to the 
previous.494 
An important thing to note in the non-judicial functions is that the Constitutional Court should keep 
distance from other parties in discussing any case being examined, or with the potential to be 
examined. Additionally, any meeting between the Constitutional Justices and other parties creates 
potential conflict of interest and violates Code of Ethics and Conduct of the Constitutional Justices, 
known as Sapta Karsa Utama. Therefore, the Constitutional Court has to avoid activities that could 
interfere with its main judicial functions, interfere with the impartiality and independence of the 
Justices or undermine the dignity and the prestige of the Court.495 
In the future, non-judicial functions must gradually be reduced as the caseload of the Constitutional 
Court is increasing, especially if constitutional complaint becomes a power of the Court, generating 
thousands of cases. All activities and programs should focus on fully supporting Constitutional 
Justices in making decisions. Moreover, activities that can strengthen the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court, including for the constitutional justices, researchers, law clerks and other judicial staffs, should 
be developed. If the Court remains free from incidents damaging public trust and the image of the 
Court, the Constitutional Court will not need to expand its network to add allies to the court. 
Maintaining the established relationships should suffice for the Court.  
Furthermore, the Court has to devote itself in enhancing the quality of decisions and the speed of 
decision-making processes. Drawing lessons from other constitutional courts, examining thousands 
of cases per year, they always place priority on making decisions, before everything else. In contrast, 
the Indonesian Constitutional Court only examines hundreds of cases each year, yet are still strongly 
criticised for quality of its decisions. These critics cite lacking adequate arguments, rationality and 
accountability in decisions. 
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IV   CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analysed current and future challenges faced by the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
as a consequence of its limited jurisdiction. Without constitutional complaint and constitutional 
question jurisdiction, the Court’s ability in safeguarding the Constitution is limited, particularly in 
protecting fundamental rights of citizens. Thus, there is a need to improve some developments related 
to the Court’s jurisdiction. The constitutional complaint and the constitutional question mechanism 
need to be adapted to the Indonesian Constitutional Court. At the same token, strengthening of 
institutional structure, human resources and decision-making process are prerequisites. Otherwise, 
the Court will be overwhelmed in receiving constitutional complaint cases. 
Another problem faced by the Indonesian Constitutional Court concerns the dualism of the judicial 
review system. The current system places the Constitutional Court in a position limited to review the 
constitutionality of laws against the Constitution, while the Supreme Court is confined to review the 
legality of regulations against laws. In the future, these jurisdictions should be integrated, for review 
of all laws and regulations against the Constitution to be in the hands of the Constitutional Court. 
Thus, consistency of interpretation in constitutional review cases can be well maintained. 
Furthermore, the performance of the Indonesian Constitutional Court is supported by its non-judicial 
functions. Various activities and cooperation with numerous state institutions and organisations as 
well as mass media have helped the Court in shaping its image as a judicial institution easily 
accessible by the public. Good relationships with the press, civil societies and academics have also 
contributed in building public support for the Constitutional Court. Creating friends of the court in 
the first decade of the Constitutional Court establishment was essential in strengthening the position 
of the Court. However, as the number of constitutional cases increase, the Court must gradually 
reduce its non-judicial functions. Thus, there more time and energy can be directed to support 
constitutional justices in the decision-making process. In addition, apprehended bias from the 
Constitutional Justices can be avoided when issues discussed by the groups come before the Court. 
Current criticisms directed against Constitutional Court decisions have been pointing to lack of legal 
reasons and accountability Such critics should be incorporated into evaluations made to improve 
quality of future Court decisions. 
***
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CHAPTER 7 
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF  
THE INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
In addition to jurisdictional limitations, the Indonesian Constitutional Court experienced some 
institutional challenges. One of the major challenges is that the Court does not have the power to 
enforce its decisions. Consequently, the Court decisions are often not enforced at either the national 
or local level. Moreover, the different nominating state institutions have not applied equal procedures 
in Constitutional Court Justices selection mechanism. Procedural inconsistencies are also present in 
constitutional justices’ candidate selection. The selection mechanism is often criticised for lacking 
the principles of participatory method, objectivity and accountability, as required by the 
Constitutional Court Law. 
The five-year tenure or term of office for constitutional justices may be extended once. This becomes 
an important challenge, particularly when the Chief Justice or the incumbent constitutional justices, 
expressing intent for term renewal, are required to apply and follow all selection processes along with 
the new candidates. Additionally, the tenure of the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court is only 
two and a half years. Therefore, there are potential internal conflicts between constitutional justices 
competing for the Court’s highest position. These challenges and problems are discussed in further 
detail in this chapter, with particular focus on existing system improvements. 
I   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COURT DECISIONS 
The implementation Constitutional Court decisions remains one of the main problems in the 
constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia. In several situations, the Constitutional Court 
decisions are not enforced or adhered to by the state institutions or public authorities. I categorise this 
problem into five different circumstances: (1) the President and the DPR; (2) the government; (3) law 
enforcement officers; (4) state officials; and (5) other courts. In this section, I analyse each category 
supported by case examples. 
A   The President and the DPR 
Court cases where the Constitutional Court decisions were not implemented by the President and the 
DPR can be found in a series of Education Budget cases and the Jurisdiction on Regional Head 
Electoral Disputes cases. First, according to Article 31(4) of the Constitution, there shall be a 
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minimum allocation of 20% for education in the State Budget and the Regional Budget.496 The 
Constitutional Court issued a decision in 2005 stipulating that State Budget Law of 2005 provisions, 
which only allocated 7% for education, were unconstitutional. However, the Court reasoned they 
could not annul the provisions because doing so would trigger governmental disaster in the state 
financial administration system, potentially leading to legal uncertainty (rechtsonzekerheid). Thus, 
the Court could only encourage the President and the DPR to increase the allocation for education in 
the state budget, as obligated by the Constitution.497  
However, in 2006, the President and the DPR only re-allocated 9.1% of the State Budget into 
education, well below 20%. The Constitutional Court reiterated that the President had to meet the 
constitutional obligation and could not delay in allocating 20% to the education budget.498 For the 
third time, however, the President and the DPR failed to meet their obligation, allocating only 11.8% 
to the education budget in the State Budget Law of 2007. In its decision, the Court asserted that the 
upper limit of 11.8% in the education budget was not legally binding. The Court ‘threatened’ to 
overturn the entire State Budget Law for the following year if the allocation for the education budget 
remained below 20% of the state budget.499 
After repeatedly ignoring Constitutional Court’s decision concerning the education budget, the 
President and the DPR finally agreed to allocate 20% for education budget in the State Budget Law 
of 2008. However, to meet this requirement, the formula for calculating the education budget scheme 
was altered, based on the Constitutional Court decision, by incorporating a variety of education-
related budgets from all ministries and state institutions as well as the salaries for educators, as 
discussed in Chapter 5.500 Thus, it can be clearly seen from series of Education Budget cases that the 
Constitutional Court has no power to force the President and the DPR to promptly abide by its 
decisions.  
Furthermore, the same situation occurred in a constitutional review decision in the Jurisdiction on 
Regional Head Electoral Dispute (2014) case. The Court stated that the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction to adjudicate regional head elections disputes was unconstitutional, as discussed in 
Chapter 2.501 On February 2015, however, the DPR passed the new Regional Head Elections Law 
                                               
496 Article 31(4) of the Constitution provides, ‘The state shall prioritise the budget for education to a minimum of 20% of 
the State Budget and of the Regional Budgets to fulfil the needs of implementation of national education.’ 
497 See 1st Education Budget (2005) case. 
498 See 2nd Education Budget (2005) case. 
499 See Education Budget (2006) case. 
500 See National Education System (2007) case. 
501 See Jurisdiction on Regional Head Electoral Disputes (2013) case. 
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and decided that the Constitutional Court would continue to have jurisdiction over regional head 
electoral disputes. This decision was immediately effective in anticipation of hundreds of 
simultaneous regional head elections in December 2015.502 On one hand, this decision indirectly 
represents a denial by the President and the DPR of the Court decision. On the other hand, both the 
President and the DPR considered that no other institution could handle regional head electoral 
disputes; as the Supreme Court has expressed objection to receiving this jurisdiction.503 The Supreme 
Court reasoned that it still has thousands of pending cases awaiting decision. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court and the lower courts are not prepared to face political frictions stemming from electoral disputes 
potentially affecting its improving credibility. 
Moreover, the DPR considers that establishing a new separate institution to resolve the regional head 
electoral disputes will need considerable time and require supporting facilities that are neither simple 
nor inexpensive. The Coalition of Civil Society to Guard the Elections Law, led by the Association 
for Elections and Democracy (PERLUDEM), also supports the DPR decision. Although the arrest of 
Chief Justice Akil Mochtar negatively affected the Constitutional Court, the Civil Society Coalition 
still placed their trust in the Court as the most prepared and experienced institution in resolving 
electoral disputes.504 In this case, the constitutional problem is not only based on disobedience from 
the President and the DPR, but also concerns the importance of finding another institution, or creating 
a new institution, to handle regional head electoral disputes within a narrow period of time. 
B   The Government 
In 2005, Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie presented an official request letter to President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono to comply with the Court’s decision in the constitutional review of the Oil and 
Natural Gas Law.505 This letter was a response to the Presidential Regulation on fuel price 
determination based on the market price mechanism,506 while in the Oil and Gas (2003) case the 
Court decided that fuel price determination based on market price is contrary to Article 33 of the 
                                               
502 ‘Simultaneous local elections to begin in 2016’, The Jakarta Post (online), 4 February 2015 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/04/simultaneous-local-elections-begin-2016.html>. 
503 ‘The Supreme Court rejects settling local election disputes’, The Jakarta Post (online), 12 February 2015 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/02/12/ma-rejects-settling-local-election-disputes.html>. 
504 Koalisi Masyarakat Sipil Kawal UU, ‘Mendesak Mahkamah Konstitusi Tangani Sengketa Pilkada’ [Urging the 
Constitutional Court to handle local election disputes], Perkumpulan untuk Pemilu dan Demokrasi (11 February 2015) 
<http://perludem.org/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1925:mendesak-mahkamah-konstitusi-tangani-
sengketa-pilkada&Itemid=128>. 
505 ‘Mahkamah Konstitusi Mengirimkan Surat Koreksi Harga BBM’ [The Constitutional Court sent a Letter to Correct 
the Fuel Price], Liputan6 News (online), 10 October 2005 <http://news.liputan6.com/read/110501/mahkamah-kontitusi-
mengirimkan-surat-koreksi-harga-bbm>. 
506  See Presidential Regulation No. 55 of 2005 on the Retail Price of Fuel in Indonesia. 
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Constitution. Asshiddiqie was aware that the there was no mechanism for sending a letter, as regulated 
in the Constitutional Court Law; for this reason, judicial creativity of the Court was at play to enforce 
its decision. Since this case, the Court has never sent another letter to enforce its decisions, as the act 
caused a serious polemic used by the opposition in the DPR to accuse the President of potentially 
violating the Constitution, an accusation that could lead to an impeachment process.507  
The constitutional review case of the Water Resources Law provides another example of a situation 
where a Constitutional Court decision was not implemented by the government. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the Court issued a conditionally constitutional decision towards several provisions 
in the Water Resource Law in 2005. This means that the reviewed provisions would not conflict with 
the Constitution as long as the provisions were implemented in accordance with the constitutional 
interpretation stated in the Court’s decision in the Water Resources (2004) case. However, in the 
Water Resources (2013) case, the Constitutional Court revoked the Water Resources Law entirely 
because the Court found that the implementing regulations did not correspond with the constitutional 
interpretation and guidelines given by the Court. The government indeed ignored the previous 
decisions of the Court when formulating the implementing regulations. 
C   Law Enforcement Officers 
In the Advocates Law (2004) case, the Constitutional Court annulled Article 31 of the Advocates 
Law, which prohibited any person who is not a professional advocate from intentionally acting as an 
advocate. The Court reasoned that many Indonesians require legal assistance or legal aid, especially 
those who are less fortunate. In this situation, academics or people who do not work as an advocate, 
such as those who work in Legal Aid Institutes in universities, may provide legal assistance. However, 
after the Court issued the ruling, law enforcement officers continued to prohibit many Legal Aid 
Institutes in universities from engaging in legal practice under Article 31 of the Advocates Law, even 
though it had been expressly revoked by the Constitutional Court.508  
In this case, one of the main reasons the Constitutional Court’s decision was not implemented is 
because of the ignorance of law enforcement officers who were reluctant to adhere to the Court’s 
decision. Another reason is that dissemination of the Court decisions did not go well. In practice, law 
                                               
507 ‘Jimly: Surat Koreksi MK Timbulkan Salah Tafsir’ [Jimly: A Correction Letter by the Constitutional Court was 
Misinterpreted], Liputan6 News (online), 10 October 2005 <http://news.liputan6.com/read/111002/jimly-surat-koreksi-
mk-timbulkan-salah-tafsir>. 
508 For further discussion concerning Legal Aid of University in Indonesia, see, eg, Pultoni and Siti Aminah (eds), 
Panduan Standar Minimum Pelayanan Bantuan Hukum untuk Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) Kampus [A Guide of 
Minimum Standards of Legal Aid Service for Legal Aid Institute (LBH)] (The Indonesian Legal Resource Center and 
Asosiasi Pendidikan Hukum Klinis Indonesia, 2014).  
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enforcement officers often do not know about the Constitutional Court decisions that may affect their 
duties. In some events, even when enforcement officers were informed of the Court decisions, there 
were some who still refused to accept the explanations.509 
D   State Officials 
One of the landmark decisions made by the Constitutional Court in 2004 was the restoration of 
political rights for former members of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), concerning the right 
to vote and the right to be voted for, as stipulated in the Election Law.510 In theory, the effect of this 
decision should be interpreted and implemented in all regulations and decisions under the law to 
ensure consistency with the legal reasoning contained in the Court decision, although the Court only 
revoked the provisions in the national law. 
Nonetheless, Siahaan found, after the release of the Constitutional Court decision, requirements for 
village heads candidates still retained the prohibition, stating that candidates must never have been 
involved with the Indonesian Communist Party or other banned organisations.511 Although the related 
provisions had been revised, Siahaan argued that the Government Regulation on the Village was a 
half-hearted regulation because it included requirements concerning loyalty, defined as: 
…never having been involved in separatist movements, never having done anything 
unconstitutional or participated in violent movements to change the basic ideology of the state 
and never violated the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia.512 
This means that Constitutional Court decisions have been ignored by state officials, not only at the 
national level, but also at the local level. Thus, the non-compliance with the Constitutional Court 
decision is not only due to lack of dissemination, but also the unwillingness of state officials to 
implement decisions associated with a political ideology or a sensitive issue, particularly against 
communist ideology. They are reluctant to change their paradigms, embedded since the New Order 
era, and thereby situation is aggravated. 
                                               
509 ‘Masih ada LBH Kampus yang dilarang ‘Berpraktek’ [There are still Legal Aid Institutes in Universities prohibited to 
practice], Hukum Online (online), 29 May 2008 <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol19342/masih-ada-lbh-
kampus-yang-dilarang-berpraktek>. 
510 See Indonesian Communist Party (2003) case. 
511 Siahaan, above n 77, 266-7. 
512 Explanation of Article 44(b) of the Government Regulation No. 72 of 2005 on the Village. 
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E   Other Courts 
In this fifth classification, the Constitutional Court decisions are not implemented by ordinary courts 
or the Supreme Court, such as in the Medical Practice (2007) case. On 19 June 2007, the Court 
annulled a provision in the Medical Practice Law related to the phrase ‘maximum imprisonment of 3 
years’ to any medical practice without a practical license. The Court reasoned that the threat of 
imprisonment for the doctors was inappropriate and disproportionate because criminal sanctions 
should place more concern to the humanistic perspective of criminal law, closely linked with the code 
of conduct for doctors.513  
Five months after the decision was declared, a doctor named Bambang Suprapto performed surgery 
on a patient without a practice license. Nine months after the surgery, the patient died. Following 
their loss, the family reported Suprapto to the police. This case was examined up to the cassation level 
in the Supreme Court. On 30 October 2013, the Supreme Court sentenced him to 1.5 years in prison. 
He was proven guilty of the criminal offence of deliberately practicing medicine without a practical 
license.  
This case attracted considerable controversy among doctors because its decision employed a 
provision that had been annulled by the Constitutional Court. The panel of Justices handling the case 
did not give further comment. However, the Head of Legal and Public Relations of the Supreme 
Court, Ridwan Mansur, explained that the Supreme Court decision should remain valid even if the 
Supreme Court Justices referred to an annulled article. Mansur also said that some of the 
Constitutional Court decisions could not be used to force ordinary judges or the Supreme Court 
Justices in making certain decisions. He added that they held an authority in deciding a case, 
independent from the Constitutional Court.514 
The Supreme Court’s explanation could potentially disrupt the existing legal system. In my view, 
they cannot use the principle of independence as a pretext for disregarding the Constitutional Court 
decision. If an ordinary citizen is obligated to know the laws, the Supreme Court Justices and ordinary 
judges should know and understand the laws even better. In addition, they should also aware of any 
decisions declared by the Constitutional Court affecting the cases being handled in the Supreme Court 
or ordinary courts. Ironically, the Supreme Court office is less than 1 km from the Constitutional 
                                               
513 See Medical Practice (2007) case. 
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Court, yet they were not aware, or did not want to comply with, the Constitutional Court decision that 
has a binding effect on all state institutions and citizens. 
F   Analysis of Constitutional Court Dilemma 
Based on the five classifications discussed above, it can be concluded that the implementation of the 
Constitutional Court’s decisions remains problematic. Several reasons exist for legal disobedience 
against the Constitutional Court decisions, as follows. 
First, there is a weak culture of court decisions compliance. This condition has been indirectly 
influenced by a general paradigm, embedded in the society, that the courts and their judges are 
corrupt. Therefore, the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and other ordinary courts have had 
to gradually and consistently repair this reputation. Second, legal disobedience against the 
Constitutional Court decisions can occur by creating specific provisions in government regulations 
that are contrary to the Constitution; primarily because the Constitution Court does not have power 
to perform constitutional review of regulations and decisions against the Constitution. In this case, it 
is very important to unify the constitutional review mechanism of all laws and regulations under the 
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction, as discussed in the previous chapter. Thus, any regulation 
potentially violating the Constitution can be challenged in the Constitutional Court. 
Third, a lack of dissemination and awareness can also lead to the Constitutional Court decisions not 
being implemented. With Indonesia’s vast territory, the Court is a single judicial institution located 
only in the capital of Jakarta; therefore, mass dissemination regarding the Court’s decisions is 
required to generate the necessary broad impact. The obligation to disseminate the Court’s decisions 
is certainly not the responsibility of the Constitutional Court alone, but also the government 
implementing the laws. Additionally, the President and the DPR can work together to compile 
decisions of the Constitutional Court that have created, modified or annulled norms in each law, as 
exercised in Germany. This compilation should be continually updated. In this way, it will be easier 
for state authorities and the public to be familiar with the Constitutional Court decisions. 
Fourth, some parties who do not want to implement the Constitutional Court decisions argue that the 
legal reasons and rationality of the Court decisions are not clear. There are two possible reasons for 
this situation: (1) the rationality of Court decisions lacks accountability; or (2) such parties 
purposefully make excuses not to implement the Court decisions. The latter reason is certainly not 
acceptable. However, the first reason should be accepted as constructive criticism for the Court to 
strengthen the rationality and legal reasons in making decisions in order to strengthen its legitimacy. 
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Fifth, the President and the DPR felt that the Constitutional Court, under certain circumstances, is too 
powerful. They considered that the Court did not appreciate the work of the government and the DPR, 
since the Court often annulled laws created by them. Therefore, when they do not implement Court 
decisions, it can also be interpreted as a political act to ‘punish’ the Constitutional Court. In more 
severe situations, a counter-attack from the DPR to weaken the powers of the Constitutional Court in 
making decisions could also occur, as analysed in Chapter 5. In addition, the Court lacks coercive 
power to enforce its decisions. This means that the Constitutional Court, as a judicial institution, is 
considered to be relatively weak in dealing with political gestures of the DPR and the government. In 
this case, it is reminiscent of Alexander Hamilton’s work: 
The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction 
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. 
It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.515 
Thus, how does the Indonesian Constitutional Court acquire support when decisions are not enforced? 
Implementation of the Constitutional Court decisions is highly dependent on the level of awareness 
among state officials and authorities. In Indonesian context, where popular democracy has flourished, 
the press and civil society play an important role in overseeing and pressuring reluctant parties to 
implement the Constitutional Court decisions. Moreover, academics have an important role in 
assessing, supporting and criticising the decisions of the Constitutional Court. They help shape public 
opinion because they are considered to hold more balanced perspectives and have less conflict of 
interest compared to politicians. Therefore, without support from the free press, civil society and 
academics, the Constitutional Court would lack power to impel its decisions to be understood and 
implemented by relevant stakeholders. I believe that this is the main reason why the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court seems very ambitious in building a close relation with the press, academics and 
civil society, as explained in the previous chapter. 
II  SELECTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUSTICE 
Based on Article 24C(3) of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has nine constitutional justices 
nominated by the President, the DPR and the Supreme Court. The number of constitutional justices 
and its selection model is identical to the system implemented in South Korea. Harding and Leyland 
                                               
515 See Alexander Hamilton, ‘The Federalist No. 78: The Judiciary Department’, Independent Journal (online), 14 June 
1788 <http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm>. 
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named this selection model the Korean representative.516 This model establishes an ideal check and 
balance mechanism among constitutional justices in which the executive, the legislative, and the 
judiciary branches of government select nine constitutional justices. The advantage of this selection 
model is that it can build and share trust between the three branches of government because they 
directly participate in selecting and determining the constitutional court justices. In addition, the 
selected constitutional justices have stronger political legitimacy compared to the selection model 
determined by a single branch of government. Many cases handled by the Court are closely linked to 
political and constitutional issues, thus political legitimacy is paramount.  
Moreover, the selection model determined by three different branches of government is also believed 
to generate constitutional justices from different backgrounds, deemed advantageous in deciding 
various constitutional cases. This constitutional justice selection modality is acceptable, in theory. 
However, this practice for selecting constitutional justices has many problems. The main cause being 
that the three branches of government do not apply the same mechanism in selecting constitutional 
justices. The Constitutional Court Law only regulates some general provisions relating to the 
nomination and selection procedure of the constitutional justices: 
Article 19: 
The nomination of constitutional justices is conducted in transparent and participatory 
manners. 
Article 20: 
(1)  The procedure for selection, election and submission of constitutional justices are 
regulated by the respective authorised institutions as referred in Article 18(1). 
(2)  Selection of constitutional justices referred in paragraph (1) shall be conducted 
objectively and accountably.  
In the following section, I evaluate past constitutional justice selection practices in each branch of 
government holding power to select candidates. The weaknesses of the current selection mechanism 
are analysed in order to improve the system for selecting constitutional justices. 
A   Evaluation of the Practices of Constitutional Justice Selection 
The practice of constitutional justice selections conducted by each branch of government has been 
subject of frequent criticism. First, there were inconsistent procedures for selecting constitutional 
                                               
516 Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, ‘The Constitutional Courts of Thailand and Indonesia: Two Case Studies from 
South East Asia’ in Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds), Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study (Wildy, 
Simmonds & Hill Publishing) 317, 329. 
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justices by the President. In selecting the second generation of constitutional justices, President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono, well known as President SBY, formed an independent Selection Committee 
in 2008. This Committee publicly announced candidate registration for constitutional justices. They 
also invited various legal and constitutional experts to be candidates. After series of screening and 
assessment, the Selection Committee nominated the best candidates to be appointed by President 
SBY.  
Nevertheless, when selecting Patrialis Akbar as a constitutional justice and extending the tenure of 
Constitutional Justice Maria Indrati for a second term in 2013, President SBY did not form an 
independent Selection Committee. Rather, the selection process was conducted internally, without 
public participation. This led to public suspicion that the President chose his people for the sake of 
personal interest. Several NGO activists, known as the Civil Society Coalition to Save the 
Constitutional Court, disapproved of the selection process and filled a lawsuit with the Administrative 
Court against the President’s decision. They argued that the selection violated the principles of 
transparency, participation, objectivity and accountability, as required by the Constitutional Court 
Law.517 Surprisingly, the Jakarta Administrative Court granted the petition and ordered the President 
to revoke Presidential Decree Number 87/P of 2013 on the Appointment of Patrialis Akbar and Maria 
Farida Indrati.518 However, the President SBY and Akbar appealed to the Jakarta High Administrative 
Court. A year later the Court granted their application,519 yet the Coalition appealed to the Supreme 
Court. In 5 February 2015, the Supreme Court rejected the Coalition’s application.520 Thus, Akbar 
and Indrati continue to serve as Constitutional Justices.  
After the change of national leadership, from President SBY to newly elected President Joko Widodo, 
known as Jokowi, an independent Selection Committee was re-established to conduct the fourth-
generation selection process of constitutional justices, as Jokowi’s administration did not want to 
repeat his predecessor’s mistake. 
Second, the Supreme Court only selects candidates who have served as judges in order to balance the 
composition and expertise of constitutional justices. However, the Supreme Court’s selection process 
is relatively closed. It is often criticised because the selection process lacks transparency and does not 
fulfil the participatory principles mandated by the Constitutional Court Law. Although the Supreme 
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Court provides the public opportunity to provide information on candidates’ track records, the public 
is not informed of how Supreme Court use that information.  
Furthermore, the Supreme Court appears reluctant to encourage their Supreme Court Justices to be 
constitutional justices in the Constitutional Court. Up today, only one Supreme Court Justice has been 
selected to be a constitutional justice, namely Laica Marzuki (2003-2008). In consequence, many 
people have questioned the Supreme Court’s consideration in selecting constitutional justices. The 
most reasonable reason for this is that not many Supreme Court Justices and judges are interested in 
becoming constitutional court justices. There is little possibility that the Supreme Court wants their 
best justices to work for the Constitutional Court because the Supreme Court still need their expertise 
in deciding thousands of pending cases.521 Additionally, it seems that institutional competition exists 
between the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. As the oldest court in Indonesia, the 
Supreme Court prefers to strengthen its own institution rather than strengthen another institution by 
sending their best justices and judges. 
Third, the DPR selection process of constitutional justices is considered the most transparent. The 
DPR provides a broad opportunity for anyone to register as a candidate. They also organise a formal 
test for all candidates, which is open to the public. This selection process is covered directly by 
various mass media, including live broadcast by national television stations. However, the candidates’ 
selection process by the DPR is also under strong criticism for being largely influenced by political 
party affiliation. In addition, candidates often lobby DPR members. According to the confession of 
former Chief Justice Mahfud MD, he lobbied DPR Law Commission members to be selected as a 
constitutional justice.522  
Nonetheless, it cannot be concluded that the constitutional justices provide special advantage to the 
DPR’s interests, despite being selected by the DPR. In fact, they actually contributed to the revoking 
of various laws made by the DPR. Furthermore, there is no empirical evidence on justices being 
partial to their political party affiliation in deciding electoral disputes. However, legal experts 
consider constitutional justices who were former political party members tend to make decisions 
deemed more political than academic.523 In this context, independence of the Constitutional Court 
becomes a central concern. The constitutional justices with political backgrounds are more likely to 
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be approached during the decision making process by political parties or others involved in political 
party circle. 
During the leadership of Chief Justice Mahfud MD such a concern was not proven; however, when 
Chief Justice Akil Mochtar led the Constitutional Court, the independence of the Court was highly 
questioned. Mochtar was caught red-handed by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) at his 
residence on 2 October 2013 for allegations of accepting bribes from political party officials for 
handling electoral cases in several regions.524 This shameful arrest immediately destroyed public trust 
towards the Constitutional Court.525 Many litigants in the Constitutional Court questioned various 
decisions made by Akil Mochtar, particularly in regional head electoral disputes. The DPR who 
selected Mochtar as a Constitutional Court Justice also received criticism from the public. They also 
asked the DPR to take responsibility for their decision in extending Mochtar’s tenure for a second 
term (2013-2018). Mochtar’s tenure had been extended by the DPR on February 2013, eight months 
before his arrest. 
In response to such criticism, the DPR conducted an internal evaluation of the selection mechanism 
for constitutional justices. In selecting the fourth generation of constitutional justices in 2014, the 
DPR, for the first time, established the Expert Team of the Constitutional Justices Selection consisting 
of academics and national leaders. The DPR then selected the candidates nominated by the Expert 
Team to be constitutional justices. This new mechanism was undertaken by the DPR to restore public 
trust in the DPR and the Constitutional Court. 
B   Improving the Selection Mechanism 
Many people are concerned that the constitutional justices’ selection mechanism does not meet the 
principles stipulated by the Constitutional Court Law, which are transparent, participatory, objective 
and accountable. Critics of the constitutional justices’ selection practice culminated after the arrest of 
Chief Justice Akil Mochtar.526 Public trust fell drastically. All praises given by the public to the Court 
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vanished immediately. The public are increasingly distrustful of law enforcement in Indonesia as the 
final bastion to seek justice in the Constitutional Court had collapsed. 
To evaluate this situation, on 5 October 2013 President SBY gathered the leaders of all high state 
institutions, excluding the Constitutional Court, asking for inputs in creating an Interim Emergency 
Law to save the Constitutional Court.527 The Court was disappointed because they were not invited 
to attend or be involved in the meeting.528 Two weeks after the meeting, President SBY issued an 
Interim Emergency Law containing several fundamental revisions on the Constitutional Court Law 
with an intention to improve the selection mechanism as well as the supervisory system of 
constitutional justices.529 In regard to selection mechanism, the main revisions are: (1) It adds a new 
requirement for candidates of constitutional justices that they shall not be members of any political 
party within a period of at least seven years prior to the nomination; and (2) The Expert Panel will be 
established by the Judicial Commission to conduct a fit and proper test for all candidates of 
constitutional justices. They will propose candidates who pass the fit and proper test to the President, 
the DPR and the Supreme Court.530 
However, not everyone agreed on the President’s decision in declaring the Interim Emergency Law. 
Several academics and NGO activists filed a constitutional review with the Constitutional Court. 
During the court proceedings, the Interim Emergency Law was approved by the DPR to be enacted 
into a new Law.531 In its decision, the Constitutional Court revoked the new Law entirely applying 
the following arguments. 
First, the Constitutional Court reasoned that the nomination of constitutional justices, through the 
Expert Panel established by the Judicial Commission, reduced the constitutional powers granted by 
the Constitution to the President, the DPR and the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the Expert Panel 
selected constitutional justices with the same standards, including similar background. The Court 
                                               
527 ‘Bahas MK, Presiden Kumpulkan Pemimpin Lembaga Negara’ [Discussing the Constitutional Court, the President 
Gathers the Leaders of High State Institutions], Kompas (online), 4 October 2013 
<http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/10/04/2251552/Bahas.MK.Presiden.Kumpulkan.Pemimpin.Lembaga.Tinggi.Ne
gara>. 
528 ‘MK Kecewa Tak Dilibatkan Presiden’ [Constitutional Court was Disappointed not to be Involved by the President], 
Kompas (online), 6 October 2013 <http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2013/10/06/0819211/MK.Kecewa.Tak. 
Dilibatkan.Presiden>. 
529 Government Regulation in Lieu of Law No. 1 of 2013 on the Second Amendment to Law Number 24 of 2003 on the 
Constitutional Court (hereinafter the Interim Emergency Law on the Constitutional Court). 
530 See Article 15(2)(i), Article 18A, Article 18B, and Article 18C of the Interim Emergency Law on the Constitutional 
Court. 
531 See Law Number 4 of 2014 on The Enactment of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2013 on the 
Second Amendment to Law Number 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court (hereinafter the Enactment of Interim 
Emergency Law on the Constitutional Court). 
171 
 
stated that selected constitutional justices should have different backgrounds because they originally 
come from three different branches of government. According to the Court, favouritism and populism 
should be avoided in the selection of constitutional justices.532 In addition, the Court considered the 
involvement of the Judicial Commission in the recruitment process to be a form of ‘legal 
smuggling’.533 
Second, the Court reasoned that the additional requirement for constitutional justice candidates i.e. 
prohibition of political party membership at least seven years prior to nomination, negatively 
stigmatises political party members. According to the Court, such stigmatisation injures the citizens’ 
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Constitution because it lacks  solid and valid legal basis.534 
However, this argument received sharp criticism because it is not consistent with another 
Constitutional Court decision in KPU and DKPP Members (2011) case stating that the candidates for 
the Election Commission should have resigned from political parties membership at least five years 
prior to the self-nomination of candidacy. The Court created this additional requirement in order to 
maintain independence of the Election Commission members from political parties.  
Third, the Court found that the Interim Emergency Law on the Constitutional Court did not meet 
constitutional requirements of emergency circumstances or a state of necessity (kegentingan yang 
memaksa) according to the Constitution and the Constitutional Court decision, as discussed in 
Chapter 3.535 As a result, the Court entirely annulled the Law. Given that it was an unpopular decision, 
the Court received a plethora of criticism from the public. 
The question remains: how should constitutional justices’ selection mechanism be improved? In my 
view, the selection of constitutional justices can still use the model, the so-called Korean 
representative,536 where each branch of government has a power to select three constitutional justices. 
At this stage, as a new judicial institution with strategic roles, the Indonesian Constitutional Court 
still needs support and political legitimacy from other state institutions, particularly the President, the 
DPR and the Supreme Court. Thus, shared responsibility from the three state institutions towards the 
performance of the Constitutional Court is required since they all contribute in selecting constitutional 
justices. In addition, the Constitutional Court has become the midpoint for implementing checks and 
balances within the constitutional system in Indonesia.  
                                               
532 See MK Perppu (2014) case, 110-1. 
533 Ibid 115. 
534 Ibid 116.  
535 Ibid 118-20 [3.25]. 
536 Harding and Leyland, above n 516, 329. 
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Nevertheless, this model’s primary weakness lies in the possibility of candidates selected as 
constitutional justices lacking expertise and competencies, but may have strong personal relationships 
with the President, the DPR Law Commission members or the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
This type of constitutional justice selection is motivated by efforts to secure the interests of the 
nominating state institutions. Moreover, there is also a concern that ordinary candidates will 
intentionally be selected by the nominating institutions to weaken the Constitutional Court 
performances, known as ‘the Trojan horse strategy’. There are several suggestions to avoid or at least 
to minimise these weaknesses of the current constitutional justice selection mechanism. 
First, each branch of government must create specific and permanent procedures for selecting 
constitutional justice candidates. The procedures can be regulated internally. Without clear 
mechanism and procedures, however, the selection of constitutional justices may constantly change 
depending on the interest of nominating institutions. The establishment of an Independent Selection 
Committee or an Expert Panel by the President and the DPR should continue as an initiative from the 
respective state institutions. This establishment is needed to avoid the subjectivity of decisions made 
by the President, the DPR Law Commission members and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
Second, the President, the DPR and the Supreme Court can cooperate formally with the Judicial 
Commission. These three state institutions can ask for assistance from the Judicial Commission, as 
the Selection Committee, to nominate the best candidates for constitutional justices. A formal 
cooperation like this would not conflict with the Constitutional Court decision because it would be 
based on the respective state institutions delegating some of their powers to the Judicial Commission. 
However, the final decision to select the constitutional justices would remain in the hands of each 
state institution, since the Judicial Commission only nominates candidates of constitutional justices. 
In addition, the President and the DPR have previously agreed to establish the Expert Panel for the 
Judicial Commission, as stated in the Interim Emergency Law on the Constitutional Court. It has also 
received input from the Supreme Court during the consultative meeting between the President and 
other state institutions. Therefore, for the three state institutions remain consistent in their decisions, 
there is no reason to reject the involvement of the Judicial Commission or an Independent Selection 
Committee for nominating constitutional justices.  
Third, another frequent problem in the selection process is that there are too few candidates interested 
or considered credible to be selected as constitutional justices. Therefore, the Selection Committee or 
the Expert Panel should be more active in inviting and searching for candidates. Presently, many legal 
and constitutional experts are not interested in registering themselves, due to the political lobbying 
prevalent in the DPR’s selection process. With the establishment of an Independent Selection 
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Committee or an Expert Panel free from political intervention, it is expected that more constitutional 
justice candidates, with different expertise, will be interested in registering themselves, or being 
registered by others. It will be easier for state institutions to select nominated candidates when the 
number of qualified registrations increases. 
III   TENURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT JUSTICES 
The tenure or term of office of Constitutional Court Justices raises polemic in the reselection of the 
incumbent constitutional justices. According to Constitutional Court Law, the tenure of a 
constitutional justice is five years and can be renewed for one term only.537 A problem occurs when 
an incumbent, including the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, is to be reselected for their 
second term. Should they register and follow the fit and proper test again with other new candidates? 
The absence of clear provisions in the Constitutional Court Law has resulted in each branch of 
government devising their own procedures for reselecting the incumbent constitutional justices. The 
following section analyses the problems caused by the tenure and reselection mechanism of 
constitutional justices. 
A   Problems of Tenure and Reselection Mechanism 
At the end of his tenure, Chief Justice Jimly Asshiddiqie (2003-2008) was not interested in extending 
his position for a second term because he would have to reapply and follow the selection process from 
the beginning. It is worth noting that the professionalism and progressiveness demonstrated by 
Asshiddiqie during his leadership lent credibility and trustworthiness to the Constitutional Court. In 
this case, according to Asshiddiqie, it was unethical for constitutional justices to register themselves 
for a second term because, at the same time, they still had to handle many cases. Nevertheless, he 
wanted his tenure extended on the condition that he would not have to apply or follow the fit and 
proper test.538 Finally, the DPR created a special procedure to nominate Asshiddiqie; as a result, he 
was reselected without taking a fit and proper test. 
After the 2008-2013 leadership periods, Chief Justice Mahfud MD decided not to continue to his 
second term. The main reason was because Mahfud, who was a member of the DPR from the National 
Awakening Party (PKB), had a desire to be a presidential or vice presidential candidate in the 2014 
Presidential Election. Furthermore, Akil Mochtar, who became the third Chief Justice of the 
Constitutional Court, continued his second term after being reselected by the DPR. Mochtar also 
                                               
537 Article 22 of Law No. 24 of 2003 on the Constitutional Court. 
538 ‘Beralasan Menjaga Etika, Jimly Emoh Melamar ke DPR’ [Reasoned to Maintain the Ethics, Jimly declined to apply 
to the DPR], Hukum Online (online), 18 February 2008 <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol18569 /beralasan-
menjaga-etika--jimly-iemohi-melamar-ke-dpr>.  
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received a special procedure from the DPR to bypass any fit and proper test. The DPR only asked if 
he would be willing to be reselected as a constitutional justice for the period of 2013-2018. 
Fourth Chief Justice Zoelva’s selection, by President SBY, followed a different procedure from his 
first term (2010-2015) as a Constitutional Justice. If he would like to continue to his second term in 
2015, the newly elected President Jokowi would need to reselect him. In selecting a new constitutional 
justice, as discussed previously, President Jokowi formed a Selection Committee in order to fulfil the 
selection principles mandated by the Constitutional Court Law. The Selection Committee announced 
that incumbent Chief Justice Zoelva still had to register himself, or be registered by others, to be a 
candidate for constitutional justice. There was also an obligation for him to follow all selection 
processes without any distinction from other candidates, including administrative selection, 
assessment of track record and an open interview by the Committee and the public. 
The decision taken by the Selection Committee was different from the previous selection process and 
cannot be separated from public concern caused by the arrest of previous Chief Justice Mochtar. 
Although Zoelva was registered by human rights NGOs, such as Impartial and the Indonesian Legal 
Aid Foundation, he decided not to follow the selection processes and left the decision about his tenure 
to President Jokowi. Hamdan argued that, ethically, a constitutional justice, particularly the Chief 
Justice of the Constitutional Court, did not need to reapply and repeat the fit and proper test in order 
for his feasibility as a constitutional justice candidate to be assessed. He also argued that his decision 
was taken to maintain the dignity and the honour of the Constitutional Court.  
Given that Hamdan did not have a public interview, the Selection Committee could not nominate him 
as a constitutional justice candidate to be selected by President Jokowi.539 Many people regretted that 
Zoelva’s tenure was not extended since he had greatly contributed in leading the Constitutional Court, 
restoring public trust during the critical period after Mochtar’s case, particularly when he led the 
Constitutional Court in resolving hundreds of cases concerning legislative and presidential elections 
disputes in 2014. 
It is clearly conceivable that there was a different treatment between Chief Justice Zoelva and the two 
former Constitutional Court Justices, who were reselected by the DPR without repeating fit and 
proper test. In addition, other Constitutional Justices were reselected for their second term by the 
President and the Supreme Court through direct personal interviews only. For instance, President 
SBY reselected Abdul Mukthie Fajar (2003-2008), as a Constitutional Justice, for a second term 
                                               
539 President Jokowi finally selected I Dewa Gede Palguna, a former Constitutional Justice from the first generation (2003-
2008) and a law lecturer at Faculty of Law of the University of Udayana in Bali. 
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(2008-2010) through a personal interview. Likewise, President SBY also reselected Maria Farida 
Indrati (2008-2013) for a second period (2013-2018) without a fit and proper test. 
In addition, the Supreme Court reselected Maruarar Siahaan (2003-2008 and 2008-2010) and 
Muhammad Alim (2008-2013 and 2013-2018) for second terms without undertaking a selection 
process for constitutional justices. Furthermore, Constitutional Justice Harjono, who was selected by 
President Megawati for his first term (2003-2008), could be reselected by the DPR for the second 
term (2009-2014), replacing Asshiddiqie who resigned from his position. Harjono was only asked 
about his willingness to be nominated as a candidate for constitutional justice by the DPR without 
having to follow any fit and proper test. However, the decision to select Harjono followed the voting 
mechanism of the DPR Law Commission members. 
At the time of writing, the only Constitutional Justice who followed another fit and proper test, but 
did not get reselected, was Ahmad Fadlil Sumadi from the Supreme Court. This decision attracted 
public attention because Sumadi was a strong candidate for a second term. Moreover, the Judicial 
Commission also recommended Ahmad Fadlil Sumadi as one of two Constitutional Justices that 
should be selected by the Supreme Court.540 Some suggested that Sumadi, who is a Judge of the 
Religious High Court in Yogyakarta, had served too long in the Constitutional Court. Before 
becoming a Constitutional Justice (2009-2015), he was the Chief Registrar of the Constitutional Court 
from 2003 to 2008. Thus, Sumadi had worked for ten years in the Constitutional Court, equal to two 
terms of a constitutional justice’s tenure. Another strong reason is that Sumadi was not reselected 
because he often made decisions that were unfavourable to the Supreme Court, the state institution 
who had selected him.541 
B   Revising the Tenure of a Constitutional Justice 
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that a problem exists regarding the constitutional justice 
tenure and the mechanism to reselect the incumbent constitutional justices. In my view, the incumbent 
constitutional justices should be invited and asked whether they are willing to continue their term. 
They should not have to follow another fit and proper test, let alone be asked about every decision 
they have ever made. Incumbent candidates can be assessed through their integrity, capability and 
independence during their tenure as constitutional justices. An examination can also be conducted on 
                                               
540 ‘Tak Loloskan Ahmad Fadlil, Pansel MA Dikritik’ [Not Passing Ahmad Fadlil, the Selection Committee of the 
Supreme Court was criticised], Hukum Online (online), 3 December 2014 <http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/ 
baca/lt547f267df25f2/tak-loloskan-ahmad-fadlil--pansel-ma-dikritik>.  
541 Fritz Edward Siregar, ‘Hakim Konstitusi dari Merdeka Utara [Constitutional Justices from North Merdeka]’ (15 
December 2014) <http://www.fritzsiregar.com/hakim-dari-merdeka-utara>. 
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legal opinions made by the incumbent candidates in their Constitutional Court decisions. Nonetheless, 
it does not mean that all incumbent constitutional justices would be automatically reselected. If the 
assessment result is not satisfactory, then their tenure does not need to be extended. The Selection 
Committee then can begin looking for new constitutional justice candidates. This suggestion is a form 
of mechanism compromising between the interests of the Selection Committee and issues of ethics 
for the Chief Justice or constitutional justices who will be assessed for their second term. However, 
this mechanism should be regulated by revising the Constitutional Court Law or by developing an 
internal regulation in each nominating institution. 
Nevertheless, the best improvement is not exactly related to the mechanism and procedures for 
reselecting incumbent constitutional justices. Reforms should relate to the tenure of constitutional 
justices, set up as a five-year term and able to be renewed for another term. One reason to limit a term 
to five-years is to adjust to the five-year political cycle of presidential and legislative elections. This 
system exists because constitutional justices are considered political representatives of their 
nominating institutions. Therefore, if the performance of a constitutional justice is not in accordance 
with the interests of the proposing institution, they will not be reselected. This means that 
constitutional justices are vulnerable to the interventions of proposing institutions seeking to secure 
their own interests. Therefore, the provision concerning a constitutional justice’s tenure should be 
revised for once and not renewed. However, ideally, tenure has to be longer than five years. There 
are several supporting arguments for revising tenure.  
First, the impending expiration of tenure can potentially undermine independence of constitutional 
justices since, to be reselected, they may be propelled to make decisions deemed more acceptable and 
in line with the interests of proposing institutions. Second, the presence of periodisation has clearly 
caused problems for constitutional justices who uphold their ethics. Therefore, removal of 
periodisation would make the constitutional justice selection process easier. 
Third, a five-year period is too short for a new constitutional justice who has important complex 
constitutional cases. In addition, it takes time for a new constitutional justice to adapt to handling and 
formulating decisions rationally and accountably. Fourth, the tenure of constitutional justices should 
not last a lifetime, but restricted to a limited time and retirement age. Therefore, this system would 
be in line with the principles of the Constitution as a living organism, where the perspectives and 
thoughts of constitutional justices in interpreting the Constitution need to develop.  
Fifth, the five-year term created by the Indonesian Constitutional Court is one of the shortest 
constitutional justice’s tenure in the world. Consequently, it is vulnerable to intervention from the 
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changing political cycle. In this case, I suggest that the tenure of constitutional justices should be nine 
to twelve years and non-renewable. 
Table 2 
Comparison on the Tenure of Constitutional Court Justice  
COUNTRY INSTITUTIONS TENURE 
NON-
RENEWABLE 
RENEWABLE 
Austria 
Constitutional 
Court 
Lifetime - - 
Belgium 
Constitutional 
Court 
Lifetime - - 
Germany 
Federal 
Constitutional 
Court 
12 years √  
Russia 
Constitutional 
Court 
12 years √  
South Africa 
Constitutional 
Court 
12 years √  
Turkey 
Constitutional 
Court 
12 years √ 
 
 
 
Czech Republic 
Constitutional 
Court 
10 years  √ 
Bulgaria 
Constitutional 
Council 
9 years √  
France 
Constitutional 
Council 
9 years √  
Italy 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Lithuania 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Morocco 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Poland 
Constitutional 
Tribunal 
9 years √  
Portugal 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Romania 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Spain 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Thailand 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Ukraine 
Constitutional 
Court 
9 years √  
Colombia 
Constitutional 
Court 
8 years √  
Croatia 
Constitutional 
Court 
8 years √  
Mongolia 
Constitutional 
Court 
6 years  √ 
South Korea 
Constitutional 
Court 
6 years  √ 
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Lastly, the tenure of the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, which are only two and a half 
years, should also be revised. The current system proved problematic during the leadership transition 
from Chief Justice Asshiddiqie to Chief Justice Mahfud MD, which led to the resignation of 
Asshiddiqie as a constitutional justice. 542 Therefore, the tenure of the Chief Justice and the Deputy 
Chief Justice should conclude at the end of his or her tenure as a constitutional justice. Thus, there 
would be no internal conflicts between constitutional justices wanting to compete for the position of 
the Chief Justice or the Deputy of Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court. Moreover, the position 
of the Chief Justice is a noble position, a symbol of Court leadership and court management. 
Therefore, it should not be frequently rotated among constitutional justices. 
III   CONCLUSION 
After twelve years since its establishment, the Indonesian Constitutional Court still faces many 
institutional challenges. The discussion in this chapter reveals that many decisions of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court were not enforced by the President, the DPR, the Supreme Court, ordinary 
courts, law enforcement officers or state officials. Such is not only caused by ignorance on the part 
of public authorities and state officials, but is also a deliberate act to not comply with the 
Constitutional Court decisions. 
Given that the Court does not have a power to force its decision, the implementation of Court 
decisions is highly dependent on public authorities and state officials’ awareness levels. Therefore, it 
is still necessary to strengthen public awareness of the constitution, together with academics, the press 
and civil societies in Indonesia. These three elements have proven to be the main keys, not only for 
monitoring the Court’s performance, but also for forcing public authorities and state officials to 
implement the Constitutional Court decisions properly. 
Another challenge faced by the Indonesian Constitutional Court relates to the recruitment system for 
selecting constitutional justices. There had been inconsistency in determining selection mechanism 
as each proposing institution lacked specific and permanent procedures to select constitutional 
justices. Moreover, criticism of the selection mechanism of constitutional justices often arose because 
                                               
542 Jimly Asshiddiqie decided to resign from his position as a Constitutional Justice just one month after he was reselected 
for the second term (2008-2013). Asshiddiqie reasoned that he had completed his duty to establish the Constitutional 
Court during its first five years. Nevertheless, a strong argument is that Asshiddiqie’s resignation was due to him not 
being reselected as the Chief Justice. In close voting among the Constitutional Justices, Asshiddiqie was defeated by his 
colleague Mahfud MD, 5:4 votes. In addition, Asshiddiqie’s resignation was also taken to avoid the emergence of 
leadership disharmony in the Constitutional Court. 
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the recruitment processes were deemed not transparent, participatory, objective or accountable, as 
required by the Constitutional Court Law principles. The state institutions possessing powers to select 
constitutional justices are the President, the DPR, and the Supreme Court; and implementation of the 
principles is mandatory through creation of independent, intervention free Selection Committee. 
Alternatively, the proposing state institutions can cooperate with the Judicial Commission to 
nominate the best candidates for constitutional justices.  
Furthermore, the reselection mechanism of the incumbent Chief Justice or the constitutional justices 
for their second term created problems because it was done differently across the proposing state 
institutions. In resolving this problem, the tenure of constitutional justices should be revised. 
Currently, the Constitutional Court Justices hold a position for five years and their tenure may be 
renewed for one term only. In my view, the constitutional justices should serve for one term only for 
a period of nine to twelve years. This means the constitutional justices will have a longer tenure, yet 
it is non-renewable. This improvement aims to strengthen the independence of constitutional justices 
so they will not be dependent upon the proposing state institution when making decisions. The term 
of the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, which is only two and a half years, should also be 
revised. Ideally, their term should end at the completion of his or her tenure as a constitutional justice. 
Moreover, the position for the Chief Justice should not be alternately chaired because of possible 
internal conflicts being caused. 
***
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CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the Indonesian Constitutional Court performance over the past twelve years. 
This final chapter concludes this discussion by determining how the Court contributes to and plays a 
strategic role in securing constitutional government in Indonesia. This chapter also answers the main 
research questions of this thesis regarding: (1) theoretical and practical reasons for establishing the 
Constitutional Court in Indonesia; (2) analysis of key decisions of the Court measured against the 
core values and principles of constitutional government and its consequences; and (3) controversies 
and challenges faced by the Court in accomplishing its missions. At the end of this chapter, I offer 
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the Court in strengthening the constitutional 
government system in Indonesia. 
I   POLITICAL AND PRACTICAL REASONS 
Indonesia experienced significant changes to the constitutional and political systems after the fall of 
Soeharto’s authoritarian regime in 1998. Constitutional reform was carried out in order to rearrange 
the fundamental principles of constitutional government through four stages, from 1999 to 2002. 
Necessary strategies to promote and protect constitutional government are: (1) separation of powers; 
(2) protections of fundamental rights and freedoms; and (3) representative democracy. In order to 
ensure proper functioning and non-violation of these principles, the framers of the amended 
Constitution in the MPR established the Constitutional Court, intended to uphold constitutional 
values, particularly through constitutional review of laws.  
In Chapter 2, I discussed the processes and debates surrounding the constitutional amendment to 
establish the Constitutional Court in Indonesia. In the beginning, framers debated whether a 
Constitutional Court should be established separate from the Supreme Court, known as the European 
or centralised model; or Supreme Court should be given additional powers, categorised as the 
American or decentralised model; or a special court should be created under the Supreme Court. 
However, the Supreme Court indirectly refused to be given additional powers as there were tens of 
thousands of case backlogs. In addition, constitutional experts and civil societies urged that the 
Constitutional Court should be formed separately and should not be a subordinate to the Supreme 
Court.  
After a long debate, the MPR finally agreed to establish the Constitutional Court as a court separate 
from the Supreme Court. The main trigger for this decision was the impeachment of President 
Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000. This political event motivated the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
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Struggle (PDI-P), the largest party in the MPR, to provide the Constitutional Court with impeachment 
power. The reason is that the PDI-P wanted to prevent Megawati Soekarnoputri, the Chairwoman of 
the PDI-P, who became the President (2001-2004), being impeached solely for political reason - as 
suffered by her predecessor President Abdurrahman Wahid. Thus, the Indonesian Constitutional 
Court was also established to ensure that impeachment of the President and/or the Vice President is 
only possible for legal and constitutional reasons. 
Therefore, I concluded that the adoption of the centralised model or the European model of 
constitutional review, in Indonesia, was based on political and practical reasons, rather than 
theoretical opinions. In other words, the decision was made on political expediency without a serious 
theoretical inquiry. In addition to pressure from academics and civil society, the Supreme Court’s 
refusal to take on additional powers, especially related to judicial review, became an important 
consideration for the MPR in creating the Constitutional Court as an independent and separate judicial 
institution from the Supreme Court. There is no convincing evidence that the MPR conducted an in-
depth academic study before choosing the European model for establishing the Constitutional Court. 
For example, constitutional amendment process did not involve discussions comparing advantages 
or disadvantages of the centralised or decentralised models. Moreover, no theoretical consideration 
was given as to whether the civil law system adopted in Indonesia would correspond with the 
centralised system of review. Moreover, the MPR did not discuss the intention to avoid and remove 
the burden of past, where the authoritarian regime often intervened in judiciary decisions, through the 
establishment of a new and separate Constitutional Court. 
In contrast, I found that the political interests of different factions in the MPR dominated 
Constitutional Court establishment considerations, including in defining jurisdictional limits. For 
instance, the MPR majority factions’ motivation in attempting to establish a weak Constitutional 
Court, subordinate to the Supreme Court, was to suppress the Court’s ability to examine laws, 
decisions and actions that violated human rights and freedoms during the New Order regime. In this 
context, the framers finally created a separation of jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of laws 
in the Constitutional Court, while the legality of regulations and decisions have to be reviewed in the 
Supreme Court. In addition, the DPR later created Article 50 of the Constitutional Court Law 
prohibiting the Court to examine the constitutionality of laws enacted prior to the first constitutional 
amendment in 1999. The Court annulled this provision in 2004. 
Moreover, the inclusion of impeachment powers and the acceleration of the Constitutional Court 
establishment, for the benefit of certain factions in the MPR, provides evidence that political interests 
dominated the establishment process. Moreover, several important suggestions given by the Expert 
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Team and the Constitutional Commission, consisting of experts and academics, were also denied by 
the MPR. This rejection demonstrates lack of philosophical and academic understanding in the 
creation of the Constitutional Court, particularly in establishing an integral system of constitutional 
adjudication, which potentially pose serious problems. 
In the end, the Constitutional Court was granted five constitutional jurisdictions under Article 24C of 
the Constitution: (1) to review constitutionality of laws; (2) to settle disputes regarding the authority 
of state institutions whose authority is given by the Constitution; (3) to dissolve political parties; (4) 
to resolve disputes concerning the results of general elections; and (5) to decide on the opinion of the 
DPR concerning alleged Constitutional violations by the President and/or the Vice-President, known 
as the impeachment of the President and/or the Vice-President. 
II   ASSESMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT’S PERFORMANCE 
With the five jurisdictions, the Indonesian Constitution has given the Constitutional Court the 
important mission of securing the constitutional government system in Indonesia. Although the 
Constitutional Court establishment was based on more political expediency, the Constitutional Court 
has become the most influential institution in maintaining the implementation of constitutional 
government elements through its decisions, namely: (1) separation of powers; (2) representative 
democracy; and (3) protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. This thesis has analysed various 
landmark decisions of the Constitutional Court, all significantly impacting these elements. 
A   Contributions of the Constitutional Court 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the Constitutional Court played a pivotal role in strengthening the 
separation of powers and the presidential system in Indonesia by resolving disputes between state 
institutions and reviewing constitutionality of laws. The Court has mediated various conflicts between 
the executive, the legislative and the judiciary concerning constitutional powers. Moreover, the Court 
has affirmed legitimate constitutional powers of each state institution, to ensure immediate resolution 
of conflicts and ability of each state institution to exercise their powers in accordance with the 
Constitution.  
Through its decisions, the Constitutional Court also made fundamental changes to the powers of state 
institutions in order to support checks and balances. For instance, the Court limited the DPR’s powers 
in selecting high state officials and exercising its budgetary function, yet it strengthened the DPR’s 
monitoring function of the President, including his or her important economic policies. The Court 
also strengthened the DPD’s power in legislation, considered weak compared to the DPR’s powers. 
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In order to prevent abuse of power by the President, the Court has imposed limitations and 
requirements concerning ‘emergency circumstances’ when declaring an Interim Emergency Law 
(Perppu).  
In the context of the separation of powers, the Constitutional Court made controversial decisions in 
several cases related directly to its powers, particularly in annulling provisions governing Judicial 
Commission’s supervision of Constitutional Court Justices. The Court reasoned that supervision from 
the Judicial Commission, as an auxiliary state organ, would interfere with the independence of the 
Court. In this case, the Court’s decision to shut down the Judicial Commission’s supervisory access 
to the Constitutional Court represents a conservative approach in understanding the concept of 
separation of powers. In my view, the Court should cooperate with the Judicial Commission to 
establish a credible and trusted court in the reform era, not only based on independence, but also on 
its accountability. 
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court has strengthened representative democracy system in 
Indonesia. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Court’s role in guarding democratic transition and 
consolidation, from an authoritarian regime to a democratic regime, is very crucial. The Court has 
become an important institution in determining the direction and quality of democracy in Indonesia 
through its constitutional review and electoral dispute decisions. The Court also serves as a special 
channel for candidates in expressing and lessening emotional and political frustrations, as well as 
those of their supporters, when defeated in elections. At the time of this writing, the Court has resolved 
more than 2,575 electoral disputes, with decisions relatively accepted and respected by all parties, 
including decisions on presidential and regional head election disputes where tensions and political 
conflict run high. As the result, a stronger foundation for the formation of political legitimacy and 
stability of elected government has come into effect. Thus, this important contribution has nourished 
democracy in Indonesia, both at the national and local levels. 
Moreover, the Court contributed to the simplification of the political party system and strengthened 
independence of the general election organisers. The Court also criticised legislators in several 
decisions for lacking consistency in making and implementing election-related policies, such as 
electoral threshold, parliamentary threshold and requirements for political parties to participate in the 
election, all of which tend to change in every election.  
Although considered successful in guarding the democratic leadership regeneration process at the 
local level, the Constitutional Court has eliminated its own power to resolve regional head electoral 
disputes. The Court reasoned that such power is not in accordance with its constitutional mandate and 
has led to unfocused handling of constitutional review cases, which constitutes its main obligation. 
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In my view, although the decision is good for the Court in the long term, it lacks accountability 
because this constitutional interpretation is clearly different from the Court’s previous decision. As I 
finish writing this thesis, the DPR still grants power to the Constitutional Court to handle regional 
head electoral disputes because no other institution has adequate systems, experience and support. 
In terms of the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, the inclusion of the constitutional bill 
of rights into the amended Constitution in 2000 has strengthened the guarantee of human rights, as 
contained in Chapter XA of the Constitution. However, the Indonesian Constitution provides key 
provisions that may restrict the exercise of rights and freedoms, as mentioned in Article 28J of the 
Constitution. First, the Constitution obligates every person, in exercising their rights and freedoms, 
to respect the human rights of others and to be subject to certain restrictions. Second, any rights and 
freedoms can be restricted in order to protect the rights and freedoms of others based on moral 
considerations, religious values, security and public order. The ‘difference paradigm’ concerning 
moral and religious values means that the Indonesian Constitution has a different character and 
perspective compared to other countries. Consequently, restrictions become crux of the matter in each 
case examined by the Constitutional Court with regards to violations of fundamental rights and 
freedoms of citizens.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, the Constitutional Court’s decisions have contributed in protecting 
fundamental rights and freedoms in Indonesia. For instance, the Court affirmed the protection of 
freedom of assembly and association as well as the freedoms of speech, expression and opinion by 
revoking various provisions contrary to the Constitution. The Court also provides protection for other 
fundamental rights and freedoms not listed in the Constitution, such as due process of law and rights 
to a fair trial. However, there are some rights considered less protected by the Constitutional Court, 
in particular, freedom of speech, the right to life and freedom of religion. 
Based on the analysis of landmark decisions, I found that the Constitutional Court made assertive 
decisions by invalidating provisions related to the restriction of freedoms of speech and opinion 
aiming to prevent criticism against the government. However, if there are conflicts of rights among 
citizens, the Court made compromises in maintaining the harmony and balance between the 
reputation and the freedom of citizens. The Court did not annul decisions, but merely provided an 
interpretation of conditionally constitutional or unconstitutional. Moreover, I have showed that the 
Court’s interpretation regarding the restriction of the right to life is inconsistent. The Court did not 
employ the same standards and criteria in determining the most serious crimes in the different 
constitutional review cases involving death penalty. This has led to the Court’s decision being less 
justified.  
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Furthermore, the Constitutional Court also acts as an interpreter in the relationship between state and 
religion and freedom of religion. According to the Court, Indonesia is neither a religion-based state 
nor a secular state. Indonesia is defined as a religious nation state. In consequence, the Court 
interpreted that the freedom of belief could not be restricted or forced (forum internum); yet the 
freedom of religion may be restricted in the relationship with others on religious matters (forum 
externum). In my view, although there is a guarantee of freedom of religion, such interpretation still 
raises concerns that dominant religious groups may impede religious freedom of minorities, 
particularly when law enforcers do not take firm stance against violence committed in the name of 
religion.  
In short, although several decisions still reveal weaknesses in legal reasoning, the Constitutional 
Court has developed constitutional government in Indonesia. The principles and elements of the 
separation of powers, protection of fundamental rights and freedoms as well as representative 
democracy have all improved through the Court’s decisions. Moreover, the Constitutional Court also 
often uses unconventional approaches; consequently, Constitutional Court decisions often spark 
public controversies. 
B   Controversial Decisions, but Generally Accepted 
As I have discussed in Chapter 5, the decisions declared by the Constitutional Court have sometimes 
led to controversy because the Court often created its decision based on judicial activism and often 
acted as a positive legislator. The judicial activism of the Court, in annulling and making ultra petition 
decisions, has sparked outrage from the DPR members. As a result, the DPR revised the 
Constitutional Court Law in 2011 to limit the powers of the Constitutional Court. However, the Court 
thwarted the DPR’s attempt by annulling various provisions considered to weaken and restrict the 
Court’s powers in exercising its constitutional duties. Academics and the public supported this 
decision because weakening of Court’s powers may lead to less protection of fundamental rights and 
freedoms for citizens.  
In addition, the Court’s use of judicial activism can also be seen in many of its decisions, categorised 
as conditionally constitutional or conditionally unconstitutional. This means that the provision under 
review is constitutional or unconstitutional if the implementation of the provision is in accordance 
with the framework and guidelines set out by the Court decisions. Moreover, the Court has left the 
classical doctrine introduced by Hans Kelsen stating that the Court as a negative legislator can only 
overturn laws. In practice, the Indonesian Constitutional Court often functions as a de facto positive 
legislator by creating new norms or regulations and intervening in government policies in politics and 
economics. 
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Although controversial, the judicial activism of the Court and its role as a positive legislator remain 
generally acceptable by the public, as long as decisions made by the Court protects the constitutional 
rights of citizens and the principles of democracy. In the Indonesian context, judicial activism can 
strengthen and consolidate democracy. Therefore, I believe that judicial activism should be allowed 
in certain circumstances, such as to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, both 
stated and not stated in the constitution, to better protect minority groups impacted negatively by 
decisions based on a majority approach, to restore the rights of citizens who have been injured and to 
make adjustments in protecting global justice. However, the Constitutional Court received sharp 
criticism for performing judicial activism or acting as a positive legislator when decisions lack 
sufficient rationality and justifications lack legal reasons. Also, I found that, over the past years, the 
Constitutional Court has lacked consistency in applying judicial activism in their decision making 
practices. 
III   PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES 
The Constitutional Court’s role in strengthening constitutional government in Indonesia is very 
important, but the Court has encountered several problems impeding its ability to safeguard the 
Constitution. In Chapter 6, I discussed the problems related to jurisdictional limitation and non-
judicial functions of the Constitutional Court, as follows.  
First, the Constitutional Court does not have constitutional complaint jurisdiction, therefore the Court 
is not authorised to examine any cases relating to decisions or actions made by state officials of public 
authorities accused of violating the Constitution. In contrast, constitutional complaint constitutes the 
primary jurisdiction of constitutional courts in many countries. The constitutional adjudication system 
in Indonesia is in need of such mechanism. However, if this jurisdiction is to be adopted in Indonesia, 
the Constitutional Court first has to strengthen its institutional structure and create limitations for 
constitutional complaint cases to anticipate thousands of expected cases per year, as observed in the 
experiences of other constitutional courts. 
Second, the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia should adopt a constitutional question 
jurisdiction, a mechanism for ordinary judges to review the constitutionality of laws or regulation in 
the Constitutional Court. In this context, if the judges of ordinary courts have doubts about 
constitutionality of laws and regulations bearing on case determination, they can refer the 
constitutional question to the Constitutional Court. The absence of this mechanism has led judges in 
ordinary courts to overlook grounds of constitutionality. Therefore, with this authority, the ordinary 
judges will also have a role and responsibility to make sure all laws and regulations are constitutional. 
Thus, the key difference between this modified decentralised system and the system prevailing in the 
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United States and Australia is that the constitutional issue will be resolved with finality by the 
specialised Constitutional Court rather than by the general Supreme Court. However, if this 
jurisdiction is to be incorporated in the constitutional adjudication system in Indonesia, the time limit 
for the Constitutional Court in deciding a constitutional question case should be regulated. This is to 
prevent lengthy delays affecting ordinary courts in making final decisions, as delays have been 
observed in some European countries such as Germany, Italy and Spain. 
Three, the judicial review system dualism in Indonesia, where the Constitutional Court is only granted 
a power to review the constitutionality of laws, while the Supreme Court with that to review the 
legality of regulations against laws, has caused several fundamental problems: (1) there is no 
mechanism to review the constitutionality of regulations or decisions; (2) it will potentially create 
inconsistent interpretations between the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court concerning laws 
and corresponding implementing regulations; and (3) the new hierarchy of laws and regulations in 
Indonesia has placed the constitutionality of MPR decisions beyond review by any judicial institution. 
Therefore, the system of constitutional review for all laws, regulations and decisions should be 
integrated under a one-roof under Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction. 
Fourth, with its limited jurisdiction, the Constitutional Court seeks to strengthen its institution by 
performing various non-judicial functions and activities outside the courtroom. It aims to heighten 
public awareness regarding the Pancasila, the Constitution and the constitutional rights of citizens. 
This role is carried out by implementing a variety of programs and activities in cooperation with 
various stakeholders, such as universities, state institutions and ministries, law enforcement 
institutions, election organisers, political parties, NGOs, foundations, civil societies and international 
organisations. Although non-judicial functions should be the responsibility of the executive branch, 
the non-judicial functions performed by the Constitutional Court are surprisingly well accepted by 
state officials and much of the public. As the result, the Court has shaped its image and built public 
trust through friends of the court: the press, civil societies and academics.  
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court should gradually reduce its non-judicial functions since the 
numbers of cases continues to increase, and, particularly, when constitutional complaint becomes an 
additional power of the Court. Another reason is that the non-judicial function encompassing public 
education may compel the Court to particular positions on contested issues. This can result in real or 
apprehended bias when such issues come before the Court. Consequently, in the longer term, this 
function may undermine public confidence in the Constitutional Court and hence its moral and 
political authority. This is the reason that in countries like Australia, judges show restraint in publicly 
expressing views on divisive issues that may present themselves in litigation before them. 
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Furthermore, as I discussed in Chapter 7, the Indonesian Constitutional Court is also experiencing 
several institutional challenges, namely the implementation of the Constitutional Court decisions, the 
selection mechanism of the Constitutional Court Justices and the tenure of the Constitutional Justices.  
First, I found that some authorities did not comply with many of the Constitutional Court decisions; 
the list includes the President, the DPR, the Supreme Court, law enforcement officers, state officials 
and other ordinary courts. This occurred for several reasons: (1) the legal culture to comply with 
Court decisions remains weak; (2) there is a lack of outreach and awareness of the Court decisions; 
(3) legal reasons and rationality of the Court decisions are unclear; (4) deliberate attempts to go 
against Court decisions through the making of new provisions in a regulation, in the hope they are 
not reviewed by the Court; and (5) non-compliance take the form of political punishment by other 
state institutions. Given that the Court does not have any power to enforce its decisions, and 
implementation of the Court decisions is particularly dependent on state officials and public 
authorities’ awareness; the role of the press and civil societies, particularly academics, is critical in 
supervising, ensuring and putting pressure on related parties to implement the Court’s decisions. I 
believe this is the main reason why the Indonesian Constitutional Court is serious about strengthening 
and expanding relationship with academics, the press and civil societies through its non-judicial 
functions, as explained above. Moreover, the government and the DPR have to work together in 
compiling the Court’s laws changing decisions. The compilation should be continually updated and 
freely accessible to state officials and the public.  
Second, the system for nominating constitutional justices, who are selected by the President, the DPR 
and the Supreme Court, can still be maintained because it provides support and political legitimacy 
to the elected constitutional justices. However, inconsistent mechanisms and procedures for selecting 
constitutional justices have caused serious problems. Each branch of government should apply equal 
standards for selection mechanisms and procedures. Moreover, the selection processes were 
considered to be lacking in transparency, participation, objectivity and accountability, as required by 
the Constitutional Court Law principles. Therefore, the proposing state institutions have to develop 
specific and permanent procedures to fulfil the required selection principles for constitutional justice 
candidates. Moreover, an independent selection committee should be created or a formal cooperation 
should be fostered with the Judicial Commission for selection purposes.  
Third, the tenure of the constitutional justices, which is five years, can only be renewed for one term, 
and this should be revised. Based on the Court experience of the selection process, this provision has 
resulted in incumbent Chief Justice and the constitutional justices experiencing differential treatment 
when seeking a second term. Therefore, the tenure of the constitutional justices should be revised by 
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increasing it for a period of nine to twelve years, without an additional term. This revision potentially 
solves ethical issues for candidates and strengthens independence of the selected constitutional 
justices from the proposing state institutions. Moreover, the two and a half year term of the Chief 
Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice also needs to be revised. To avoid internal conflicts and to create 
continuity of leadership, the terms of the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice should continue 
until the completion of the constitutional justice’s tenure. 
IV   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court, initiated by Constitutional amendment, has been 
tremendously important for the development of the Indonesian constitutional system. This thesis has 
demonstrated the role of the Constitutional Court in securing a constitutional government in 
Indonesia. With its limited jurisdiction, the Court has made significant contributions to strengthening 
the constitutional government system. In spite of controversy over its performance, the Court has 
turned the Indonesian Constitution into a living organism that is present and is evolving in everyday 
life. 
However, the Indonesian Constitutional Court is still far from being a perfect system. There are many 
improvements that should be undertaken, particularly regarding the quality and consistency of its 
decisions, expansion of constitutional jurisdiction and institutional strengthening. Nevertheless, while 
reforms are necessary, the Court should be very cautious about moving to enhance its authority vis-
à-vis the legislature and the executive because it would almost certainly provoke further political 
retaliation and renewed attempts to undermine the Court. Therefore, the Court will need to move with 
great political skills to securing wins.  
Furthermore, the experiences of other constitutional courts indicate that the Court can be forceful, 
and has provided significant contribution in the early years of its establishment, but may suffer from 
poor performance when entering a second decade. The main challenge for the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court, after Akil Moctar’s case, is to maintain independence of the Court. Public trust 
must also be restored so that the Court can handle constitutional cases in professional and credible 
manner. 
Finally, this thesis concludes that the Constitutional Court will remain one of the key players in 
determining the direction and development of constitutional government system in Indonesia, in 
particular with the separation of powers, the fulfilment of fundamental rights and freedom of citizens 
and democratic principles.  
***
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